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Foreword 
Howard Bucknell has set himself a formidable task: to provide, in brief 
compass, a more comprehensive framework for understanding and ac-
tion with respect to this nation's unprecedented energy situation and its 
attendant policy problems. The result we frequently call an exercise in 
policy analysis, but it is also an exemplar of synthesis-the effort to 
combine relevant factors so as to form a whole that is more than the sum 
of its parts. 
Energy and the National Defense, written in a style that is largely 
free of arcane words and phrases, gives us an overview of an extensive 
terrain: availability of different forms and sources of energy, alterna-
tives to heavy reliance on oil and natural gas, the inseparability of 
political and economic factors during a period of unprecedented transi-
tion in the nation's energy position, value conflicts that affect hard 
choices (e.g. , the tension between energy conservation and economic 
growth), the unavoidable interlocking of domestic policy and foreign 
policy, salient worldwide ramifications of the energy problem (includ-
ing global interdependence and political alignments), the consequences 
of policy failures for the prospects of war and peace, and the energy 
problem as a litmus paper test of the way the U.S. national policy-
making system functions (or does not function) at this time in our 
history. 
Certain attributes of this work may serve to differentiate it from 
many of the books, articles, and reports that the energy crisis has called 
forth in great number. 
First, Dr. Bucknell has presented a very well documented outline of 
how this nation's energy situation and its attendant problems appear 
when several different, but equally pertinent, perspectives are brought 
to bear. This amounts to recognition that, like so many other crucial 
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problems of public policy, the context of this one is multidimensional. 
To convey this kind of understanding in a single volume is, of course, 
fraught with difficulties too familiar to require enumeration here. How-
ever, to characterize the result as a syllabus, as a cogent summary 
containing the main points of what amounts to a course of study, is 
perhaps one way to highlight the nature of the author's contribution as a 
beginning, not as a final destination; as a larger, though still pro-
visional, map to be extended and enriched by additional details. 
Second, it is necessary for fruitful public debate of critical issues to 
have writings that set forth an argument or a thesis, that encourage 
advocacy and rebuttal, and that are prepared by specialists for reaction 
by other specialists. It is also necessary to be exposed to materials that 
provoke thought and elicit the reader's response to stubborn facts, di-
lemmas, and paradoxes. This book can be used to further the cause of 
enlightenment. Its contents portend more than mere acceptance or rejec-
tion by the reader. 
If more questions are raised than are answered, it is not because the 
author is uninterested or because diagnosis is often easier than prescrip-
tion. Dr. Bucknell intends his framework to save a dual purpose: to 
justify our confronting certain factors and choices that all too rarely play 
a prominent role in public discourse surrounding the energy problem; 
and to suggest a context within which answers may be pursued and 
correlated. 
Third, certain themes constitute focal accents in a fabric of analysis 
woven across chapters dealing with complex aspects of the energy prob-
lem. Among those that seem worthy of careful scrutiny and further 
exploration are: a set of uncertainties interrelated in such fashion that 
each apparently fuels the potential dangers of the others; the adequacy 
or inadequacy of the knowledge and information base underlying dis-
cussion and decision (including discrepant perceptions and factual 
judgements distributed unevenly among participants in the policy pro-
cess); and the pervasive effects of time, the pressures generated by the 
disjunction between different sequences of events-for example, 
exhaustion or interruption of certain sources of key fuels versus how 
long it will take to generate viable alternative sources or types of 
energy. 
The usefulness of these thematic emphases is not that they refer to 
unfamiliar phenomena and problems. Rather, readers of Energy and the 
National Defense are offered convenient pegs on which to hang applica-
tions of available tools and techniques of analysis not specific to the 
energy policy problem per se. Thus the theories and models of 
decision-making, of forecasting, of risk and risk-taking, and of knowl-
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edge utilization in policy arenas-to name only a few-are germane to 
any attempt to gain intellectual control over the exigencies of the situa-
tion. 
Fourth, a natural extension of the foregoing themes into an overarch-
ing concern is made possible by the author's overt attention to the 
essential connection between process factors and policy outcomes. Dr. 
Bucknell underscores the crucial importance of inquiring into how our 
total institutional machinery for collective problem-solving functions or 
malfunctions. Energy policy, by itself,· is complicated enough, but 
equally so are the interlocked structures and processes from which 
policies and actions emerge. And, as he rightly suggests, further serious 
complications arise from the U.S. commitment to democratic proce-
dures. 
One advantage of focusing attention on problem-solving and 
policy-making is that we can ask how the energy crisis might become an 
occasion for using existing knowledge of process to either improve it, or 
to appraise how it is working in this case. 
The Policy Sciences, as originally conceived and over the years 
extended and elaborated by Harold Lasswell and others, may furnish 
useful suggestions for capitalizing on the problem-solving dimension of 
the nation's energy policy challenge. A policy sciences orientation re-
minds us that there are two interrelated facets of interest: the role of 
knowledge in the policy-making process; and the role of knowledge of 
the policy-making process. The former refers to the amount and quality 
of intelligence available to policymakers or problem-solvers. The latter 
refers to the improvement of the policy-making-process by means of 
applying knowledge concerning that process to the identication of more 
effective procedures. 
Dr. Bucknell's contribution is, of course, an addition to the stock of 
intelligence available to participants in the policy process. However, its 
substantive content regarding the energy problem can also be coded 
according to the five intellectual tasks of problem-solving (which is just 
one of the categorical schemes included in the Policy Science's reper-
toire): (1) goal clarification; (2) trend description; (3) analysis of condi-
tions; (4) projection of developments; and (5) invention, evaluation, and 
selection of alternatives. 
Where does the United States presently stand with respect to each of 
these tasks in the field of energy policy? Does the prevailing division of 
labor among branches of government and among public and private 
agencies facilitate or hinder the adequate and simultaneous performance 
of the five tasks and why? 
This book can and should be read with these queries in mind. 
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Clearly, the energy situation and its policy requirements represent an 
enormous challenge. Vested interests, widespread confusion, strong 
inertial forces, and underlying fears obviously run counter to sober 
judgment, holistic thinking, and fresh perspectives. Faith in democratic 
problem-solving is not at a high-water mark. 
On the other hand, perhaps we should consider the possibility that 
the very magnitude of our prevailing difficulties may, slowly, be creat-
ing conditions more favorable to social learning, by which we simply 
mean some noticeable change in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors as a 
result of painful or costly experiences. We know that such learning does 
take place. 
Changes in the general climate may also make it possible for 
strategic ideas and modes of analysis to gain more visible currency in 
the public domain. But unless this kind of readiness is matched by the 
preparation and diffusion of thoughtful exercises in policy clarification, 
substantial progress will be delayed. 
Therefore we would hope that Energy and the National Defense will 
be found worthwhile reading by knowledgeable officials and pol-
icymakers, not because the material is necessarily new, but because 
it is a cogent reminder of how inescapable linkages between facets of 
the energy problem often transcend the different sets of responsibilities 
and concerns that result from a division of labor among governmental 
jurisdictions and agencies. We would hope too, that experts-re-
searchers and policy advisers in both public and private sectors--on 
one or another aspect of the energy problem might be reminded of the 
great importance of the interface of specialized competencies: how these 
viewpoints are to be assessed, articulated, or reconciled by those who 
make and are deeply affected by crucial decisions. 
Finally, we would hope that those who are still pursuing their formal 
education, those who are citizen participants in the policy process, and 
those who are or may be opinion leaders, will find an understandable 
overview of the many pieces of a policy puzzle that often are scattered 
and fugitive from the standpoint of any single individual. 
RICHARD C. SNYDER 
Preface 
This book concerns the American energy situation in its political, so-
cial, economic, and military ramifications. For this reason it deals with 
international as well as domestic issues. Its treatment of the interna-
tional energy equation, however, is sketchy indeed compared to the 
discussion given by Melvin A. Conant in his Access to Energy: 2000 
and After (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979). And again 
unlike the Conant book and the other major energy inquiries published 
in 1979, this book does not deal directly with the turn of the twenty-first 
century. The emphasis of this book is on the present decade-on what is 
happening to America in the immediate future, in the next ten years. 
These years will shape the next century. 
While the book deals with the American energy posture, it need not 
be thought that this posture and what it portends are devoid of interest to 
the rest of the world. The democracy of ancient Greece was founded 
upon slave labor. For many reasons it may be posited that the democ-
racy of the United States has evolved and is now supported in a similar 
manner by cheap and plentiful energy. What happens now to democracy 
in the United States because of energy questions is of transcendent 
importance to the world at large. As Thomas Jefferson wrote from 
Monticello in his letter of 5 May 1811 to John Hollins, Esq.: "The eyes 
of the virtuous all over the world are turned with anxiety on us. As the 
only depositories of the sacred fire of liberty and that our falling into 
anarchy would decide forever the destinies of mankind, and seal the 
political heresy that man is incapable of self-government." 
The ability of the United States to defend its vital interests abroad 
while preserving its most cherished liberties at home will be severely 
challenged during this decade by the uncertainties of the energy ques-
tion. Energy thus probably poses the most serious and far-reaching 
challenge faced by our nation since the Civil War. 
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The academic reader will note that many of the book's citations are 
from the "gray literature" of government reports, opinion-making jour-
nals, and the press. Although considerable effort has been expended to 
verify data by use of more learned sources and to consult sources subject 
to peer review, in the final analysis the focus of the book's citations is 
defended on the grounds that it reflects most closely the information on 
which the informed public and the government leadership are operating. 
It is hoped that the book highlights discrepancies between this informa-
tion and "reality." Where discrepant views of a situation exist, the 
popular view, rightly or wrongly, is seized upon by our leaders for 
policy formulation. Uncertainty supports preconceived notions to the 
extent sometimes of enhancing wishful thinking. 
The conclusions of this book coincide in many respects with those of 
the report of the National Research Council Committee on Nuclear and 
Alternative Energy Systems, January 1980. Its conclusions about our 
energy status are similar to our own: conservation of energy should be 
given first priority, but vigorous efforts to develop synthetic liquid fuels 
are also essential during this decade. In other words, these paths are 
probably complementary and are not profitably debated in adversary 
fashion. The cost of our great transition away from heavy dependence 
upon imported petroleum will be much greater than heretofore ap-
preciated. Considerable strategic and economic debate will also result 
concerning imported oil should the heavy oils of Venezuela prove ex-
ploitable on a very large scale. Considerable assistance by the United 
States may be necessary to achieve this-possibly through the agency 
of the new U.S. Synthetic Fuel Corporation. 
Since submission of the manuscript to the publisher a striking piece 
of energy legislation has been passed by the Congress and signed into 
law by the president. The Energy Security Act of 1980 creates the U.S. 
Synthetic Fuel Corporation with a mandate to produce at least 500,000 
barrels per day of crude equivalent by 1987 and at least 2 million barrels 
per day by 1992 from coal, shale, tar sands, and some categories of 
heavy oils. Limited operations abroad within the Western Hemisphere 
are permitted. Alcohol production (for gasohol) is delegated to the 
Departments of Energy and Agriculture-a decision of already ques-
tionable merit. Although it was clearly the intent of Congress to produce 
fuels that would reduce our dependence on oil imports, the language of 
the act actually would permit very extensive production of gaseous 
instead of liquid fuels. Considerable growing pains are in prospect for 
this semipublic corporation. While the evolving act, whose antecedents 
are discussed in chapter 9, passed with a comfortable majority, its 
opponents remain vocal and determined. The associated bill to create an 
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Energy Mobilization Board empowered to smooth away legal and regu-
latory problems now confronting energy resource development was de-
feated. It may or may not be resurrected. The Synthetic Fuel Corpora-
tion may only limp without it. Since Congress has now prohibited the 
president's fee on imported oil, some form of quota system on imports 
will probably be necessary to force American refineries to accept 
synthetic crudes. Importing oil is a lucrative business in spite of OPEC 
price rises. To many people none of this constitutes much of a problem 
since, also in 1980, Ronald Reagan deprecated the notion that we 
had energy problems, our national demand for oil diminished signifi-
cantly, domestic oil production rose somewhat, and imports were re-
duced by about 2 million barrels per day. A product of the combined 
effects of oil price rises, conservation efforts, recession, and unem-
ployment, this phenomenon has caused people to forget that we are 
uncertain which effect was dominant and that we are equally at sea 
about which effects will persist in our economy. In any case the 
residual daily import of some 6 million barrels of foreign oil per day 
still constitutes a rather tangible threat to our national security whether 
viewed in economic or in military terms. The Energy and National 
Security Act also describes the almost defunct Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve as "a national security asset of paramount importance." 
The president is directed to resume filling it at a rate of at least 
100,000 barrels per day. At this rate the Reserve would reach the 
500-million-barrel level set by Congress in 1975 by about 1995. It 
would not reach the billion barrel level specified by President Carter in 
1977 as essential to national security until sometime in the twenty-first 
century. While we are moving in the direction of treating energy as a 
major security factor, concrete results have yet to materialize. 
On the solar side, while Research Council reports may tend to play 
down the potential role of solar power, the studies undertaken in support 
of this book indicate that a major breakthrough in photoelectric cell 
manufacture is quite probable and could result in a greater decentralized 
solar contribution than is commonly counted on by the physical science 
and business community. This, of course, is in the realm of speculation. 
Ironically enough, such a development would serve in large measure to 
collapse the "hard" path versus "soft" path debate which has been 
somewhat paralyzing in its effect on the development of energy policy. 
But solar energy, even when semantically expanded to include power 
from ocean waves, will not solve all of our problems. 
In this book I place considerable emphasis on the possibility that the 
Soviet Union might attempt to assume de facto control of the Middle 
Eastern oil distribution. As the book developed, it became more and 
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more obvious that this event was well within the range of possibility. 
The Afghanistan invasion may be a move in itself undertaken for politi-
cal reasons or it may simply be the first and easiest of thrusts towards 
the Iranian oil fields and the Strait of Hormuz which controls access to 
the oil-rich Persian Gulf. All of this is rendered even more uncertain by 
the current war between Iraq and Iran, which will probably result in 
world-wide oil price rises and possibly in a shortage by mid-1981 un-
less widespread depression occurs first. Also uncertain is the fate of our 
great military and trade alliance system built up in the aftermath of 
World War II. What would become of NATO should the USSR control the 
oil Europe must have? What prospects confront Japan under the same 
circumstances? Can we prosper in a world where trading partners are 
under the dominion of a hostile power? In any case, would we have the 
requisite fuel? Can we survive and prosper if isolated to the Western 
Hemisphere? 
These questions and many like them require consideration even 
though definitive answers are not yet possible. It is clear, however, that 
energy factors during the 1980s will not only control the direction of 
national policy; they will also determine the basic issues of war and 
peace, prosperity and penury. If we value what we have, it is our 
responsibility not to lose it. But first we must, as a people, recognize the 
inevitability of change so that we can beneficially adapt to unfamiliar 
circumstances. As Tennyson wrote in The Passing of Arthur: 
The old order changeth, yielding place to new; 
And God fulfills Himself in many ways, 
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world. 
HowARD BucKNELL III 
October 1980 
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ENERGY UNIT CONVERSION TABLE 
1 barrel of oil (42 U.S. gallons) - 5.8 X 106 BTU 
1000 cubic feet natural gas _ 1.0 X 106 BTU 
1 ton bituminous coal = 2.5 X 107 BTU 
1 barrel of oil = 5800 cubic feet natural gas (heat content) 
1 ton bituminous coal 
-
25 barrels of oil (heat content) 
1 kilowatt electricity 
-
3.4 X 103 BTU 
1 quad = 1 quadrillion (1 X 1015) BTU 
1 quad/year = 0.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) of oil 
equivalent 
1 quad _ 40 million (40 X 106) tons bituminous coal 
1 quad _ 1 trillion (1 X 10 12 ) cubic feet natural gas 
1 quad _ 100 billion (100 X 109) kilowatt hours (KWH) based 
on a 10,000 BTU/KWH heat rate 
50 metric tons per year = 1 barrel of oil per day 
1 metric ton= 7.4 barrels of oil 
1 cubic meter = 35.3 cubic feet (natural gas conversion) 
Energy and National Security 
National security is at best an ambiguous phrase. It is often used by 
Congress, the president, the courts, or individuals and corporations to 
propose or to justify measures perhaps not otherwise supported by exist-
ing public perceptions. It is used only less loosely than the phrase "in 
the national interest," which has a built-in attraction for the zealot, the 
scoundrel, and the patriot alike. 
Barring clear-cut violations of our national sovereignty, such as the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, there is a strong and doubtless justifiable ten-
dency in our society to dismiss or rationalize most postulated security 
threats, however defined. Nevertheless there are threats to our security 
and some of them derive from energy factors. 
Maxwell D. Taylor put it this way: 
Most Americans have been accustomed to regard national security 
as something having to do with the military defense of the country 
against a military enemy, and this as a responsibility primarily of 
the armed forces .... To remove past ambiguities and recognize 
the widened spectrum of threats to our security, we should recog-
nize that adequate protection in the future must embrace all impor-
tant valuables, tangible or otherwise, in the form of assets, na-
tional interests, or sources of future strength .... An adequate 
national security policy must provide ample protection for the 
foregoing classes of valuables, wherever found, from dangers 
military and non-military, foreign and domestic, utilizing for the 
purpose all appropriate forms of national power. 1 
Charles Hermann takes this a step further. "National security thus 
becomes security with respect to 'value outcomes' desired by those who 
comprise the effective political base of a nation. "2 Hermann goes on to 
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identify five broad aspects of the national security setting that have been 
changing and that will continue to change. These are: 
1. Preferred value outcomes. The values that citizens of the United 
States hold most dear and the priorities assigned to them are not 
static. 
2. International environment. Can the United States be secure when 
there is a severe threat to Japan or Western Europe, whether that 
threat be military or fiscal? 
3. Domestic environment. Resources expended to provide security 
from other threats-for example, external military dangers-reduce 
the resources available to cope with domestic problems. Critical 
tradeoffs are required. 
4. Nature of threats. Constant reappraisal is necessary. Threats such as 
energy-oriented terrorism may arise completely out of the realm of 
previously considered military threats. 
5. Strategies for threat aversion. Shifts in values, environment, 
capabilities, or threats lead to the need for altered strategies for 
threats posed to our security. 
The values we hold most dear shift with the passage of time. The 
arguments have changed in two hundred years, but the elitist percep-
tions of Alexander Hamilton still flourish in our polity as do the more 
populist perceptions of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The fact 
that these varying ideologies, often reflected in the so-called conserva-
tive and liberal literature of our day, have been argued in the main 
peacefully, under conditions of domestic tranquility, is due to our 
adherence to a basic constitution, which, while subject to evolutionary 
change, is nevertheless a bastion of rocklike durability. 
The ability to dispute our idealogies and to adhere to the stability and 
safety of a constitutionally guaranteed process of government is based 
upon our physical security. This physical security comprises the satis-
faction of basic human needs including food, shelter, transportation, 
and the like. It also comprises the security from violent domestic distur-
bances, invasion, or direct attack. Necessarily, in the sense that we are 
also dependent upon the security of various foreign interests, obliga-
tions, and national investment whose relative importance may vary from 
year to year, the security of the international order affects our own 
security. Virtually all of these security elements are affected by our 
energy situation. 
Domestically, the greatest threat posed by the energy situation prob-
ably has to do with economic growth and the redistribution of income. 
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While we do have income transfers, or redistribution of wealth, in our 
social schema, up to the present we have depended largely upon eco-
nomic growth to maintain both the security and the vitality of the large 
middle class. While the relative slice of the pie has been subject to 
struggle and dispute, this has only intermittently given rise to violence 
in our society. The size of the pie always got bigger, so that most people 
got more. While there is considerable debate over the cm:rent and, 
particularly, the future relationship between energy and economic 
growth, in the last three decades a strong if not precise correlation has 
existed between energy-demand growth rate and GNP growth rate. True, 
GNP does not, per se, reflect necessarily benign conditions: automobile 
accidents, for instance, provide a positive input. Nevertheless, lowered 
energy availability and higher relative energy prices-particularly oil 
prices-probably will dictate a change in the nature of our society. It 
need not be taken for granted that this change, which may be quite 
drastic, will be amicably accepted throughout our society. In the short 
term, for example, an inability to provide energy support for a predomi-
nantly industrial economy can result in massive unemployment, in de-
pression, even though a transition to a service economy is perhaps being 
made. Much depends on the rate of change. 
Abroad, the system of alliances which we fashioned in the aftermath 
of World War II is severely threatened by the energy situation. To be 
sure, a number of these alliances are at best encumbrances; but of those 
upon which our economic and military security actually rest, a number 
may be fractured as threats to oil availability become acute in the decade 
ahead. Much of our ability to hold this coalition of nations together 
resulted from our ability and willingness to provide overarching conven-
tional military protection quite apart from our nuclear strategic deter-
rent. Military forces and the production elements of our society neces-
sary to support military efforts are acutely energy-sensitive because of 
the nature of modern warfare. The erosion of our ability to provide this 
umbrella of protection reflects energy factors that may make the world 
alignments of 1990 very different from those we know today. 
If indeed we must undergo the transition from an economy based 
largely on oil and natural gas to one that is, with respect to energy, 
very pluralistic, the social orderliness with which we make the change 
will largely reflect the time available for the shift after we recognize that 
it is inevitable and that no single alternative energy source is available to 
solve the problem by itself. The question of time becomes crucial. If we 
use the price factor to induce change both in our habits of energy 
consumption and in the types of energy upon which we depend, we soon 
encounter the question of economic and social inequity. If our energy 
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prices are set for us substantially by external actors, we encounter 
economic instability. Carried to extremes, this can lead to social and 
political instability and, eventually, to the emergence of demagogues 
and terrorism .. 
All of this is part of the history of democracy and is not unique to our 
circumstances. We are closely tied to the world order. There is no profit 
in belaboring the point that what happens economically and politically 
abroad can affect us deeply. In energy terms we are involved in one of 
the great socioeconomic experiments of modem history. The disconcert-
ing element is that for the time being we are the subject of that experi-
ment. It is being conducted by OPEC and not without risk, for these 
nations too are bound to the existing world order. The energy situation 
is a worldwide problem, but in this book it is addressed largely through 
the lens of U.S. perceptions. This is not an entirely parochial stance, 
since if the energy question is not grappled with successfully in the 
United States, the implications for the rest of the world are ominous. 
Energy supply and demand deeply affect the national security. While 
the status quo turns out to be an elusive or even illusory element in most 
of our personal and national planning--change being the only constant 
of our generation-nevertheless there is much to be said for attempting 
to control rates of change in order to avoid shredding the fabric of our 
society. 
Looking at the historical energy-base transitions that have occurred 
in our society as depicted in Figure 1.1, it may be pointed out that 
historically, as we changed fuel bases, in each case a dominant pre-
ferred fuel became available and something on the order of forty or fifty 
years was involved in the transition and in the accompanying social, 
economic, and politic~ adaptations. 
Today the factors causing our energy-base transition are far less 
within our own control, and there are reasons to believe that the time 
available for change may be considerably foreshortened in comparison 
to our previous experience. Thus we must ask, What is our capacity for 
dealing with rapidly changing circumstances? 
Public policy in our country is largely determined by the public 
perception of reality and not necessarily by reality itself. Interest groups 
of all persuasions play a role in coloring the public's perception and in 
conveying to the Congress and the presidency their conceptions of the 
general public interest reflecting their own private or group interest. The 
bureaucracy involves itself in this process as does the press. Political 
figures attempt to evolve policy that meets the public perception with 
only occasional attempts to educate the public factually. Often their 
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Figure 1.1 The Pattern of Change in the U.S. Energy Base 
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information is uncertain. The products of their efforts are challenged 
and debated in the courts. Gradually reality emerges and, one hopes, 
triumphs. 
Practically speaking, this is usually a very efficacious system since 
our system of constitutional checks and balances prevents most of the 
excesses and injuries to the individual so frequent in more rational and 
orderly forms of government. But there is increasing evidence today 
that the public's perception of the energy situation is too far removed 
from reality. Thus policies aimed at meeting the public perception fall 
very short of dealing with the problem. Given uncertain and contradic-
tory information, the general proclivity is to believe what one wants to 
believe. Under these conditions the stability and slowness to respond to 
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change so characteristic of our system of government may make it 
inadequate to prevailing circumstances. This might be the case where 
energy and national security are concerned. 
During the Civil War Abraham Lincoln suspended the right of 
habeas corpus and imposed martial law in Illinois. During World War II 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Congress found it expedient to imprison 
thousands of U.S. citizens without charge or trial. Both measures were 
taken in the name of national security. Both measures received popular 
support. Both measures were later determined to be unconstitutional. 
What we do in times of tranquility and what we do in times of perceived 
emergency are two different things. In effect, we change our form of 
government. In the Civil War and World War II examples, unconstitu-
tional measures were taken "for the duration." They were thus termed 
acceptable. What happens if the next major crisis, one involving energy 
factors, persists for a decade or more? This question cannot be an-
swered, of course, but related circumstances are examined in this book. 
A pervading theme of this book is uncertainty. Our physical situa-
tion as to energy supplies has elements of uncertainty. Our political 
ability to deal with the energy problem is fraught with uncertainty. And 
the social impact or desired result of what we or other nations do or do 
not do about energy is uncertain. 
But one energy area is characterized by decreasing uncertainty. Re-
gardless of how the game is played out, it is now becoming ever more 
clear that real energy prices, relative to the prices of other commodities 
upon which we depend, will become and remain higher. This has much 
to do with what sort of a country we can look forward to. 
The exact relationship of our type of democracy to specific theories 
of economic practice has been debated since our founding. Various 
plausible but divergent views have been carried forward over the years. 
Largely through the existence of frontier opportunities and the continu-
ing growth of our economy, the politically explosive issue of redistribu-
tion of wealth has never been a salient issue in this country in spite of 
periodic complaints about the income tax, government regulation, and 
various social support programs. The energy situation may change this 
with unpredictable consequences. 
Aristotle taught that a strong and numerous middle class seemed 
essential to the successful operation of a democracy. Inflation and rising 
energy prices are distinctly related in the face of energy scarcity and a 
changeover to a different energy base. As a result, the middle class 
may disappear, economically speaking. What sort of government do we 
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then assume, politically speaking? In the throes of such a process, 
what adventure might we undertake abroad? 
We describe ourselves as a free-enterprise, capitalistic democracy. 
Whether we are or not is subject to technical dispute in view of our 
various regulatory and social programs. But the matter has never been a 
sustained, burning issue. It may become one if the requirements of an 
energy transition force it upon us. 
When we consider the economic costs of an energy transition, the 
question arises whether the public or the private sector will ultimately 
bear the burden. The answer to this question also has something to say 
about our political system. The problem is approached with some diffi-
culty because the extent of change, and hence end sums, are in dispute. 
Many scholars, particularly economists who have the appropriate skills 
for such computations, are not persuaded that the effort is worthwhile. 
To them the problem will eventually solve itself in the marketplace 
through the working of Adam Smith's "unseen hand" of supply follow-
ing demand. In other words, when and if oil and gas run out or become 
too dear to bum, then, and only then, will substitutes appear on the 
market. 
This makes a good rational argument, but modem human experience 
has been that the juggernaut weight of the unseen hand can, in the short 
term, assume terrifying proportions to the individual as it moves in its 
awesome and uncaring way across a society. Bankruptcies, breadlines, 
lost wars, and overthrown governments are often strewn in its wake. 
Actually while striving to retain as many of the best features as 
possible of a free enterprise system we have long operated in this coun-
try what Paul Samuelson simply calls a mixed economy.3 Ideally this is 
a sort of cut-and-try, pragmatically arrived-at, nonideologic, quasi-free 
enterprise system. Theoretically and practically it preserves the enor-
mous benefits to be derived by decentralized economic decision-mak-
ing. 
It also theoretically and practically releases the great psychic per-
sonal energies of millions of individuals who are free to conduct them-
selves for personal gain, advancement, pleasure, and so forth in what 
the Founding Fathers chose euphemistically to call "the pursuit of hap-
piness" rather than, more specifically, the right to own private property. 
As we all know, the success and/or social justice of such a system is 
a matter of continuing and often heated debate in our society. It is not 
our purpose to attempt an evaluation here. Other scholars have under-
taken it, albeit with varied success. 
On the liberal side John Kenneth Galbraith suggests that "the market 
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and its disciplines are greatly praised by scholars. They are rarely 
applauded by those who are subject to them." On the conservative side 
Milton Friedman flatly defines capitalism as "a system of economic 
freedom and a necessary condition for political freedom." He adds, "A 
society which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of 
guaranteeing individual freedom. "4 
Anthony Downs sums up the condition of government in such a 
confused arena: "In a democracy the government seeks to please the 
people and [therefore] operates in a fog of uncertainty. "5 So an underly-
ing uncertainty will dog our efforts in this book to untangle the web of 
energy policy as it relates to national security, the national defense, and 
the preservation of our polity. 
We must realize that we probably cannot hope to undertake even a 
specialized analysis of a major American public policy without taking 
into account that ( 1) we do not live in a "pure" free-enterprise society 
and (2) policies we may encounter in our estimates of the energy situa-
tion where survival is concerned may well run the gamut of ideological 
labeling from ultraconservatism to virtual socialism. 
The life spans of the democracies whose histories are known have 
quite frequently been determined by the aptness or ineptness of the 
foreign policies evolved under popular government. The fact that today 
we are dependent on a single finite resource for nearly half our energy 
base is a domestic economic phenomenon and a domestic problem of 
the frrst order. The fact that about half of that resource is imported from 
abroad is perhaps the major problem of our foreign policy despite per-
sistent efforts to relegate it to somewhere below the SALT and to place 
energy among a bin of imported raw materials. These and most other 
raw materials are useless to us without energy. Energy shortages could 
provoke wars that SALT cannot contain except in the most ultimate and 
catastrophic sense. 
As Richard Moorsteen has put it: "To view the oil crisis as an 
especially difficult problem in academic economics is to make again the 
mistakes so characteristic of that noble science. The critical elements of 
the problem are political-military, and overlooking them is as reckless 
as it is foolish. "6 So this book includes a politico-military outlook based 
on questions of energy. The outlook here is also one of uncertainty. It is 
inescapable that because of the energy situation the position of the 
United States at home and in the world at large has changed markedly 
from that of only a few years ago. But the totality of the change remains 
to be determined. To some extent the events of which the president 
warned in April 1977 have already taken place: "Inflation will soar; 
production will go down; people will lose their jobs. Intense competi-
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tion for oil will build up amongst nations and also among the different 
regions of our country. "7 
Further changes are occurring daily. To some, these changes will 
appear benign, since they reinforce the interdependence of at least some 
of the earth's nations and possibly herald a return to simpler and what 
some would deem less falsely affluent domestic conditions in the United 
States. To others these changes will appear nothing less than malignant 
and subversive of the very foundations of our Republic. In either case, 
however, basic domestic and foreign policies that evolved during an era 
of U.S. energy independence and worldwide industrial and military 
dominance are being severely challenged. It is the purpose of this book 
to outline these changing conditions insofar as they are induced by the 
energy situation. If an outline of the problem and a suggestion of its 
importance arouses interest, thought, and further specific research, the 
book will be worthwhile. 
The bureaucracy plays a more substantial role in policy formulation, 
in the energy area at least, than may have heretofore been accepted. The 
act establishing the Federal Energy Administration in 197 4 specifically 
demanded an energy plan from the newly formed organization. When 
President Carter developed his first National Energy Plan he did 
not substantially involve the bureaucracy in its formulation. But sub-
sequently when the Department of Energy was created in 1977, the 
Congress specifically asked for a second National Energy Plan. This 
plan was duly promulgated as NEP n. It incorporated some of the lessons 
of 1978 and 1979 but failed to reflect the emphases of the presidential 
energy initiatives developed during the summer of 1979 under the pres-
sure of public discontent over gasoline supplies. On the basis of previ-
ous experience, development of energy plans will probably be an in-
teractive and continuing process. It need not be imagined that the 
bureaucratic influence will be at once benign and more farseeing than 
that of any other group in our society. But it may be more powerful. 
Thus, although much is made in this book of the public perception 
of the energy situation and how this has affected policy development, 
it is well to keep in mind that the perceptions of the military and 
civilian bureaucracies are major influences, at least in the short term, 
on the nation's reactions to the energy and national security situations. 
In the final analysis this is a political book with some inescapable 
albeit moderated biases. It discusses a political situation evolving from a 
political system's reaction to an emerging, imperfectly defined, and 
uncertain but potentially very threatening physical and economic en-
vironment. It attempts to address the problem in terms that will attract 
the attention of the informed public, the public servant, and the scholar. 
Energy Availability and the 
Supply/Demand Mechanism 
To understand our energy dilemma in terms of national security we must 
understand clearly where we stand now as opposed to where we may 
arrive in the future. We must start with a discussion of the availability of 
oil and natural gas. We emphasize these two fuels because at the mo-
ment they provide three-quarters of all the roughly 38 million barrels of 
oil-equivalent consumed in this country, on the average, every day of 
the year. The remaining 9.5 million barrels of oil-equivalent per day are 
provided by coal, hydroelectric power, and uranium in nuclear reactors. 
For practical purposes, solar power, wind power, biomass, geothermal 
power, ocean-derived energy sources and so forth make, as yet, only 
local and hardly perceptible overall contributions. Thus for the present 
we must focus on the natural gas and oil question in order to determine 
whether we have a problem and, if so, how serious it is. Underscoring 
the necessity for this is the portentous fact that of all the oil consumed 
daily in this country approximately 43 percent is imported from abroad. 
Some of this is from relatively secure sources; most of it, according to 
recent experience, is not. 
Estimating oil and gas resources is a somewhat arcane art supported 
by the sciences of geology and economics. It has its own peculiar 
terminology which, if not understood, can lead to very different percep-
tions based on the same facts. 
Measured (or proved) reserves are those resources estimated by 
testing to be recoverable from proved reservoirs or deposits under the 
economic and operating and technological conditions existing at the 
time of the estimate. 
Indicated reserves are those additional resources in known reservoirs 
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(above and beyond measured or proved reserves) which engineering 
knowledge and judgment indicate to be economically available by ap-
plication of improved recovery techniques such as fluid injection. 
Inferred reserves are those additional reserves which it is believed 
would be developed by extending existing fields. 
Undiscovered reserves are those which a knowledge of geology and 
experience in oil exploration lead one to believe may be present. 
Subeconomic reserves are those that have been located but whose 
extraction is considered too expensive at existing market price and with 
available technology. 
The status of U.S. oil and gas reserves is reported periodically by the 
U.S. Geological Survey, the Energy Information Administration, the 
American Petroleum Institute, the American Gas Association, the Oil 
and Gas Journal, major oil companies, and others. In most cases the 
basic reference sources are the American Petroleum Institute and the 
American Gas Association, which are industry-financed. 
At the end of 1974, the U.S. Geological Survey reported that mea-
sured or proved oil reserves for the United States amounted to about 34 
billion barrels. 1 This figure was very uncertain, since it represented the 
calculation of oil content in the ground under many acres of land based 
on evidence assembled from a few eight-inch holes thrust at a cost of 
about forty to fifty dollars a foot perhaps three miles or more into the 
earth. 2 As of the end of 1978 British Petroleum estimated these proved 
reserves at 33.7 billion barrels, and as of the end of 1977 the Energy 
Information Administration estimated them at 29.5 billion barrels. The 
CIA estimated our proved reserves at the end of 1978 to be 27.8 billion 
barrels. As of 31 December 1979, the American Petroleum Institute's 
Committee on Reserves estimated proved U.S. reserves at 27.1 billion 
barrels. This will be their last published estimate, since the Department 
of Energy will now assume that responsibility.3 
This figure of something less than 30 billion barrels is a key to 
understanding our current domestic oil production situation. Based on a 
present oil production rate of about 8 to 9 mbpd and an oil consumption 
of about 17 to 18 mbpd we see that approximately 30 billion barrels 
would support our current domestic production rate for roughly ten 
years. But because of the nature of the oil fields this does not also mean 
that we could, in an emergency, support all of our present consumption 
for five years, since experience has been that a production-to-reserve 
ratio greater than 1: 10 is not likely. The implication of the 30-billion-
barrel figure then, according to Charles D. Masters, chief of the Office 
of Energy Resources, U.S. Geological Survey, is that oil production in 
the United States is, given current economic conditions, at a reasonable 
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maximum today.4 This means that future oil discoveries in the United 
States will act mainly to extend the time during which we are able to 
produce about half the oil we are using today. On the whole we are 
using domestic oil at a rate of about 3 billion barrels per year and are 
discovering about 1. 5 to 2 billion barrels a year. In 1979 proved re-
serves were extended by 2.2 billion barrels but 1.5 billion of these came 
from already known fields. 5 These figures will improve marginally in 
1980. 
As to other categories of oil reserves, the U.S. Geological Survey 
computes indicated reserves of about 4.6 billion barrels, inferred re-
serves of about 23 billion barrels, and undiscovered reserves from 50 to 
127 billion barrels. Subeconomic reserves (which would include wells 
termed "exhausted" under current economic conditions) are estimated 
at 120 to 140 billion barrels in known assets plus another 44 to 111 
billion barrels in undiscovered subeconomic reserves.6 The recoverabil-
ity of subeconomic assets does not depend entirely on economics, since 
extraction procedures also often involve the application of more ad-
vanced technology as well as the extra money required to drill, for 
example, 15,000 feet instead of 6,000 feet or less. Furthermore, 
whether the drilling is to be allowed or not is a question with political 
overtones. 
Thus what we will be able to produce in our own country in the way 
of oil from reserves involves judgments based on a combination of 
geologic, economic, technological, and political factors. Uncertainties 
are necessarily involved. 
Total proved natural gas reserves in the United States at the end of 
1979 were estimated to be 194 to 199 trillion cubic feet by the American 
Gas Association. As of the end of 1977, the Energy Information Admin-
istration reported that our proved reserves of natural gas were 208.9 
trillion cubic feet or the equivalent about 36.8 billion barrels of oii.7 
This is compared to the 237.1 trillion cubic feet reported by the U.S. 
Geological Survey in 1975.8 We consume gas at the rate of about 20 
trillion cubic feet per year and have added to the identified reserve 
category through exploration at the rate of about 10 trillion cubic feet 
per year in recent years although in 1979 14.3 trillion cubic feet were 
added to reserves and figures for 1980 may improve slightly.9 
According to U.S. Geological Survey reports, as of 1974 we had 
about 201 trillion cubic feet in indicated reserves and perhaps 322 to 655 
trillion cubic feet in undiscovered natural gas reserves. Somewhere 
between 90 and 115 trillion cubic feet were considered to be identified 
but subeconomic with perhaps 40 to 82 trillion cubic feet in the undis-
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covered subeconomic category. 10 These subeconomic resources do not 
include geopressurized methane, nor do the subeconomic oil reserves 
include shale oil or oil from liquefied coal. Very deep gas sources 
remain uncertain. 
Besides the uncertainties in resource estimation which we have al-
ready discussed, it should be realized that forecasts of oil and natural 
gas availability in this country have fluctuated wildly over the last sixty 
years or so. Government forecasts in the last fifty-two years have been 
particularly erratic and with some reason. 
Fuel-resource statistics available to our government have tradition-
ally been provided by private industry. There is at this time still no 
primary or verifiable government-controlled energy data gathering and 
analysis system worthy of the name. There may never be. It is not even 
established beyond public dispute that there need be. At this writing, 
however, there are about 261 generally duplicative energy data programs 
operated by more than forty executive departments and agencies. 11 
These are gradually being consolidated under the new Department of 
Energy in the Energy Information Administration. 
While the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 makes provi-
sion for the disclosure of supply information by the oil and gas com-
panies to the federal energy administrator (now the secretary of energy), 
it does not give him direct access to specific privately held geologic 
information upon which to calculate reserves in the ground. Nor does 
the legislation passed to establish a Department of Energy include a 
complete administrative solution to this problem.12 Therefore, the 
capacity of the government to plan, if this is desired, is somewhat 
flawed from the beginning. Worse, as we have noted, the data provided 
are inherently lacking in precision under the best of circumstances. 
In terms of attracting new capital, privately explored oil and gas 
reserves have tended to grow somewhat, and, when involved in tax 
rebate or controlled price discussions, the same reserves have tended to 
shrink. Government data summaries and policy outlooks besides reflect-
ing internal bureaucratic disputes, have necessarily changed accordingly 
until recent years and they still face private sector pressures of consider-
able magnitude. What is calculated by a geologist and what is published 
by a bureau chief can be two different things. 
John Blair gives a fascinating account of the rise and fall of govern-
ment estimates of oil reserves. 13 He points out that the calculations of 
U.S. oil resource depletion which M. King Hubbert made in about 
1956, although at first derided within the U.S. Geological Survey, were 
confrrmed by 1970 when oil production peaked in this country and 
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began to decline thereafter. It was not until 1975, however, that any 
drastic revision to U.S. Geological Survey estimates occurred. 
The estimates of undiscovered recoverable oil resources in this coun-
try fluctuated wildly in the two decades between 1952 and 1972. In 
1952 Stanolind estimated these resources at about 120 billion barrels. 
By 1972 Theobold, of the U.S. Geological Survey, produced an esti-
mate of better than 400 billion barrels. Hubbert reduced this in 197 4 to 
something on the order of 90 billion barrels. 14 This correlates closely 
with the 50 to 127 billion barrels quoted earlier for the U.S. Geological 
Survey estimate of 1975. These drastically reduced prospects now seem 
to be generally accepted, especially since the 1975 report of the Com-
mittee on Resources and the Environment of the National Academy of 
Sciences.t5 
After the enthusiasm of the U.S. Geological Survey faded, a com-
prehensive new estimate of oil and gas reserves was issued in circular 
725, Geological Estimates of Undiscovered Recoverable Oil and Gas 
Resources of the United States. The discrepancy between the estimates 
in this publication and those in its immediate predecessor, Energy 
Perspectives, 16 was considerable. Where Energy Perspectives esti-
mated recoverable undiscovered U.S. reserves at 300 billion barrels, 
circular 725 reduced this estimate to the range of 50 to 127 billion 
barrels. In the case of natural gas the variation was from 1,500 trillion 
cubic feet to 438 trillion cubic feet. In 1972 the U.S. Geological Survey 
had estimated undiscovered natural gas reserves at about 2,100 trillion 
cubic feetY These drastic downward revisions of what remained to be 
found in the way of oil and gas eventually penetrated the political 
process. 
On 18 April 1977 in an evening speech televised from the White 
House, President Carter said to the American people: "Tonight I want to 
have a talk with you about a problem that is unprecedented in our 
history. With the exception of preventing war, this is the greatest chal-
lenge that our country will face during our lifetime. The energy crisis 
has not yet overwhelmed us but it will if we do not act quickly .... The 
oil and gas that we rely on for 75 percent of our energy are simply 
running out. "18 The president went on to put all this in a global context 
emphasizing that the worldwide demand for oil was increasing drasti-
cally and that this increase was rapidly approaching the point where 
even the vast Middle Eastern proved reserves would be unable to meet 
demand. He stressed the need for conservation, the renewed use of coal, 
and a shift in the future to "permanent renewable energy sources like 
solar power." He called for the rapid creation of a one-billion-barrel 
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national strategic oil stockpile. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
of 197 5 already provided for this in general but specifically stipulated 
only that 150 million barrels of oil were to be placed in storage by 1978 
(a figure which was not met). 
This was the opening salvo in the latest round of the long-fought 
contest between those who believe that we need a positive national 
energy policy because we are running short of our most commonly used 
fuels and those who doubt that we are running out and, in any case, 
believe that our best policy with respect to energy would be to leave the 
solution to private enterprise by allowing the free marketplace to work. 
Before President Carter's speech, except for general outrage over the 
Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 and localized public dissatisfaction 
over the natural gas shortages during the winter of 1976-1977, there had 
been little overall public interest in our energy situation in spite of all the 
media discussion of the subject. In December of 1975 a comprehensive 
poll sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations revealed 
that no more than 4 percent of the general public considered energy to 
be a serious national problem. 19 In other words, 96 percent of our 
general population apparently felt that our energy supplies were 
adequate and secure. This despite what some termed the "lesson" of the 
Arab embargo. 
This indicated 96 percent level of confidence and unconcern over 
energy resources was repeated almost exactly in a Gallup Poll of 
January 1977 during the natural gas crisis.2° Clearly it seemed that the 
public did not correlate natural gas and oil with "energy" despite their 
overwhelming dependence upon these sources of energy. 
After the president's speech almost 50 percent of respondents to a 
variety of polls, according to White House sources, indicated concern 
over energy. But this concern besides being somewhat short-lived had 
heavy overtones of disbelief as well as surprise and anger over what was 
perceived as sudden bad news. 
It developed that no more than 50 percent of our population had been 
aware that we were importing foreign oil in the first place and only 17 
percent thought that we needed to.21 It was hard to tell what people 
believed about energy. Clearly they were (and probably are) skeptical 
about both whom and what to believe. 
As of October 1978 a Gallup Poll reported that no more than 5 
percent of our population rated the energy situation as our most impor-
tant problem. Inflation preoccupied the public mind and there was ap-
parently no indication that people perceived any connection between the 
two issues.22 
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Therefore it is only natural that the president's message would en-
counter public skepticism. An editorial from the Columbus (Ohio) Dis-
patch from the heartland of our country seems to convey the essence of 
this sort of reaction. The title of the editorial is "Government Energy 
Forecasting Faulty": 
In 1908 officials of the U.S. Geological Survey declared this 
nation's "maximum future supply of petroleum is 22.5 billion 
barrels." Fact: More than 110 billion barrels have been produced 
[since]. 
The Interior Department said in 1949 that the "end of U.S. oil 
supply is almost in sight." Fact: More than 75 billion barrels of 
U.S. crude oil have been produced since that year.23 
Perhaps the most cogent conservative attack on President Carter's 
speech and the National Energy Plan proposed by the White House was 
made by William E. Simon in an article published in the Wall Street 
Journal on 10 June 1977.24 Simon was secretary of the treasury in 
President Ford's cabinet and was the first administrator of the Federal 
Energy Administration under President Nixon. 
The main thrust of the argument advanced by Simon is embodied in 
two statements. The first is: "Contrary to the President's frequent asser-
tions, the country has long had a comprehensive energy policy. It's just 
been the wrong policy. For more than 20 years the government has 
increasingly tried to regulate the energy industry so that prices were 
artificially held below market levels." The second is: "What we have 
learned over time is that increases in demand, when allowed to work in 
the market place, have brought increases in supply. Between 1950 and 
1970, for example, the known oil reserves of the U.S. increased by over 
500%. Even now, as the National Academy of Engineering has pointed 
out, we have only recovered about 30% of the oil from known reserves 
by relying on low-cost technologies; with higher prices and greater 
return on investment, it should be possible to recover much of the 
remainder. " 
In stating that known oil reserves had increased "by over 500%," 
Simon may have been referring to the wide variations in predictions 
about undiscovered resources which we have discussed. In any case, 
Simon wrote as a dedicated conservative and it was not within his 
purpose, perhaps, to point out that between 1918 and 1977 about $101.3 
billion has been expended by government in the United States in direct 
and indirect subsidy of the oil industry. 25 Nor is it in the liberal tradition 
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to point out that the low prices for natural gas set by the Federal Power 
Commission in interstate traffic undoubtedly contributed to the rapid 
exhaustion of the more easily accessible natural gas in this country, 
which in tum resulted in greater than expected oil usage. 
The dialogue between liberal and conservative observers of the 
energy situation will be examined further in subsequent chapters since 
this has much to do with perceptions of energy's relationship to national 
security. At this point, however, we should note that both the presi-
dent's and Simon's statements have been considerably obscured in the 
public eye by reports of "oil gluts," "gas bubbles," and the recent 
energy events in Mexico and Iran, with ensuing forecasts of demand 
largely premised upon economic reasoning. 
At this point there may be reason, based on the record, to question 
expert opinions on oil and gas estimates, but we would be foolhardy not 
to acknowledge that the general direction of current estimates is pes-
simistic. Note that these estimates assume that all public lands will be 
open to exploitation, a matter of some doubt. 
Economists in general tend to have an essentially unique disciplinary 
view of fossil fuel reserves. Their estimates are usually based on histori-
cal resource discovery data and the premise that a given price for oil and 
gas has produced and therefore will produce a given quantity of those 
commodities. Generally economists tend to ignore the fact that oil and 
gas are finite resources. 
Richard B. Mancke, for example, writes of at least a two-hundred-
year supply of petroleum in the world, but at unstated prices.26 This 
conventional wisdom, based on at least fifty years accumulated experi-
ence, amounts to saying that when you want oil and gas you dig a hole 
in the ground and pour money into it. Oil and gas-sometimes emerge. It 
is now becoming rather crucial where the hole is, who owns the hole, 
and how much money one is capable of pouring. The economists could 
be right and wrong at the same time. Much depends on the time-frame 
and the individual outlook. 
Obviously the oil reserves available to us domestically and, for that 
matter, internationally, are a function of price. But the price is not en-
tirely monetary. It also involves technological, political, and possibly 
military factors since imported oil can be threatened. We will never run 
out of oil in an absolute sense. We can't afford to. It becomes more and 
more difficult to extract residual amounts after about 50 percent of a 
given deposit is removed. On the average we have only removed about 
30 percent of the oil and 80 percent of the gas from our "spent" wells. 27 
The technology for secondary and tertiary extraction becomes ever more 
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complex and expensive. And finally, when it takes more energy to 
produce oil (or gas, for that matter) than can be gotten from burning it, 
the economic costs become irrelevant except for nonenergy uses. 
Oil and gas are believed to be finite nonrenewable resources what-
ever their origin. But even their origin is occasionally in dispute. The 
Wall Street Journal, for example, published an article by Thomas Gold, 
the director of Cornell University's Center for Radiophysics and Space 
Research, in which Gold questioned the knowledge of geologists con-
cerning the basic origin and chemical evolution of the earth's hydrocar-
bon fuels. 28 He postulated that the current theory that oil, gas, and coal 
are remnants of past biological activity (hence "fossil fuels") might be 
erroneous. This point was based upon the recently popularized discov-
ery of geopressurized methane gas at the extraordinary depth of 15,000 
feet in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Gold went on to theorize that perhaps the hydrocarbons were not 
formed on earth over the ages in the manner the geologists believe but 
instead might have been present from the beginning when our planet 
was formed from primary materials from outer space in the early days of 
our planetary system. If this is the case, Gold speculated, we might have 
a hydrocarbon fuel supply available "that would last 20 million years at 
our present rate of fuel consumption." 
To most geologists Gold's arguments made little sense since, if 
hydrocarbon fuels did not require biological origins, then prebiologic 
pre-Cambrian rocks might well yield oil and gas. Large portions of the 
dry land area of the earth have pre-Cambrian rocks at the surface-little 
of which has ever yielded a trace of oil or gas. 29 Thus Gold's hypothesis 
seemingly has little validity. 
For the public, however, another uncertainty factor was added. In the 
business community which subscribes to the Wall Street Journal there 
are strong incentives to want to believe that there is indeed a vast store 
of oil and gas yet to be discovered and produced and that the current 
edifices of energy production, with appropriate price rises, can be main-
tained as they are. 
Estimating the physical availability of oil and gas involves many 
uncertainties. Calculating the probable demand for these commodities 
is beset with just as many imponderables, and in addition these two 
activities act and react one upon the other through economic linkages. 
As Herman Franssen wrote: "Energy forecasting is not an exact science; 
instead it is more of an art, influenced by the Zeitgeist (Spirit of the 
time), biases of the authors and by the inherent supply and demand 
uncertainties which increase rapidly over time. "30 
Although the exact relationship between energy supply growth and 
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Figure 2.1 U.S. Oil Supply 
8 0epending on growth rate of synthetics industry 
Source: Exxon Co., U.S.A., Energy Outlook 1980-2()()() (Houston, Tex., Dec. 
1979). By permission of Exxon Corporation. 
general economic growth is not entirely clear, energy demand forecasts 
are based on considerations of economic growth, demand elasticity, 
conservation, and concepts of fuel substitution. Basically, within limits, 
supply is a function of demand. But we are not too certain about the 
limits of their relationship. Generally speaking, as in the case of oil 
supply predictions, earlier optimistic (i.e., expansive) predictions as to 
demand have moderated substantially in recent years. Figures 2.1 and 
2.2 are projections developed by the Exxon Corporation. They are on 
the optimistic side compared with some projections and perhaps under-
estimate the effects to be achieved through energy conservation mea-
sures. They are predicated upon an assumed economic growth in the 
United States of about 2.7 percent annually through the year 2000. This 
contrasts with a 3.6 percent growth assumed only a year earlier. As a 
result of these lowered expectations, where Exxon had predicted in 
1978 that overall energy demand in the United States would be over 50 
mbpd oil equivalent in 1990, by December 1979 it was predicting that 
this demand would not be reached until the year 2000. Clearly if the 
1980 recession is severe, then these figures may be further moderated. 
The effect on oil demand of the 1974-1975 recession can be seen in 
Figure 2.1. To meet the implied or assumed demand, the supply curves 
of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 (1) show the decline of U.S. oil and gas produc-
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Figure 2.2 U.S. Gas Supply 
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Source: Exxon Co., U.S.A., Energy Outlook 1980-2()()() (Houston, Tex., Dec. 
1979). By permission of Exxon Corporation . 
tion (domestically) since the early 1970s; (2) indicate that production 
from new discoveries will probably be meager; (3) show little reliance 
on synthetic fuels (from coal, shale oil and heavy oils) before 1990; (4) 
emphasize increasing reliance on imported fuels-especially oil-
through 1990. 
This leads us to a brief preliminary discussion of international oil 
factors as they apply currently to the United States. British and Swedish 
estimates indicate that the world's presently proved oil reserves amount 
to between 649 and 670 billion barrels. The president's first Nation£ll 
Energy Plan quoted a figure of only 600 billion barrels.31 It is extremely 
important for national security reasons to note that fully half of these 
known reserves are concentrated in an area 800 by 510 kilometers 
around the Persian Gulf.32 Annually the entire world consumes between 
23 and 24 billion barrels of oil. Less than 15 billion barrels of new oil 
have been found annually in the last four years.33 
Considering that a very vulnerable tanker requires about a month to 
reach the United States from the Persian Gulf, the oil reserves of Canada 
and Mexico assume increasing strategic importance to the United 
States. Canada has announced that her proved reserves of about 8.3 
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Figure 2.3 The Persian Gulf Area 
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billion barrels just suffice to meet her requirements for future growth.34 
Her present level of deliveries to us may in fact be reduced. 
Mexico is just entering her second oil age. The first occurred be-
tween 1921 and 1930 when U.S. oil companies operated the Mexican 
fields on a concession basis. These fields were ruined according to some 
authorities by rapacious overproduction by the American conces-
sionaires.35 Subsequently Mexico nationalized her oil fields and placed 
them under control of the government-owned Petroleos Mexicanos 
(Pemex) oil company. Currently Pemex reports proved reserves of 
40-45 billion barrels, probable reserves of 37 billion barrels, and poten-
tial undiscovered reserves of 200 billion barrels.36 Oil and gas are ap-
parently combined in these figures. Current production averages 1.2 
mbpd with shipments going now to the United States, Canada, and 
Cuba, and soon to Japan. By 1985 Mexican oil production is expected 
to reach 3.0 to 4.5 mbpd.37 The Mexican oil situation is of major 
importance to the United States but it does not solve our oil problem. 
We remain heavily dependent upon imports from the nations comprising 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with increas-
ing reliance, for the time being, upon the seven Arab members of that 
organization (oAPEc).38 Mexico and Canada are not members of OPEC, 
but they generally price their oil at the levels set by that organization. 
Table 2.1 lists the sources of the U.S. oil supply. Although the 
percentage of the U.S. oil supply imported from any one individual 
country is relatively small, we learned in 1973 that concerted embargo 
action by a few of these countries can have serious effects on our 
economy. In 1979 the Iranian shutdown illustrated that the loss of oil 
from even a single country can be a serious matter. Our present depen-
dence upon imported oil is acute. The stability of countries from which 
we import is of increasing concern as is our ability to protect the lines of 
communication involved under wartime conditions. It should be noted, 
for national security purposes, that the oil glut which began to be dis-
cussed periodically in 1977 was (1) an international phenomenon, not 
reflecting any excess U.S. domestic supply, and (2) transitory in nature 
because of temporary mismatches between producer optimism and sag-
ging consumer economies.39 The "gas bubble" phenomenon experi-
enced in this country after the interstate price rises permitted by passage 
of the Natural Gas Act of 1978 is still not explained. Many authorities 
believe that gas previously locked in by owners during the period of low 
regulated prices was suddenly made available to the market at the higher 
prices. But the precise relationship is not clear as of this writing. All of 
this contributes to uncertainty and can lead to very bad judgments in the 
area of national security. For example, a Cabinet Task Force convened 
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Table 2.1 
SOURCES OF U.S. OIL, JANUARY-JUNE 1980 
Thousands of 
barrels per day 
United States (including Alaska) 
Saudi Arabia 
Nigeria 
Libya . 
Mexico 
Algeria 
Canada 
Venezuela 
Virgin Islands 
Indonesia . . . 
United Arab Emirates 
Netherlands Antilles 
Total 
10,190 
1,348 
946 
595 
528 
513 
462 
436 
410 
368 
228 
212 
16,236 
Source: American Petroleum Institute, "Energy 
Backgrounder," October 1980. 
by President Nixon reported in 1970 that no shortage of domestically 
produced oil could be foreseen and that the country faced no problems 
should imported oil be embargoed. Natural gas and its supply/demand 
relationship with oil supply/demand factors were not discussed.40 
The prediction of the Cabinet Task Force proved quite wrong. When 
the relatively mild Arab oil embargo was imposed in 1973 (depriving us 
of 2. 7 mbpd), the country suffered at least a $1 0-billion drop in its GNP 
and something on the order of 500,000 people immediately found them-
selves unemployed.41 We are now significantly more dependent on 
imports. 
The U.S. Geological Survey calculates that there are over 1,700 
billion tons of identified coal resources in the United States at depths of 
less than 3,000 feet. More than 2,200 billion tons additional reserves are 
estimated to be still unidentified or to be found in deeper basins. Of all 
these the Bureau of Mines estimated in 1976 that about 437 billion tons 
are in deposits of the type and depth considered minable at existing 
mining and economic conditions. This amounts to about 1,944 billion 
barrels of oil equivalent. In 1978 we produced 653.8 million short tons 
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of coal.42 Clearly at this rate of consumption we theoretically have over 
six centuries worth of more or less easily recoverable coal. But this 
reserve will dwindle and the economics of coal usage will shift as we 
impose sulfur restrictions on its burning and as we rely on it to produce 
the more easily used forms of hydrocarbons--oil and gas-through 
liquefaction and gasification processes. About one quarter of the energy 
in coal is lost when it is converted in this manner.43 On the basis of 
availability alone, coal is without doubt the most logical fuel base for 
the United States, but its increased use is far from free of political, 
economic, and environmental problems. 
The Energy Information Administration estimates as of 1 January 
1978, that at a cost of $30 or less per ton we have reserves of 690,000 
tons of uranium (U 30 8). At a cost of $50 or less this reserve increases to 
890,000 short tons. An additional 140,000 tons of uranium is expected 
to be available as a by-product of phosphate and copper production 
between 1978 and 2000. Potential but undiscovered resources including 
possible and speculative categories are estimated at between 2,565 
thousand tons and 3,475 thousand tons. In 1978 we produced 18,500 
tons of uranium. Since our minor imports and exports almost balanced, 
it may be concluded that this is the amount of uranium necessary to 
support the seventy-one nuclear power plants in operation or startup as 
of the beginning of 1979 (eighty more were under construction) as well 
as the nuclear power plants of our warships (mostly submarine) and the 
Defense Department's nuclear weapons programs.44 Known reserves 
then, apparently have the capability of supporting the nuclear status quo 
for about twenty-five years if we do not recycle our fuel or embark on a 
breeder reactor program. Our ability to support an augmented nuclear 
power program may be marginal in view of the host of questions now 
under public debate. 
The United States has oil-heavy shale deposits in very considerable 
quantity located primarily, according to present surveys, in Colorado, 
Wyoming, and Utah on federally owned land. Known recoverable shale 
oil in these regions is currently estimated at about 600 billion barrels. 
Leaner Devonian shale reserves in the Midwest offer promise of another 
423 billion barrels.45 We also have about 10 billion barrels of heavy oil 
(equivalent to the Alaskan oil reserves), located mainly in California, 
and large tar sand deposits, heretofore inaccessible, are known to exist 
at great depths in Utah. Getting at these rich resources poses a host of 
problems which will be addressed separately. 
We have described an amazing treasure trove of energy resources 
without yet touching on solar power as offering other means of obtain-
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ing energy in this country. But it must be faced that our economy, in its 
present constitution, is heavily anchored to the use of readily available 
natural gas and oil. For all practical purposes it appears that these 
energy sources at anything approximating current prices are going to 
become scarce fairly soon-if not today, then tomorrow. The exact date 
for long-range policy purposes is probably not worth quibbling over 
even though considerable argument still exists concerning the amount of 
undiscovered oil and gas in the sea areas contiguous to the United States 
and also concerning the techniques for increasing the yield of nominally 
dry oil wells. Worldwide resources are also dwindling; M. King Hub-
bert, writing as a consultant to the Congressional Research Service, has 
this to say concerning the time span during which crude oil from what-
ever nation can serve as a major source of energy: "The peak in produc-
tion rate [worldwide] will probably be reached in the 1990 decade and 
children born in the 1960's will see the world consume most of its oil 
during their lifetimes. "46 
In general, in spite of optimistic short-term forecasts, estimates of 
the oil and natural gas ultimately available remain pessimistic and in 
some cases are being revised sharply downward. For one thing the 
phrase "at current rates of consumption" is often misleading because 
the rates of consumption are themselves moderating very slowly, espe-
cially in this country. At what point these rates might tum downward 
because of price, recession, war or other factors remains to be seen. 
Apparently then we are indeed "running out"-on an economic basis 
given present price incentives, if not clearly on a geologic basis. This, 
however, is not the public perception; the urgency of the matter is 
uncertain, and it seems clear that this perception will not change while 
energy prices remain relatively low. 
Although popular attention has been until recently focused on the 
rapid depletion of what was long artificially priced "cheap" natural gas, 
it is probably the oil problem that should logically be of major concern 
because of mobility fuel needs. We know how to make propane from 
either oil or natural gas, but we do not generally make gasoline from 
natural gas although this is possible through the miracle of applied 
chemistry. 
All other factors being equal, oil-fired transportation makes our soci-
ety work in its present form. Blair establishes that about 53 percent of 
all petroleum consumed in this country is used in the transportation 
sector. In Europe he states that the figure is 28 percent.47 Actually in 
this country, including the petroleum needed to manufacture cars and 
build and maintain roads, automotive traffic alone uses more than 3 of 
every 10 barrels of oil consumed in the United States.48 
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While in most cases it is practical to use oil as a substitute for gas, the 
reverse, particularly in transportation, is not true at the present state of 
technology, sunk costs, and risk capital availability, even though some-
day we may use hydrogen-powered automobiles. Safety is a major 
consideration for vehicles propelled by any gaseous fuel. 49 A 
hydrogen-driven automobile would probably most safely hold its hy-
drogen in a metallic hydride form instead of a pressure chamber. We 
have yet to perfect this technology although we know that present-day 
automobile and aircraft engines can be modified to run on hydrogen. 
And current methods of producing hydrogen are expensive since a great 
deal of electrical power is involved. Undoubtedly we will see an in-
crease in electrically propelled vehicles for urban transportation. 
Methyl alcohol fuel cell engines may appear on our highways. 
There is the ultimate question of whether we should be burning gas 
and oil for fuel at all. Both are basic ingredients for the petrochemical 
industry (including fertilizer manufacturing) which, in time, may well 
demonstrate a higher priority need for these apparently nonrenewable 
resources than ever conceived of in our current society. 
The uncertainty of the energy situation severely inhibits the rapid 
development of any positive operational energy policy. There are great 
incentives to hope for the best. Yet the general security of the nation 
may demand that we commence the transition away from an oil and gas 
society. We have the capacity to do so. 
"How much would it cost to escape from all of this?" "What are the 
penalties if we do not?" How long would it take?" and "What alterna-
tives are economically available as well as technologically and politi-
cally feasible?" are the basic questions. 
Alternatives to the 
Oil and Gas Economy 
What alternatives to an oil and gas economy appear to be available in 
terms of feasibility in the near future-that is to say during the decade of 
the eighties? 
Any prospects of an increase in domestic oil and gas production, 
even in the short term, profoundly affect the prospects of any alternative 
energy strategy and fundamental questions of national security. Thus, to 
understand what may happen in the development of new energy re-
sources it is necessary to recap the domestic oil and gas production 
situation. There is a school of thought in the petroleum industry, espe-
cially among the so-called independents, which considers that domestic 
oil and gas production is still sensitive to profit increase-that is, that 
our supplies have not physically "peaked out. "1 While not necessarily 
shared by the major oil companies with overseas resources, this belief 
underlies conservative thinking on energy policy. Advocates argue that 
by "unleashing private enterprise" (i.e., raising the permissible profits 
for petroleum and natural gas development) we will see an immediate 
return of American exploratory capital which has been diverted to the 
Middle East, the North Sea, and other foreign areas during the last 
twenty years. 
Currently it is reported that independent oil and gas producers are 
spending as much on exploration in this country each year ($3.75 bil-
lion) as the major oil companies, although the majors control 67 percent 
of U.S. re.serves.2 The Natural Gas Bill of 1978 immediately raised the 
price of natural gas from $1.42 to $2.09 per thousand cubic feet, pro-
vided for subsequent substantial annual increases in step with inflation, 
and will effectively remove price controls from natural gas by 1985. 
This congressional action reflects reliance on the optimistic viewpoint 
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of the independents while at the same time representing a hope that the 
price rise in the case of natural gas will prompt conservation of this 
resource on the part of the public and industry alike. The general out-
come, once more, is uncertain. Particularly uncertain is the impact that 
this bill will have on U.S. oil demand with the concomitant effects on 
oil imports. 
What we have said so far addresses the near-term questions of the 
next seven years. Considering the slightly longer term, we have the 
finite and restricted nature of oil and gas availability discussed in our 
second chapter and the view of domestic oil and gas production taken by 
the major oil companies as indicated by their actions as opposed to their 
rhetoric. 
Figure 3.1 reveals the atrophy and dismantlement of the U.S. domes-
tic gas and oil exploratory infrastructure that has taken place over the 
last twenty years. Clearly the protection given to the domestic oil indus-
try through the imposition of the Mandatory Oil Import Quota in 1959 
did not appreciably stimulate oil exploration at home. It was estimated 
in 1974 that a period of at least five years would be required to gather 
together the material and human resources necessary to reestablish oil 
and gas exploration in the lower forty-eight states on a large scale. To 
the extent that this has been attempted, the independents seem to be 
responsible. Only a few of the 49,816 wells drilled in the United States 
in 1979 were exploratory. Most were in known fields. 3 
The oil industry in general and the major oil companies in particular 
seem already to have evaluated and tested the feasibility of renewing 
intensive exploration in the United States. With the exception of Alas-
kan and some off-shore drilling, they have apparently found it less 
profitable than exploration abroad. Note that the emphasis here is on 
exploratory drilling only; not the extension of existing fields. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates a sharp increase for both total capital expendi-
tures and expenditures for exploration and development in the gas and 
oil industries in the United States beginning in 1971. This reflects the 
trend shown in Figure 3.1. But Figure 3.2 also illustrates that dry-hole 
losses continue to mount in the United States and that there is increasing 
incentive to invest in oil production abroad. U.S. investment at home 
for oil production constitutes a steadily declining fraction of investment 
in the world at large. This coincides with one year's experience in 
mounting dry-hole losses commencing in 1973. The oil industry as a 
whole has apparently concluded, on the basis of drilling costs, geologi-
cal data, government regulation, or all three, that the oil and gas explor-
ation potential in the United States has been tried and found wanting. 
The fact that the giants of the domestic industry have heavy capital 
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Figure 3.1 Trends in Exploratory Drilling in the 
United States 
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investments abroad, and oil to sell from foreign sources as a result, is a 
significant factor in the U.S. energy equation. It impinges heavily on 
the prospect and mechanisms of developing domestic alternative energy 
resources in the near term. 
The current ability to import oil in the United States is approaching a 
saturation point with existing port and off-loading facilities. The giant 
supertankers of the latest and most economic category cannot currently 
deliver their cargoes in our ports. A very considerable capital invest-
ment is necessary for the augmentation of these facilities. Doubtless 
some of this investment would be made from public funds, although this 
is colored by the safety and environmental objections that have been 
raised concerning the operations of supertankers.4 In any case, this 
expenditure, whether from public or from private sources, would de-
tract substantially from the ability to support the augmentation or de-
velopment of domestic resources. The costs of business as usual today 
considerably affect our efforts to provide for tomorrow. 
Logically, in moving away from the existing oil and gas economy 
because of scarcity and insecurity of resources, first attention must 
focus on alternatives that might permit use of the existing infrastructure 
even though this might be only a temporary expedient. While we know 
that ultimately we must rely on renewable energy resources, our task in 
this decade is to make use of what we have while preparing for the 
future. Besides economic concerns, both international politics and 
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Figure 3.2 Capital Expenditures and Dry-Hole Losses in the 
Oil and Gas Industry (Geological, Geophysical, 
and Rental Costs Excluded) 
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technology enter into our considerations. Two approaches will be con-
sidered. Exploitation of heavy oils heretofore deemed subeconomic will 
be discussed, as will the production of so-called synthetic liquid fuels. 
The three most immediate prospects for synthetic oil supplements on 
the domestic scene are shale oil, liquefied coal, and alcohol produced 
from biomass. This alcohol may be ethanol produced from crops or it 
may be methanol produced from wood. Coal and Devonian shale are 
also prospective sources for methanol. Depending upon the relative 
availability of the primary source in the various regions of the country, 
propane, as the third member of the paraffin series after methane and 
ethane, is manufactured from either oil or gas. It can also be separated 
from the gas produced by coal. While under investigation for a number 
of years as an automotive propellant because of its susceptibility to 
liquefaction at low pressures (a process somewhat plagued by safety 
considerations), propane is not a particularly attractive candidate in this 
area now because of its extensive use in rural home heating, industry, 
and crop drying in the agricultural sector. Further, its removal from 
natural gas considerably lowers the leftover gas's heat content when 
used as a fuel. 
There has been a surge of interest in the building of large-scale coal 
liquefaction and gasification plants in recent years. The technology for 
this is by no means new. Based on established processes in use around 
the world since World War II, particularly those developed in South 
Africa, the general estimate seems to be that with the present technology 
plants in this country could produce gas and oil and its derivatives in the 
price range of about $35 to $50 per barrel of oil equivalent. This reflects 
against a 1979 world oil price of about $30.75 per barrel and a U.S. 
average domestic price as of December 1979 of about $16.98 per barrel 
stipulated by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. The cost 
of gas is hard to compare with the cost of oil, but if heat content were to 
be used as a reference, the corresponding price of new natural gas as 
compared to newly found domestic oil would be on the order of $5.17 
per thousand cubic feet resulting in an average price for all gas in the 
country of about 3. 79. These prices, presumably, will eventually be 
reached under the new Natural Gas Bill. There are, of course, many 
other factors and considerations involved. By the time this book is in 
print these prices may seem low. 
The coal gasification question is seldom considered in all of its 
dimensions. The debate over using coal for the purpose of augmenting 
natural gas resources generally assumes the production of pipeline qual-
ity gas. This refers to gas of a heat (BTU) content sufficient to warrant its 
transmission over thousands of miles.5 The process for the extraction of 
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gas of such a quality from coal is in a rudimentary state. The price of 
such gas is currently estimated to be on the high side of the figures 
previously given. 
On the other hand, /ow-BTU gas suitable for short-range urban distri-
bution can be produced much more cheaply from coal. Indeed until 
about 1947 practically all the country's "city gas" in areas remote from 
natural gas fields was produced locally from coal by the utilities con-
cerned. The art for this is well known. In many cases the facilities for 
it are still in existence even if in need of substantial renovation. But 
city gas does not have the heat content to support all industrial proces-
ses, and in some cases railways to carry the coal no longer exist. 
It can be anticipated that a government policy urging and facilitating 
the use of coal in local low-BTU gasification plants would meet some or-
ganized resistance. In addition to environmental and economic problems 
common to any moves to revert to coal, substantial local dispersed 
production of low-BTU gas (as opposed to central manufacture of high-
BTU gas), when permitted by existing railroad facilities for coal de-
livery, detracts from the economic viability of the gas pipeline systems. 
These pipelines are often at least partially owned by the major oil 
companies and their associated financial institutions.6 Many coal mines 
are also owned directly or indirectly by the oil companies. Together, 
oil and gas companies probably own more than 40% of the nation's 
developed coal resources. While the local production of low-BTU gas 
from coal might be logical from government and some consumer view-
points and even compatible with the logical long-term goals of the oil 
companies, it nevertheless follows that the short-term view may pre-
vail with the oil companies. 
In June 1977, the Energy Research and Development Administration 
(ERDA) terminated its "Coalcon" project which had been aimed at de-
veloping an environmentally clean process for converting coal to oiJ.7 It 
is not entirely clear now whether technical problems concerning the use 
of high-sulfur eastern coal (rather than low-sulfur western coal) were the 
main reason for terminating the project or whether some other factors 
pertained. Poor management was charged by the General Accounting 
Office. Similar projects are now being revived, but oil from coal will 
apparently not flow freely in this country in the near future under "busi-
ness as usual" conditions. 
Thus, since the art of using coal directly for automotive purposes is 
not highly developed in this country, and since very high capital in-
vestment requirements for suitable internal combustion engines will 
probably discourage any immediate research push, it follows that the 
most immediate result from a "shift to coal" policy would be in its 
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direct use. This means that it would be used largely as a petroleum 
substitute in central power stations for the generation of electricity an-
ticipating that natural gas will not much longer be used for this purpose. 
About 1. 7 million barrels of oil per day were consumed in 1978 to 
produce electricity.8 To some extent coal would also be used as a 
substitute for petroleum and natural gas in manufacturing. And to a 
lesser degree it can be expected to be used in home heating as a re-
placement for electricity, gas, or oil. 
Therefore, while a very substantial shift to coal can occur in our 
society, powerful forces tend to ensure that it will be used only directly, 
if at all, in the immediate future rather than as a source for liquid and 
gaseous fuels. This implies increasing pressure on petroleum and 
natural gas resources. It also implies environmental problems of some 
considerable magnitude. 
As pressures to do something about the energy situation mount, the 
general public inclination to abate environmental regulations will prob-
ably increase. It is true that a number of the regulations are premised on 
rather dubious prepositions. Environmental Protection Agency regu-
lations developed for crowded urban centers have occasionally been 
invoked in such regions as the mountains of Colorado where no 
dwellings are to be found for many miles and where the ambient air 
pollution due to vegetation already exceeds that prescribed by law. 
Nevertheless, as Ward and Dubos have cogently brought out, there is 
very distinctly a pollution threshold beyond which a lethal atmospheric 
condition develops where one of only irritation and unpleasantness pre-
vailed before. The 1952 episode in the London of the old smog and fog 
days where perhaps 3,000 people died from airborne pollutant poison-
ing in one night is one case in point.9 The "acid rain" controversy in 
which it is charged that sulfuric acid from Ohio coal-fired electric plants 
are killing fish and damaging crops in Pennsylvania and New York is 
another. 
Thus, processes to remove sulfur and other pollutants are necessary 
and their cost is part of the price of shifting to coal. Further there is the 
long-term effect of below-threshold pollution to consider. Here our 
knowledge is extremely limited but extensive enough to cause concern 
and to support research and tentative preventive measures. Although not 
particularly emphasized in current antipollutant regulations for au-
tomobiles (since the problem is inherent in the engines we use), the 
carbon monoxide exhausted by our cars is lethal in heavy concentrations 
and can result in irreversible brain cell damage in lesser concentrations. 
Carbon monoxide is a heavy gas and settles towards the roadbed and 
sidewalks of the concrete canyons of our larger cities. The amount of 
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carbon monoxide produced by a population of, say, three million au-
tomobiles is considerable. 10 Whereas because of the inefficiency and 
expense involved in producing and transmitting electricity it may be 
posited that electrification of automobiles is a dubious energy budget 
plan, it may eventually prove to be the only alternative to banning 
automobiles in our cities altogether (which in itself might be a good 
energy budget plan if alternative mass transit were to be promoted). 
Electric cars can be run on coal used to generate electricity. They would 
be charged at night when electric load demands are low. 
Excess coal production capacity today in this country (on the order of 
150 to 200 million tons per year) 11 could immediately support a consid-
erable increase in the direct use of coal (including low-BTU gas produc-
tion). The sizable increase in coal production capacity necessary to 
support our electric utilities and a major liquefaction and high-BTU 
gasification program (in view of the 25 percent energy loss involved), 
however, probably cannot occur overnight. There are too many safety 
and labor problems. Safety regulations for deep mining are inadequate 
and those on the books are poorly enforced. 12 Notorious labor problems 
make for, at best, a far-from-predictable industry. 
Additionally the coal industry faces severe political problems; the 
coal-rich western status are developing tax programs for "exported" 
coal. Environmental problems in the case of the western strip-mining 
areas are substantial, and transportation problems abound since we have 
allowed our coal-delivery railroad networks to atrophyY Slurry 
pipelines to deliver water-emulsified coal over long distances are op-
posed by the railroads and often would be most useful for coal mined in 
areas where water is scarce. Research may introduce new prospects. But 
time, perhaps a decade or more, is required for their development unless 
drastic action were to be taken. 
There is also the uncertain "greenhouse" effect to consider since the 
burning of coal produces large quantities of carbon dioxide. Repeated 
warnings have been issued by scientists in recent years that a continuing 
increase in fossil fuel combustion-particularly coal-with the con-
sequent increase in carbon dioxide concentration could raise the earth's 
atmospheric temperature with possibly very severe consequences. 
The "shift to coal" strategy, while of great importance in overall 
energy terms, does not appear to offer immediate prospects of alleviat-
ing the very significant liquid mobility fuel problem in this country. 
Nevertheless it is important to understand that the conversion of coal 
into synthetic liquid fuel is a known art successfully practiced, for 
example, in South Africa. In spite of political and corporate pro-
nouncements to the contrary, there is no mystery to making gasoline 
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from coal. In fact, the South Africa Oil, Coal, and Gas Corporation 
(SASOL) plants were built by an American concern-Fluor Engineers 
and Constructors, Inc., of Los Angeles. Furthermore, coal has a sub-
stantial political lobby. Using existing and proven South African pro-
cesses, the excess coal mining capacity in this country could produce 
about 820,000 barrels of oil per day. Theoretically this could be in-
creased to about 2.5 million barrels per day of methanol, but the pro-
cesses for this have not been tested commercially. 14 It should be noted 
that preliminary tests have revealed that Midwestern coals are generally 
subject to a caking problem which seemingly makes them poor candi-
dates for the SA SOL process. But other, similar, processes are at hand .15 
The United States is singularly blessed with shale oil deposits. These 
include the Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah deposits in the Green River 
Formation, and the Upper Mississippi Valley to Michigan deposits in 
the Devonian and Mississippian formation. The richer deposits are those 
of the Green River Formation. This formation is estimated to contain the 
equivalent of 1.8 trillion barrels of oii.I6 Approximately 600 billion 
barrels of oil would be obtainable from shale holding 25 gallons of oil 
per ton or more; the remainder would be obtainable with greater diffi-
culty from shale holding about 15 gallons of oil per ton. The Michigan 
Antrim shale deposits consist mostly of low-grade oil-bearing shale and 
until recently most authorities considered their exploitation viable only 
in terms of gasificationY Now it appears that liquefaction of the Devo-
nian shales may be feasible using hydro-retorting processes with large 
quantities of water impracticable in the arid western states. About 423 
billion barrels are estimated to be available from this source .18 
The high-grade shale contains about 0.6 barrels of oil per ton of 
shale. Under operating circumstances this might amount to 0.4 to 0.6 
barrels of oil per ton actually extracted. This should be compared with 
the 0. 8 barrels of liquid hydrocarbon produced per ton by the first South 
African coal liquefaction plant (SASOL 1). The second, improved, plant 
in South Africa is expected to produce 1.5 barrels, mainly gasoline, per 
ton. 19 The reason that shale oil is competitive with coal liquefaction is 
that the postextraction processing is simpler and less expensive. This 
comparative advantage is even more pronounced if the earth-moving 
problems involved in shale mining are minimized. 
There are basically three major methods of extracting shale oil. 
These are surface or above-ground retorting, true in situ (i.e., in place 
or in its natural state) retorting, and modified in situ retorting which is a 
combination of the first two technologies. 
Surface retorting is a well-known art. Although never practiced on a 
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large scale, the method has been used since 1694. Today the ussR 
produces about 1.5 percent of its total energy requirement by this pro-
cess.20 After many years of experimentation in this country, including 
projects undertaken by the Bureau of Mines during World War II, the 
Paraho Project was initiated in 1974 by a large consortium of major oil 
companies on government-leased land in the Piceance Creek Basin at 
Anvil Points near Rifle, Colorado. The Paraho process, which used 
experimental retorts roughly a quarter the size ultimately planned, fully 
demonstrated that oil could be extracted from shale in large quantities. 
Over 10,000 barrels of oil produced from this process were refined and 
satisfactorily tested by the military for a variety of mobility fuels. 21 
The earth-moving requirements involved in mining the shale for 
delivery to above-ground crushers and retorts would be staggering on a 
full production scale. Using the figures touched on above it can be 
estimated that a 2 mbpd surface retorting shale oil industry might in-
volve moving some 1.2 billion tons of shale rock per year. 
By 1976 after considerable expenditures, it was generally recognized 
that the above-ground retorting of mined and mechanically crushed 
shale at high temperatures (about 900° F.) in huge steel vessels followed 
by water-intensive refining of the resultant shale oil on-site to achieve a 
pipeline-transferable liquid similar to crude petroleum was, for the time 
being, too expensive a process in the face of foreseeable world oil 
prices.22 
Potential environmental problems attributed to the substances 
leached from the "dumped" spent shale by rain and snow were raised. 
Control of dust generated by crushing oil shale at the surface and re-
vegetation of the mined areas required significant quantities of water. 
The possible contamination of the water table and nearby streams (in-
cluding the Colorado River) was given serious consideration. These 
factors coupled with increasing plant costs have delayed surface retort-
ing projects. Full-scale retorts have not been constructed to "prove" 
pilot module results, although this is still planned. 
The in situ shale oil extraction processes involve underground retort-
ing with very little mining and no surface disposal of spent shale. True 
in situ shale oil recovery, while theoretically promising avoidance of 
environmental problems, is mainly in the exploratory research stage 
with commercialization probably many years in the future. 23 Experi-
ments to date have not produced significant amounts of oil and do not 
appear to be properly designed to develop and utilize a significant 
portion of the oil shale deposit. 24 
Modified in situ shale oil extraction offers a compromise between 
the straightforward brute force approach of surface retorting and the 
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as-yet-to-be-attained in situ retorting. Modified in situ retorting in-
volves mining some 20 to 25 percent of the shale rock in order to expand 
the surrounding rock into the mined-out section to form natural under-
ground retorts. The mined shale can be subjected to surface retorting or 
it can be left to accompany the shale rock slides occurring naturally in 
the mountainous regions where the oil shale outcrops. The earth-moving 
comparison is striking. Whereas a 2-mbpd shale oil industry employing 
surface retorting techniques would have to move perhaps 1.2 billion 
tons of rock per year, a modified in situ industry would have to move no 
more than about 730 million tons per year. To produce an equivalent 
amount of oil using the South African (Fischer-Tropsch Process) coal 
liquefaction procedure would require mining and moving about 487 
million tons of coal per year. Typically about 650 million tons of coal 
are mined annually in this country. 
A modified in situ shale oil operation is already in existence in this 
country. Beginning in 1972 in unusual secrecy, the Occidental Petro-
leum Corporation, a large but not a "major" oil company with few 
domestic oil-related investments, commenced a series of shale oil in 
situ extraction experiments on privately owned land in the mountains 
near Grand Junction, Colorado (Logan Wash site). The shale rock on 
this land was adequate for testing but not premium quality in terms of oil 
content. The incentive for the secret approach in an industry more given 
to flamboyant public advertising lay in the fact that Occidental en-
gineers had evolved a unique extraction process which was believed to 
be patentable. The long-term advantage to a company in terms of roy-
alty fees gathered on the basis of capital investment by others is consid-
erable. Occidental has invested about $60 million in the experiment.25 1t 
has proven more successful than anticipated, but the commercial feasi-
bility of the process remains to be demonstrated. To compete success-
fully with surface retorting with its high liquid yield (95 percent), the 
modified in situ process must obtain yields of about 60 percent, accord-
ing to officials in the Department of Energy (0.4 barrels per ton from 
high-grade shale). Current experiments have not obtained this yield and 
the business community is persuaded at the moment that it may not. 26 
Uncertainty is involved. 
Basically the Occidental approach, at its Logan Wash site, is to mine 
tunnels into a shale mountain at two levels using conventional proce-
dures. The relatively small amounts of shale extracted in the process 
(20-25 percent)-which could be retorted on the surface-is distributed 
in nearby canyons and gulleys. It has none of the dangerous leaching 
properties of spent shale, being simply an addition to the shale slides 
occurring frequently and naturally in the mountains. 
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Inside the shale mountain further excavation forms rectangular shale 
pillars about 200 feet on a side and about 300 feet tall. Explosives are 
then used to "rubble-ize" the shale inside these great pillars so that they 
become, in effect, natural retorts or chambers containing crushed shale 
rock. 
At this point the entry provided by the upper-level tunnel is used to 
bring in air and an igniting fuel such as shale oil. When a predetermined 
volume of oil shale has been retorted, the outside fuel source is 
discontinued. Continued air injection reacts with the residual carbon on 
the spent shale and generates heat to continue the retorting process. The 
retorting of the crushed shale commences from the top proceeding to-
ward the bottom at a rate determined by a computer program. Low-BTU 
gases evolved during retorting process can be used to sustain the com-
bustion process, generate steam, or to cogenerate electricity required in 
the operation. The unique feature of this process, which is still closely 
held even though patents have now been issued, is that through a 
"cracking" process resulting from the combination of combustion and 
temperature control as determined by a computer program, the product 
emerging from the bottom of the retort is not the paraffin-heavy shale oil 
produced by previous methods. It is instead a liquid directly transmitta-
ble by pipeline as in the case of crude petroleum. No water-intensive 
on-site refining is required. Very little water is involved in the process. 
Environmental disturbance is minimal. 
The process just described constitutes a major engineering break-
through provided it succeeds on a large scale. It was described in some 
detail because it may be the approach needed to open up a shale industry 
that could otherwise languish until the year 2000. This is a matter of the 
utmost importance to our national security. 
There appears an excellent prospect for the Occidental process to 
work out. The Rio Blanco Oil Shale Company jointly owned by 
Gulf Oil Corporation and the Standard Oil Company of Indiana has 
purchased a license to use the Occidental method. But if modified in situ 
processing does not succeed, surface retorting is available albeit it 
arouses greater environmental opposition. Even the Occidential modi-
fied in situ process has been challenged environmentally. A suit filed by 
the Environmental Defense Fund, the Colorado Open Space Council, 
and Friends of the Earth named as defendants Secretary of the Interior 
Cecil Andrus, local officials of the Bureau of Land Management and the 
Geological Survey, Gulf Oil Corporation, Standard Oil of Indiana, Ash-
land Oil Company, and Occidental Petroleum Corporation. 27 While the 
frrst ruling was in favor of the defendants, the question of subsequent 
appeal remains to be decided. 
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While a nascent shale oil industry exists, it probably cannot succeed 
in the near term without heavy government subsidy any more than can a 
coal liquefaction program. Apart from economic considerations the 
general informed opinion appears to be that a 2 mbpd shale oil program 
is the maximum attainable for the time being because of the impact of 
population increase and the demands of supporting infrastructure, in-
cluding water. The extraction of oil from Devonian shale in the Midwest 
has not been extensively studied in this connection, but the large re-
serves of this resource warrant rapid investigation. 
Supplementing gasoline with 10 to 20 percent alcohol produced from 
biomass has long been practiced in this country on a small scale. At the 
present time, gasohol is being produced in some of the midwestern 
states with increasing government support. 
Brazil, however, offers the foremost example of a large-scale effort 
to use gasohol to supplement gasoline supplies. A substantial proportion 
of the sugar cane and cassava crops in southern Brazil has been diverted 
to alcohol production. This process has been studied by Norman Rask 
and Reinaldo Adams of Ohio State University, with the following find-
ings to date:28 
Alcohol from energy crops will be competitive with other alterna-
tives to petroleum. Competitive alcohol prices at current production 
technology are within the range of estimates for shale oil and liquefied 
coal-two major substitutes for petroleum. 
Positive employment and income effects are associated with energy 
crop production. Increased employment will be dispersed throughout 
the agricultural sector where energy crops are produced, helping to stem 
the flow of rural migration to urban centers, a major problem in many 
developing areas. Associated processing activities and other local indus-
try will also promote regional employment and income gains. 
Domestic food supplies and food trade volumes may be adversely 
affected. The food-energy relationship raises several critical issues in-
cluding the possibility of higher domestic food prices and less surplus 
available for international trade. Conversely, energy imports will be 
reduced. In the case of Brazil, sugar cane and soybeans are two major 
export crops competing with energy crops for agricultural resources. 
Alcohol production is potentially more profitable for Brazil than for 
the United States. The current emphasis in the United States is on grain 
alcohol (from com), where the cost of the raw material alone per gallon 
of alcohol produced matches the minimum price of finished alcohol in 
Brazil. One bushel of com at $2.25 can be converted into 2.6 gallons of 
ethanol at $.87 per gallon, exclusive of processing cost. An additional 
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$.25 for processing (after credit for feed by-product sales) gives a total 
cost of $1.12 per gallon, with some estimates at even higher levels. 
Sweet sorghum may be a cheaper source of gasohol than com for this 
country. Com, on the other hand, is more easily transported and stored. 
Will ethanol production be a cottage industry at the local level or will it 
become a big business involving a few major processing centers? 
Over the past seventeen years the government has paid com and 
wheat farmers an average of $1.6 billion per year to lower their produc-
tion. Wallace Tyner of Purdue University has calculated that 2.5 billion 
gallons per year, or 164,250 barrels per day, of ethanol could be pro-
duced using existing surplus agricultural production capacity. 29 Theoret-
ically one calculates that about 1.2 million barrels per day of ethanol 
could be produced through utilization of crop residues, unused crop-
land, "set-aside" acres, forage, forest wastes, and municipal solid 
wastes without impinging on the current production of food. Although 
cautiously supportive of the gasohol concept, the Department of Ag-
riculture has warned that an agricultural price support and stabilization 
policy serves different functions from an alcohol fuels program so that 
substitution and shifting of federal outlays may not be feasible. 30 The 
economics of a large-scale gasohol program and its impact on food 
prices are still ambiguous. Meaningful federal support is now appar-
ently assured with the recent extension of the four-cent excise tax 
exemption. This could stimulate long-term private investment on a rela-
tively large scale. 
A common argument used against gasohol is that distilling the al-
cohol for it requires more energy than is produced. A study at the 
University of Illinois reveals that the differences of opinion on this 
energy balance derive from different assumptions as to whether crop 
residues would be used for fuel or not. The modernity of the distilling 
plant is also a factor. In terms of nonrenewable energy, grain-based 
gasohol is probably close to the energy break-even point. On the other 
hand, in terms of petroleum savings (since coal, for example, can be 
used also to operate the distillation unit), gasohol is an "unambiguous 
energy producer. "31 
To this point we have been speaking of ethanol alcohol produced 
mostly from crops and crop residues. For automotive engines, 
methanol or wood alcohol, with certain additives, is just as acceptable 
as fuel. The Mitre Corporation has calculated that a plant about the size 
of a large pulp mill can produce 65.4 million gallons of methanol per 
year32 or 4,384 barrels per day. Since the annual consumption of gaso-
line in this country in 1978 was 7.41 million barrels per day33 with about 
20 percent of the automotive fleet concentrated in the northeastern 
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sector of the United States, it follows that some 340 plants would be 
required to meet the automotive power requirements of the Northeast 
(1.5 mbpd). A more modest proposal has been advanced by the Inter-
technology/Solar Corporation to develop tree farms in the Northeast 
using about 2 percent ( 1 . 6 million acres) of the total forest land with 
about 18 plants producing on the order of 76,970 barrels of methanol 
per day. This would meet the requirements of a 5 percent gasohol 
mixture for the Northeast.34 About twice as many plants and twice as 
many plants and twice as much tree acreage would be required for a 
10 percent gasohol mix in the Northeast. 
An essential element to recognize in biomass fuel production is that 
here one is dealing with a renewable rather than a depleting resource. 
This should mitigate price increases over the years. 
In general, prices of synthetic liquid fuels whether produced from 
shale, coal, or biomass do not yet compare favorably with prices of 
liquid fuels from natural petroleum. Figure 3.3, extracted from the 
National Energy Plan II, gives the current estimate of the Department of 
Energy as to the price of imported oil at which synthetic fuels would 
become economically competitive. 
Concerning Figure 3.3, the Department of Energy has this to say: "In 
the mid-term and beyond, the heavy oils, tar sands, and shale oil are 
likely to be far more viable commercially than the coal-synthetic fuels. 
Unfortunately, the most economic unconventional sources are either 
found mainly outside the U.S. (e.g., the heavy oils, tar sands), or they 
are subject to special environmental limitations (e.g., oil shale). Hence, 
development of the less economic coal-synthetic fuels must also be a 
critical part of the oil and gas strategy. "35 
It is noteworthy that while shale oil extraction is considered the most 
economic and the production of ethanol the least economic, in terms of 
availability of the necessary technology ethanol production is already 
here, albeit on a small scale. But all in all, one cannot be too optimistic 
that large volumes of synthetic fuels will shortly enter our economy 
unless substantial dislocations are accepted. Assuming maximum ex-
ploitation of oil or methanol from surplus coal production, a maximum 
sustainable effort from shale, a maximum effort for ethanol from the 
agricultural sector without food production restraints, and a sustainable 
large-scale methanol production program from forest reserves, one cal-
culates that about 7.2 mbpd of liquid fuel could be produced by 1990. 
Considering the problems and expenditures involved it appears more 
likely that something on the order of 1.5 to 2 mbpd will result, barring 
extreme crisis involving the prolonged loss of 8 mbpd of oil which we 
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Figure 3.3 1990 Crude Oil Prices Required to Make 
Synthetic Fuels Competitive (1978 Dollars) 
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Source: From U.S. Dept. of Energy, National Energy Plan II, 1979, p. iv-3. 
Notes: Low end of the range reflects an optimistic interpretation of available data 
and financing terms commensurate with a mature plant; high end reflects a con-
servative interpretation and a pioneer plant. Financial assumptions include an 
inflation rate of 6%, income tax rate of 50%, project life of 20 years, 16-year 
double-declining depreciation, real interest rate of 3%, debt-equity ratios of 
30nO% and 0/100% for low and high ends of the range respectively, and 
real return rates of 9.5% and 15% for low and high ends respectively. 
import. On a national security basis, however, the rapid development of 
a synthetic fuel industry is already overdue. 
Another factor that may inhibit the energy industry's interest in syn-
thetic fuels is the uncertain but potentially great impact of the Ven-
ezuelan heavy oil deposits on the international oil trade. Figures of 700 
billion barrels and more have been quoted for these reserves north of the 
Orinoco River by the national oil company of Venezuela, Petroleos de 
Venezuela (Petroven).36 Heretofore considered a subeconomic resource 
not even counted in conventional oil reserves and requiring special 
refming techniques because of vanadium and nickel contaminants, this 
thick oily substance may emerge as a severe competitor in industry 
eyes to major domestic development of synthetic fuels during the 1980s. 
There can be no argument, of course, but that in a strategic sense a 
shift in U.S. dependence to an oil source in the Western Hemisphere 
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would be greatly to be preferred over our now dangerous dependence on 
Middle Eastern resources. The Venezuelan story, however, is not yet 
complete; the facts are not in. And our foreign policies relating to 
the Western Hemisphere are by no means clear. The Alberta tar sand 
deposits of Canada may be much larger than the original Athabasca 
estimates (up to 600 billion barrels) but their development is already 
under way and involves a struggle between the province and the fed-
eral government. Heavy oils (perhaps 10 billion barrels) are also 
present in the United States, mostly in California. Our domestic tar 
sands are concentrated in Utah and occur at great depths, making 
extraction difficult. 
We tum now to an examination of other resources which may be 
available. We will not provide a complete account of energy research 
and development nor vigorously assess in technical or even economic 
terms the relative viability and prospects of such efforts in this country 
or abroad. But general observations are necessary to help us understand 
policy options that affect our national security. 
A very useful overall early account of the technological state of 
energy research and development (although it is changing rapidly) was 
provided in 1973 by Hammond, Metz, and Maugh in Energy and the 
Future. 37 The value of their presentation was accentuated by an absence 
of the bias in use anticipation inherent in similar reports by industry or a 
government agency, where estimates necessarily reflect very substantial 
sunk costs in previous research and development and capital expendi-
tures. While the industrial bias in this respect is readily understandable, 
it must be understood in addition that the government has also invested 
heavily in specific energy developments. This inevitably colors its ap-
proach to the feasibility of alternatives. Spent money attracts more 
money, in terms of policy decisions. 
At the instigation of Congressman Mike McCormack (D-
W ashington) a preliminary overview report on the status of the nation's 
energy research and development efforts and prospects was prepared in 
December 1972.38 This initial report was followed in 1976 by a very 
comprehensive bibliographic inventory of U.S. energy and develop-
ment efforts (including expenditures) in both the public and private 
sectors for the years 1973, 1974, and 1975 by the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. 39 
Nuclear power development has dominated U.S. energy research and 
development efforts over the last twenty years. From the Oak Ridge 
Laboratory inventory it can be stated that during the years 1973, 1974, 
and 1975, of the $3 billion directly invested in energy research and 
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development by the government, about 50 percent was devoted to elec-
tric power-almost entirely in the area of nuclear power. Since the early 
1950s it may be conservatively estimated that about $18 billion has been 
spent by the government in this area-with perhaps a larger sum in-
vested in capital assets such as uranium enrichment plants, etc.40 
Given the problems of uranium availability, there are strong incen-
tives to protect the nuclear power electrical production investment by 
reprocessing the spent fuel rods containing over 90 percent unfissioned 
uranium, which we currently bury in the ground. But ultimately con-
tinuation of nuclear power in this country, if we are not to depend upon 
imported uranium from South Africa, Australia, and the Soviet Union, 
requires the development of breeder reactors. 
The national commitment to a breeder reactor program sought by 
Presidents Nixon and Ford in their various energy messages (see chap. 
9) reflected, then, projections of very high national electrical demand, a 
dawning realization that uranium was probably not as plentiful as had 
once been thought, and a huge sunk investment in a government-
sponsored nuclear power industry. The levels projected for electrical 
power demand in the early 1970s have not materialized and may di-
minish further because of reduced birthrates, high costs, publicly per-
ceived dangers, and other factors, but this remains an area of consider-
able uncertainty. 4 1 
The Nixon administration focused on one category of possible 
breeder reactors to the exclusion of other approaches, although a pro-
totype breeder was already in operation in the USSR and prototypes were 
in advanced stages of development in France and to an extent in the 
United Kingdom.42 In any case, the disadvantages of the highly corro-
sive sodium coolant, the handling problems associated with the toxic 
plutonium which the breeder produces, and the bomb-producing poten-
tial of this plutonium are thought by many to constitute problems of 
considerable magnitude. This viewpoint is summarized in the 1977 Ford 
Foundation study, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices, as well as in the 
more sensationalized Friends of the Earth publication, The Silent Bomb. 
In the meantime Admiral Hyman G. Rickover has quietly introduced 
a new core into the old Shippingport reactor, in Pennsylvania near 
Pittsburgh, the only "civilian" reactor that he has ever concerned him-
self with. Although the details have not yet been released to the public, 
this core, possibly including a thorium mix, appears likely to be the first 
thermal (neutron speed) light (regular) water breeder reactor. If so a 
major breakthrough may have been achieved in stretching out uranium 
resources for the time being. 
Another approach to the breeder question has recently been advanced 
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by Walter Marshall, deputy chairman of the United Kingdom's Atomic 
Energy Authority. His proposed CIVEX process would utilize fast 
breeder reactors in such a fashion as to tend to keep the plutonium from 
being extracted for the making of nuclear weapons. This process is 
under evaluation at the present time.43 
For all the controversy that surrounds the nuclear reactor question, a 
few salient points exist which must be kept in mind. First, about 12 
percent of the electric power generated in the United States is now being 
produced by nuclear reactors. Whether to use nuclear power or not is no 
longer a responsibly debatable issue. Its use is already a fact which 
reduces our need for imported oil (or coal) by about 1 mbpd. The future 
growth of the industry is a separate issue. 
Second, the disposal of spent fuel poses serious questions on at least 
two fronts. The so-called wastes themselves pose a potential hazard. 
The failure to reprocess these wastes into new fuel reserves is incompat-
ible with the known limitations in uranium supply. 
Third, if nuclear power is ultimately to support a major portion of the 
nation's electrical generating capacity, as some have envisioned, 
breeder reactors must be developed. To stop breeder reactors is to 
effectively limit the future of nuclear power. From a security point of 
view, how much time we have to consider this question is a function of 
how much readily available and relatively cheap-to-extract uranium ore 
we possess within our own borders. This is a matter of dispute and is 
another uncertainty factor in our national energy and national security 
equation.44 
Finally, regardless of the arguments of the reactor plant construction 
companies and the utilities, the accident at the Three Mile Island reactor 
site near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1979 indicates a need for much 
closer federal regulation of and attention to plant design, construction, 
and operation, as well as operator qualification and training. Public 
opinion, informed or not, may effectively stop nuclear power develop-
ment if firm and very obvious corrective measures are not taken by the 
government. Again, an uncertainty factor is introduced. 
Various alternative energy conversion possibilities are open to us in 
terms of technological feasibility: 
Fusion power, which offers the hope of virtually unlimited fuel 
resources using either deuterium from seawater or tritium bred in the 
fusion reactor itself as fuels. The temperatures involved, however, and 
associated nonexplosive hazards associated with reactor operations pose 
severe engineering problems. As Hammond, Metz, and Maugh point 
out, in contrast to the demonstration of a fission reaction within three 
years after its conceptual description, twenty years have gone, so far, 
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into attempts to demonstrate the practical possibility of fusion. For 
practical policy considerations it must be noted that demonstration may 
never be achieved. 
Magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generators in which even coal could 
be used to generate electricity directly at greater efficiencies than 
through the use of a steam turbine. 
Geothermal processes in which the internal heat of the earth is used 
to produce steam for the generation of electricity as is now done, for 
example, in California and various districts of Italy and Iceland where, 
additionally, direct home heating and industrial heating are achieved. 
Ocean power, involving attempts to harness the energies available in 
the movement of ocean waves, the ebb and flow of the tides, and the 
great temperature differentials in the ocean depths. 
Wind energy research presaging a rebirth of one of man's oldest 
attempts to convert natural energy to useful power. 
Waste combustion for electrical production, under quite intensive 
development in the private sector and being used by a number of cities. 
Solar energy development including the direct use of the sun for 
heating and cooling, the production of electricity either through making 
steam to turn generators or through direct conversion by photovoltaic 
cells, and bioconversion involving the production of fuels by photosyn-
thesis (the production of alcohol with which to dilute and extend 
gasoline supplies is a case in point). 
The development of hydrogen for propulsion and other purposes. 
Common to all of the diffuse and periodic sources of energy (i.e., 
sun, wind, barometric pressure, tides, etc.) is the essential lack of 
knowledge as to how to store their output when it is not needed or in 
anticipation of the time when it will be needed most. 
We know little, for example, about the ability to store electricity. 
The state of the art of battery design appears to be very rudimentary. 
Batteries, in this country, have long been of interest more to camera and 
transistor-radio buffs than to serious scientists. A great deal depends on 
this. The question of electric automobiles is directly involved. Much 
benefit may be obtained from study of the batteries produced for our 
Navy's submarines by Gould and Exide. 
In the end, in a societal sense, it may prove more feasible to store 
hydrogen than electricity. But, this too, is a question which we have 
only begun to look at seriously. Production of hydrogen has itself been 
posited as a limiting parameter. But here again, novel sources of hydro-
gen such as spent shale from which oil has been extracted may be found 
useful. 
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As broad scientific and engineering interest is focused on an area of 
potential research and development, a rapid readjustment of cost- and 
feasibility-estimates occurs. This is particularly true when it becomes 
apparent that different aspects of the problem offer quite different prom-
ises of success in terms of ultimate and short-term payoff. In 1969, 
when the geologist M. King Hubbert was discussing the potential of 
solar energy and estimating low feasibility with high costs, this energy 
source was considered in a less than optimistic "lumped" sense. In 1973 
various particular subapplications were beginning to emerge and feasi-
bility estimates rose somewhat while cost estimates declined. By 1977 a 
specific application was being discussed on the basis of the reliability of 
vendors, the availability of trained installation personnel, and the atten-
dant direct questions of customer financing. By 1978, however, with 
government encouragement but minimal support apart from promises of 
a solar installation tax credit, we see the emergence of a $150 million-
a-year nascent industry with some prospect of growing to the $20 
billion-a-year category in two decades.45 
While it seems to be accepted, at least for the time being, that the 
capital necessary for development of alternative energy resources will 
(or if one prefers, should if possible) come from the private sector, the 
same cannot be said of expenditures for the energy research and de-
velopment that necessarily precedes capital investments. Here, for bet-
ter or worse, the federal government today entirely dominates the scene. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the trend of energy research and development 
expenditures in the United States for 1973, 1974, and 1975 by both the 
public and private sectors. Figures for later years are not available at this 
writing. 
Since research and development determine what options are open for 
production in the future, we must face the fact that, free enterprise or no 
free enterprise, our energy future is currently in the hands of the federal 
government. This pattern is actually not limited to research and de-
velopment efforts. There are few major preproduction or pilot produc-
tion alternative energy developments under way in this country today 
that are not at least partially supported by federal funds. This situation 
of course, has not developed overnight. For many years the heavy direct 
and indirect subsidy of energy by the government has been a fixture on 
the American scene. Table 3.1 offers the data. 
How much time is required to produce energy after the research and 
development stage? In the Project independence Report some estimated 
facility lead times are given in terms of years from a decision to develop 
new energy resources to the startup of the facility concerned. A new oil 
field might be developed in one to four years, a new surface mine on 
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Figure 3.4 Trends in U.S. Expenditures for Energy 
Research and Development, 1973-1975 
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Research and Development, 1973-1975, prepared by the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratories (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976). Redrawn from Howard Bucknell, 
"Energy and National Security: A Status Report," Energy Communications 5, 
no. 4 (1979). By permission of Marcel Dekker, Inc. 
Notes: About 50% of federal expenditures were for electric power research 
and development, largely nuclear fission. California, Washington, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, New Jersey, Idaho, Michigan, New York, and Tennessee 
(in that order) accounted for 54% of state expenditures. 
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Table 3.1 
PUBLIC SUBSIDIES (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) USED TO STIMULATE ENERGY 
PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1918-1977 
(Billions of 1977 Dollars) 
Other (includ-
Tax Disburse- ing market 
incentives ments Services activity) Totals 
Nuclear 15.1 2.9 18.0 
Hydro 1.8 13.53 15.33 
Coal 4.03 4.99 0.69 9. 71 
Oil 50.4 1.1 7.5 42.3 101.3 
Gas 16.04 0.30 0.16 16.50 
Electricity 31.37 0.48 24.73 56.58 
Source: Based on data from Battelle Pacific Northwest Labora-
tories, An Analysis of Federal Incentives to Stimulate Energy Pro-
duction, Executive Summary, December 1978, p. 7. 
private land in as little as three years. Other new energy facilities require 
a minimum of five years lead time. But nuclear plants require eight to 
fourteen years, hydroelectric facilities twenty. 
The Project Independence Report, developed in 1974, naturally did 
not address questions concerning how long it might take to establish 
entirely novel energy industries. Even today one can only guess at how 
long it may be before large-scale applications of solar power are de-
veloped in this country. Nevertheless, the long lead times for conven-
tional facilities illustrate vividly that new energy resources of any nature 
are not to be had on demand during periods of crisis. Crisis management 
for the coming decade, therefore, must be based upon developed re-
sources in being-including strategic stockpiles of oil. 
Because of both economic and technological factors the shift in our 
energy base will take time-a good many years. 
In general terms, the energy developments listed above have scarcely 
been explored. As a beginning is made, however, five salient points 
emerge which are of fundamental importance in understanding the prob-
lems faced in the selection of energy policy options and in putting into 
effect operational priorities as they affect national security. 
The results of energy research and development show increasingly 
that the nation's demographic, geographic, geologic, and climatic di-
versity supports emphases in one region which would be inappropriate 
in another. Research and development must therefore be carried forward 
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simultaneously on a much broader front than heretofore. There is much 
to be said for the decision-making benefits to be gained by state, re-
gional, and local input to national energy research and development 
programs as opposed to arbitrary attempts to guess at requirements from 
Washington. But by and large, on the basis of the record, privately 
supported developments will probably be too little and too late to satisfy 
overall societal and national defense needs. The domination of energy 
research and development by the federal bureaucracy results in cen-
tralized decision-making that can produce major errors in perception or 
judgment. But no other option appears at hand. 
It is clear that these alternative energy approaches tend to group 
themselves into long-term, near-term, and "more-feasibility-studies-
required" categories. But there is a tendency concerning the near-term 
developments to conceive that successful pilot demonstrations herald 
the end of feasibility studies and can automatically be followed by 
production capabilities. This is not the case. Experience in coal gasifica-
tion and liquefaction, for example, has been that even a quarter-scale 
demonstration model by no means demonstrates accurately the propor-
tionate feasibility of a commercially viable full-sized plant. The scale-
up factors (including costs) are seldom linear. Generally speaking, it 
must probably be accepted that major changes in our energy base will 
not be achieved within a decade. Thus, if we are lacking in national 
security today, it may be taken for granted that wfj will probably remain 
in this condition of vulnerability for some years to come. 
As advances have been made in each of the energy research and 
development areas listed, it has become increasingly clear that unex-
pected possibilities and problems are opened up. Thus, considerable 
flexibility should be maintained in research and development policy in 
order to take advantage of opportunities and to avoid the pitfalls of 
diminishing returns. Solar energy may be taken as an example here, 
because in at least its heating and bioconversion applications it is close 
to the stage where only direct engineering work is necessary to 
capitalize on its potential. This potential represents an important con-
tribution but in itself will not solve the national energy problem. The 
ability to exploit sudden breakthroughs is not present in the normal 
bureaucratic structure. Thus, some "supra" mobilization board is indi-
cated as part of the preferred energy administrative apparatus. It should 
be staffed as far as possible by entrepreneurial personnel removed from 
the Civil Service since risk-taking is involved. 
Another point to be remembered is that none of the alternatives to 
petroleum or synthetic fuels so far deemed plausible, with the notable 
exception of nuclear power for the Navy, offer specific propulsion 
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benefits to the armed forces. Thus, while the society as a whole has 
some prospect of being weaned away from a petroleum and gas econ-
omy, the military element of our society in its present constitution 
seems to remain inexorably wedded to it. From a defense standpoint it 
should be noted that the long lead times for the development of alterna-
tive resources on a meaningful scale effectively preclude reliance on 
their mobilization in times of emergency. In wartime we can ration 
gasoline and draw from a National Strategic Petroleum Reserve (if we 
have one), but we probably cannot solve the wartime problem by devel-
oping new energy resource industries before we lose the war. Concern-
ing our domestic capacity to meet fuel needs, we should remember 
that our domestic refining capacity, maligned as it is, nevertheless 
considerably exceeds our domestic oil-producing capacity. Running our 
refineries at full tilt requires a sustained influx of foreign crude or 
domestic synthetic oil. 
If alternative energy resources are necessary to us in time of war, or 
more optimistically, are necessary to reduce the chance of war, then 
these resources must be developed in times of peace. As has been true 
since the days of Moses, the granaries of a nation are not filled during 
the years of famine. 
The final point is that most alternative energy resource developments 
or conservation efforts today are being debated in adversary terms, 
following a common American practice, in order to determine the 
"winner"-the single best alternative energy resource on which we 
should concentrate our development efforts. Thus every encouraging 
advance in one area is taken as a threat by the proponents of all other 
energy approaches and is opposed accordingly. Proponents of conserva-
tion measures tend to play down all alternative resource development 
other than decentralized solar lest success in those areas make the case 
for energy conservation less meaningful. 
None of the schemes of energy development which we have dis-
cussed in this chapter can solve the national energy problem in its 
entirety or at once. We must learn to live with a wide diversity of energy 
supports. And, finally, if the resources we rely upon are endangered, we 
have no recourse but to conserve their use while seeking replacements. 
The Economic Politics 
of Energy Transition 
In an energy-dependent society when it becomes apparent that the 
energy sources which mainly sustain it are no longer reliably and eco-
nomically available, one can expect attention to be given to the matter 
of shifting to other sources of energy provided the technological and 
political options to do so exist. Who is to be given the responsibility of 
making the necessary decisions? The question can arouse much eco-
nomic as well as ideologic controversy. The answer may well be found 
in the political arena if the political structure is strong enough to with-
stand the strain. And if it is not? Well, we have been taught in the 
last two centuries that revolution is a form of politics too. After all, 
our own country was formed by that process. 
In a large and complex country, it need not be supposed that the 
transition from one energy base to another can be accomplished easily, 
quickly, or cheaply. Not everyone acknowledges the necessity for 
change: the "sunk costs" or capital investments at the individual and 
corporate levels in the older forms of energy and the devices it serves 
are enormous. And the financial costs, while staggering, are at least 
matched by political and social costs-some of which can be only 
inexactly measured. 
One can perceive that if an individual householder has recently 
bought a new gas furnace and has also purchased a new gasoline-driven 
automobile, the news that the country is shifting overnight to an all-
electric economy based on nuclear power might strike him with dismay. 
When multiplied by the millions and added to the dilemma of huge 
agricultural, military, industrial, transportation, and commercial service 
sectors, this dismay could amount to a level of national consternation 
and indignation sufficient to place all politicians on the unemployment 
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rolls regardless of the facts and figures they may present. This might 
constitute in our country a bloodless (or so one hopes) revolution, for all 
that a new form of government might be involved. 
Nor need one conceive that this is a problem peculiar to democracies 
enjoying free elective processes. The industrialized dictatorships ruled 
by fear and force are faced with an equivalent and even more serious 
problem. There the massive civil coercion resulting almost necessarily 
during a fundamental and rapidly undertaken shift in energy resource 
base can provoke outright bloody revolution, the specter all dictators 
must live with. 
In democracy and dictatorship, however, there runs a common 
thread. If energy is essential to the society involved, and energy sources 
become unreliable, it must adapt itself to the new circumstances or 
perish. The time available for this transition is often more a matter of 
conjecture than considered judgment, since besides the uncertainty at-
tending the status of physical resources there are also uncertainties about 
the intentions of foreign powers which in tum exacerbate uncertainties 
concerning the reactions of the domestic populace. 
The most useful analytic procedures we have in confronting such 
circumstances are to be found in the evaluation of the nature of the 
probable changes, their time-frame, and the process involved. These 
may be quite different in different countries because of variations in 
population, population distribution, social mores, geography, indige-
nous resource base, and type of government. 
For this reason what we have to say about the energy situation in the 
United States may or may not mirror the problems confronting other 
countries. Nevertheless, our energy situation is inextricably bound up 
with that of many other countries and this interrelationship will be 
addressed to some extent here and at greater length in subsequent chap-
ters. Some aspects of the intertwined relations of energy are essentially 
benign and positive. Some are most definitely negative. As in families, 
the interdependencies imposed among nations by the complex web of 
life are not always happy ones. 
Our task in this chapter is to address the question of energy transition 
costs. How much would it, or will it, cost in this country to change from 
an oil and natural gas economy to some other energy base? 
Maintaining or attempting to maintain the energy status quo means 
maintaining and probably increasing defense expenditures. Thus, if 
public expenditures are involved in an energy base transition, these 
expenditures, politically speaking, are competitive with defense dollars. 
This introduces a dilemma peculiar to our present dependence upon oil 
imported over long distances by sea from politically turbulent areas. 
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Should our dollars be most logically expended to ensure the military 
defense of this traffic? Or would we be wiser to spend our money to 
remove ourselves from the dependence? Or must we do both? The 
answers to these questions require estimates of feasibility. In this chap-
ter we will attempt to assess solely the question of how much it would 
cost, provided that it is technically feasible, to effect a transition of our 
society away from acute dependence on oil and gas, other than that 
produced within our own borders, to reliance upon some other sources 
of energy. Complete autarky is not implied here, since few current 
analyses consider this as a serious possibility. The question of monetary 
costs attending an overall societal energy transition is very difficult to 
isolate because all studies on this subject perforce interweave the costs 
of maintaining and extending the existing economy with those of find-
ing and developing a substitute. So we must seek information from a 
variety of sources, noting the trend of this information as we do so. 
A study of capital requirements for energy through the year 1985 
which was often quoted until recently is the National Petroleum Council 
report, U.S. Energy Outlook: An Initial Appraisal, /971-/985. Figures 
from this study are provided in Table 4.1. The amounts given in this 
table reflect 1970 dollars and hence would grow appreciably as a result 
of inflation. These figures do not include interest on debt repayment 
(which would also raise the amounts); neither do they take into account 
conservation policies (which might lower the amounts). They assume 
little change in energy usage because of then-anticipated moderately 
higher prices. Current world oil prices, of course, are not moderately 
higher than those of 1970; they are seven times as high. And they are 
expected to increase. 
Nuclear power and coal industry costs are not reflected in Table 4.1, 
nor are capital expenditures (other than in refinery expansion) by U.S. 
companies abroad. U.S. companies currently provide roughly one-half 
of the Free World petroleum investment. 1 Additionally, the costs of 
fossil-fueled public utility plant expansion and the research and de-
velopment effort eventually required to produce nonfossil fuel energy 
sources are not included in the table. 
The Sun Oil Company estimated in 1972 that to include the public 
utilities, coal, and nuclear plant requirements and to include capital 
expenditures abroad by U.S. companies necessary to meet our import 
requirements as well as the U.S. share of Free World oil and gas 
demands would raise total capital requirements to about $500 billion for 
the period 1971 to 1985.2 This figure was also used by then-Secretary 
of the Treasury John B. Connally in his testimony before the House 
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee in April 1972.3 Under question-
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Table 4.1 
NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL ESTIMATE OF OIL AND 
GAS CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, 
1971 THROUGH 1985 
Oil & gas production & exploration 
Domestic oil refining 
Pipelines (domestic & marine) 
Gas transportation 
Oil from shale 
Syngas plants 
Tankers 
Terminals in U.S. 
Refineries overseas 
Alaskan pipelines & facilities 
Total 
Billions of 
1970 dollars 
92.0 
20.0 
18.0 
21.0 
0.5 
2.5 
13.5 
1.0 
2.5 
3.0 
174.0 
Source: National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy 
outlook: An Initial Appraisal, 1971-1985. 
ing, Connally acknowledged that the U.S. share of this amount was 
not available "under present circumstances" in the private sector. 
But the Sun Oil figures are not the last word. More detailed figures 
on the financial needs solely of the petroleum industry have been pub-
lished by the Chase Manhattan Bank.4 The estimate of their Energy 
Economics Division was that the petroleum industry alone would need 
about $1.35 trillion between 1970 and 1985 to meet anticipated 
worldwide demands. We are better than halfway through this period and 
nothing approaching one-half of this figure has been met. 
The Federal Energy Administration's Project Independence Report 
in reviewing the capital investment requiremerlt for energy from 197 5 to 
1985 concluded that something on the order of $380 billion to $454 
billion (in 1973 dollars) would be required to meet U.S. needs if the 
domestic supply of energy was in fact to be accelerated. These figures 
span similar estimates made by the National Petroleum Council, the 
National Academy of Engineering, and Arthur D. Little Associates.5 
In a speech given on 22 September 1975, President Ford spoke of 
"over $600 billion of energy investment over the next decade to finance 
American energy independence. •'6 
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Estimates made in the spring of 1977 by Carter administration offi-
cials in support of forthcoming conservation proposals mentioned the 
figure "three-quarters of a trillion dollars." A figure of $550 billion 
between 1977 and 1985 is quoted along with environmental concerns in 
the administration's National Energy Plan as the rationale for not at-
tempting to accelerate energy production efforts on a crash basis.7 
The Energy Information Administration currently points out that 
energy capital expenditures for 1971 to 1977 total $286. 3 billion in 
constant 1978 dollars8 or $40.9 billion per year. The capi.tal require-
ments for energy projected by the Department of Energy for the period 
1978-1985 range from $336.15 billion to $385.06 billion. This invest-
ment of $48 billion to $55 billion per year is held to be within the 
proportion of nonresidential fixed business investment that can be 
supplied by the private sector based upon historical evidence. Thus the 
Department of Energy assures us that our energy bill in terms of future 
capital investment can be met by the private sector essentially on a 
"business as usual" basis. The disconcerting element in this assurance, 
however, is that the Department of Energy, in the same report,9 postu-
lates that oil imports are expected to rise from the then current 8. 1 mbpd 
to between 9.1 and 12.50 mbpd in 1985 and between 9. 8 and 16.1 mbpd 
in 1990. This coincides with the general industry view, since large-scale 
efforts to develop alternative energy resources were simply not expected 
at the time the report was written. 10 
In a national security context, if it is accepted that large volumes of 
imported and interruptable oil constitute a financial and military danger 
to our society, then it cannot be said that a "business as usual" energy 
investment approach is a solution to the national security dilemma. A 
rapid transformation of our society from one acutely dependent upon oil 
would require the expenditure of public funds above and beyond private 
funds on a scale far and away greater than heretofore visualized. It 
should be noted at this juncture that there is a lack of agreement as to 
whether large sums, above and beyond those noted, would in fact effi-
ciently enhance energy production. This argument combines doubts 
concerning the physical capacity for rapid expansion of U.S. energy 
industries with pessimism concerning large-scale ventures under gov-
ernment direction-success in the Manhattan and Apollo programs and 
the wartime establishment of the synthetic rubber industry notwithstand-
ing. 
In any case, given our specific national goals for defense, social 
improvement, education, economic strength, and environmental protec-
tion, it might be bizarre to propose that a sum equivalent to all business 
profits should be expended annually for the development of energy 
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Table 4.2 
GENERAL TRENDS IN RELIANCE ON ENERGY SOURCES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Percentage 
1950 1972 1976 1978 
Coal 37.8 17.2 21 18 
Petroleum 39.5 45.5 46 48 
Natural gas 18.0 32.3 25 25 
Hydropower 4.7 4.1 4 4 
Nuclear 0 0.9 4 4 
Geothermal, solar, 
and other 0 0 0 1 
Note: These figures are derived from the EIA Annual 
Report to Congress, 1979, p. 7, except as modified by 
information received from the Chase Manhattan Bank and 
the Bureau of Mines (U.S. Department of the Interior). 
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resources. 11 Yet there is the alternative question: What happens to these 
various goals and needs of the nation if there is an insufficiency of 
secure energy to implement them? 
The availability of capital funds for energy development, the deci-
sion to commit them, and the sources from which they might be drawn 
will become some of the major political issues of our era. They directly 
impinge on questions of national security in its broadest context. 
In the interest of consensus for the achievement of immediate goals, 
it can be anticipated that policy proposals will place a heavy emphasis 
on conservation of energy in the hope that it will prove the cheap way 
out-financially and politically. As current debates in Congress have 
emphasized, this can be a moot point. It is not clear what we will learn 
about the cost of transforming the energy base of our society. It is clear 
that up to now estimates have escalated steadily. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the general trend of our energy source reliance 
during the period 1950-1978. Nationwide, on the average, we use about 
36 percent of our energy for industry, 26 percent for transportation, and 
19 percent each for residential and commercial applications .12 This 
average figure is unsatisfactory for planning, however, because of re-
gional differences in our large country. Where only about 9 percent of 
regional energy is used in households in the west South Central states, 
this figure increases to about 40 percent in New England. On the Pacific 
coast about 32 percent of energy is used in the transportation sector 
whereas in the west South Central states the figure drops to about 20 
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percent. On the other hand, about 51 percent of the energy budget in the 
west South Central states is used for industrial purposes whereas in New 
England this drops to about 9 percent. In electric power consumption 
there is also a spread of percentages with the highest percentage occur-
ring in the east South Central region with the South Atlantic and Pacific 
coast regions close seconds. 
It is instructive to note that about 15 percent of our total energy 
consumption is reflected in gasoline demand for automobiles. In the 
overall sense, however, as previously noted, over 50 percent or 10.9 
mbpd of our total petroleum consumption of 18.6 mbpd occurs in the 
general transportation market. 13 If transportation is a factor vital to the 
functioning and defense of our society, then, clearly, the availability of 
liquid mobility fuels is of crucial present-day importance. 
In early 1977 imported oil accounted for 50 percent of all the oil 
consumed in this country. Since that time it has varied between 43 
percent and 47 percent with indications that it could exceed 50 percent 
in the 1980s without government-imposed limitations even though a 
sharp drop in consumption was noted in 1979 (January 1980 saw the 
lowest demand-18.6 mbpd, which was 2 mbpd, or 10 percent, below 
the level a year earlier. 14 
Typical stock levels at the end of any given month range between 
800 and 1,200 million barrels of all categories of petroleum products. 
This amounts to about 90 to 140 days' worth of imported oil at current 
consumption rates. Crude oil production in the United States in March 
1980 had dropped to about 8.5 mbpd, 13 percent of which was derived 
from off-shore wells.15 It peaked in 1970 and has been declining ever 
since. If the importing of crude were to be suspended, at the end of 
about 100 days (arbitrarily expressed, since rationing would ensue), 
petroleum product availability in this country would be down by about 
50 percent. 
U.S. refining capacity amounts to about 17 mbpd, which consider-
ably exceeds domestic supply .16 The incentive for domestic refining of 
crude oil lies in the relative cheapness of crude oil transport compared to 
refined product transport. 
National gas production in the United States amounts to about 20 
trillion cubic feet per year. It peaked in 1973 at 22.6 trillion cubic feet 
and has been declining ever since. Domestic proved reserves (excluding 
those in Alaska) have been steadily diminishing since 1965. 
Coal production was 640 million tons in 1975. This is an increase of 
no more than 4 percent over 1972. In 1978 coal production reached 
about 650 million tons. Capacity exceeded the demand for coal by 
perhaps 200 million tons. 
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The current seventy-one commercial nuclear reactors actually pro-
ducing electric power in the United States reduce our oil (or coal) 
consumption by about one million barrels oil-equivalent per day. From 
providing 1 percent of our energy needs in 1972, nuclear power in 1979 
accounted for about 4 percent (12 percent of electrical power). 
Although the automobile is to be found everywhere in the United 
States, the implications of automobile travel are quite different in dif-
ferent regions of the country. New York City has a large and relatively 
efficient mass transportation system. Los Angeles does not. Workers in 
the two cities are faced with different considerations when they make 
decisions about private auto ownership. 
Similarly the energy supply-and-demand figures averaged across the 
country are quite misleading on a regional basis. In the energy consump-
tion and supply fields there is no "average" American energy commu-
nity in terms of practical policy development. This is of extreme impor-
tance in the formulation of energy policy-including a policy to have no 
policy. And it lies at the heart of understanding what happens vis-a-vis 
energy at the congressional level. 
The northeastern states, for example, receive the vast majority of 
their energy supplies in the form of sea-delivered petroleum products. 
These deliveries are generally of foreign origin. About 80 percent of 
New England homes are heated by oil-mostly foreign oil. 
Thus, basically, the northeastern sector of the United States is the 
major direct recipient of imported oil whereas the oil consumed in the 
rest of the United States is more generally provided from domestic 
resources. In a sense, for energy purposes, New England is almost a 
foreign country. In any case, its energy problems cannot be addressed 
by looking at the nation's overall statistics of energy. 
The oil obtained from Alaska as the new pipeline begins reliable 
sustained operation ends up in California. California, of course, has its 
own oil resources and the Alaskan oil, at this point, is a glut on the 
market since there is no pipeline at present over the Rocky Mountains. 
There may never be, in view of the economics of the situation and the 
multistate regulatory problem. Shipping Alaskan oil to Japan in ex-
change for East Coast-delivered oil may eventually be a partial solu-
tion. The great crude oil carriers which carry oil economically if not 
safely in the Atlantic trade cannot navigate the narrow Panama Canal. A 
multitude of smaller ships must be used if the Alaskan oil is to reach the 
East Coast--or even the Gulf Coast. A considerable price, therefore, is 
paid for not having constructed a pipeline from Alaska through Canada, 
despite the vagaries and venalities of Canada's very complicated web of 
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Figure 4.1 The Trend in Tanker Size 
t--------1973 477,000 tons 1,181 feet -------------1 
327,000 tons 1,135'feet --------------<._1 
Source: Based on sketch in Newsweek, 19 Oct. 1970, p. 95. By permission of 
Fenga & Freyer, Inc. 
governmental jurisdictions. In recognition of this fact the decision to 
negotiate the building of a trans-Canadian gas pipeline has belatedly 
been made by the administration. 
The enormous increase in tanker size which now precludes use of 
either the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal is shown in Figure 4.1. (Wi-
dening and deepening of the Suez will change this somewhat by mid-
1981.) Figure 4.2 shows the economic rationale behind building these 
huge vessels. A peculiarity of the modem supertanker is its extreme vul-
nerability to sabotage or torpedo or missile attack. It is almost impossible 
to miss. Its cargo ensures that a hit will result in total destructionP And 
yet our national well-being depends heavily, as President Carter has 
phrased it, upon a thin line of tankers stretching around the world to the 
Strait of Hormuz. 
Unfortunately, the energy problem portrayed for New England is 
typical of most of the nation's main regions in one way or another. Our 
midwestern states, for instance, obtain oil and gas from Canada. The 
same problem occurs in the Soviet Union, although it is not yet depen-
dent on foreign sources. In the absence of delivery systems the probable 
energy riches of Siberia in the distant, frozen reaches of the USSR are of 
scant comfort to the residents of Moscow except, possibly, in terms of 
national pride. These fuels could eventually wind up in Japan if she can 
bear the economic and political price. 
The regional disparity in energy supply and energy demand in the 
United States has so far received very little attention from the would-be 
planners in Washington. The response to the problem by private entre-
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Figure 4.2 Oil Transportation Costs by Tanker Size, 1979 
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preneurs has only coincidentally reflected considerations of national 
well-being. 
In the Project Independence Report conceived under President 
Nixon and completed under President Ford, the only reference to the 
disparity of regional energy needs lay in a short discussion on the 
differences in energy pricing among nine arbitrarily selected regions. 18 
President Carter's National Energy Plan made no mention of this phe-
nomenon at all. Yet it is of crucial sociopolitical and economic import. 
Left unattended it could throw our Republic back to the pre-
Constitutional days of rampant interstate economic (and worse) warfare 
where "have" states defended their products and "have-not" states 
sought military redress. 
Only twelve states of the Union are self-sufficient in energy. The 
remainder are net importers. About twenty-six states have substantial 
internal energy resources. On this basis while the extremely energy-rich 
states are in a minority, the division between energy-rich and energy-
poor is close enough to 50-50 as to significantly affect energy policy 
development, especially in the Senate. 19 
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But in spite of problems, energy ties our country together. The 
transportation (and communication) facilities we have developed link 
the enormously diverse sectors of our nation into a single cohesive and, 
up to now, marvelously productive whole. 
For this linkage we presently rely on liquid fuels derived from petro-
leum. Over 50 percent of the petroleum we use goes into transportation. 
Automobiles consume some 50 percent of this. Trains, trucks and buses 
consume less, not only because they are more efficient as machines but 
because a high percentage of passenger miles in this vast country are 
traveled by air. Here the distance per gallon is often better measured in 
terms of yards per gallon rather than miles per gallon although when 
planes are fully loaded the gallon per passenger mile ratio is acceptable, 
especially on long trips. Should it become necessary to ration liquid 
fuels, however, it can be expected that, as in World War II, air travel 
would necessarily be controlled on a priority basis. The Soviet Union 
has recently found it necessary to cut back Aeroflot services within its 
borders due to its own energy problems. 
In 1977 the Free World oil industry invested $61.580 billion in 
capital for production, processing, transportation, exploration, and so 
forth.20 Of this, $22.4 billion was invested in the United States (five of 
the seven so-called major international oil companies are nominally 
U.S. corporations).21 The petroleum industry's worldwide gross in-
vestment in fixed assets at the end of 1977 totaled $427 billion; $163 
billion (38 percent) of this was located in the United States.22 After 
correcting the 1967 expenditures (using the U.S. GNP price deflator) it 
can be said that in ten years worldwide oil production expenditures had 
increased by 20 1 percent. 23 
The thirty largest petroleum corporations which Chase Manhattan 
monitors on a continuing basis allocated 60 percent of their capital 
spending in 1974, or about $13.4 bi!Iion, to the United States.24 About 
two-thirds of this, Chase Manhattan analysts calculate, was devoted to 
increasing the supply of petroleum. The point is made by these analysts 
that although 60 percent of the group's capital investment was made in 
the United States, only 41 percent of its profits were earned here. 
Capital investment in the United States is portrayed as being, for 1974, 
twice as large as profits. The decrease in profits originating in the 
United States, which resulted from elimination of the depletion 
allowance and from increasing taxes, will probably now be accentuated 
as a result of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980. Nevertheless, 
domestic capital investment in oil production has continued to rise. In 
spite of these increasing capital investments, however, domestic oil 
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Figure 4.3 Primary Oil Movements by Sea, 19n 
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Our Energy Lifelines (Washington, D.C., 
1979). 
production has steadily declined and, until 1979, imports steadily in-
creased to make up the difference. The 1975 world oil surplus condition 
due both to possible overproduction in the Arabian fields and to the 
worldwide economic recession was only slightly reflected in the United 
States. Today's situation of slight oversupply will be overtaken by an 
undersupply situation which, on the whole, will probably persist in the 
decade ahead in spite of fluctuations in demand due to recession. 
Although an enormous quantity of oil is imported daily into the 
United States, it must be understood that the United States is not OPEc 's 
only market. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The implications of this 
situation will be addressed later in a discussion of the international 
aspects of energy policy (chapter 7). 
The domestic oil corporations do not control the entire energy re-
source industry in this country-although the larger of these companies 
have always dealt in natural gas and are, increasingly, buying coal and 
uranium mining companies and investing (often on a consortium basis) 
in various processes for the gasification and liquefaction of coal and the 
extraction of oil from shale. For practical purposes, the major petroleum 
64 Energy and the National Defense 
companies dominate our national energy scene at present. It is estimated 
that better than 27 percent of capital available to the oil industry in this 
country is controlled by the four U.S. companies incorporated as the 
Arabian-American Oil Company, or Aramco.25 
In the case of the major oil companies we are dealing with large 
international organizations. They are in business to sell oil as long as 
they have it. For the time being they have a great deal of oil to sell. 
Much of it is foreign oil. They must attempt, therefore, to sell it rather 
than to spend much money on developing another resource. Generally 
speaking, what they do spend on alternate resource development may 
be thought of as a long-term investment, a holding action financed as 
cheaply as possible as a hedge against future supply uncertainties. 
On the face of it, then, the oil companies are structured and regulated 
unfavorably for the rapid development of U.S. total energy resources, 
even though such development might be included in their long-range 
plans and might reflect the national interest. 
Current government policy-as expressed in concrete tax laws, 
rather than political speeches-is apparently driving, or has driven, the 
major oil companies out. This is of acute importance because these 
companies also control most natural gas companies and, as a rough 
estimate, about 50 percent of domestic uranium production and perhaps 
20 percent of our coal production. 
It should be noted that the coordinated operations of all of our energy 
industries for many years would be necessary to make a meaningful 
contribution to our national energy development needs if the private 
sector is to solve the problem. Such a coordinated operation may well be 
impossible under our existing antitrust laws even though it might be 
acceptable for patriotic reasons to many oil corporation executives con-
scious of the national security implications of present trends. 
There are those, of course, who doubt the vision, selflessness, and 
for that matter the capacity, of the American business community to put 
together a coherent national energy program-even if it were to be done 
within the constraints of the antitrust laws. But other questions may cast 
a darker shadow on the prospects of financing our energy needs through 
the private sector. 
The Federal Energy Administration concluded in its 1974 Project 
Independence Report that the private sector of the United States was 
capable of financing the major energy programs required for "indepen-
dence." According to FEA calculations, with supporting estimates from 
the Brookings Institution: and the Bureau of Labor, between $379 and 
$474 billion (in 1973 dollars) would probably be available during the 
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period 1975-1985 if energy investment for coal, oil, and gas were to 
follow roughly the patterns of the last twenty years. That this will be the 
case is, at best, uncertain. 
One of the assumptions implicit in Project Independence thinking 
was that a vast program of energy expansion in the United States would 
attract foreign capital on a large scale.26 There is historical support for 
such an assumption. Certainly, for instance, the great U.S. railroad 
expansion of the nineteenth century was heavily financed by private 
foreign investors. But today, with many nations of Western Europe 
falling steadily deeper into debt to meet OPEC price demands, there is 
a question about the availability of capital from these sources. As to 
the OPEC nations investing in U.S. enterprise, we have further consider-
ations. 
For one thing, investments from these nations are national govern-
ment investments, not the private investments of individuals. This in-
troduces political as well as economic factors. It is something of a moot 
question whether the OPEC cartel would desire to invest in American 
"independence." It is commonly understood that Project Independence 
implied not merely economic independence but also, most assuredly, 
political independence to pursue foreign policy goals deemed important 
by the American people-to the extent that we have the means to do so. 
Whether those means exist or not at the moment is, of course, assuming 
the proportions of a national debate in itself. 
Secondly, there is the question of inflation and the diminishing value 
of the dollar on the international exchange. American investments pay 
dividends in coin of diminishing value. 
Thirdly, there is the question of financial risk. A general uneasiness 
continues to pervade the oil industry concerning the price of oil since 
many indicators of the heretofore accepted traditional category have 
until recently pointed toward a drop in world oil prices due to a glut 
caused by Middle Eastern overproduction of oii.27 That this glut would 
probably be transitory is beside the point: the prospects even of great 
corporations can be ruined in the short term by major vagaries in market 
prices. If oil prices drop, capital to produce alternative energy sources 
will not be forthcoming. Capital already invested will be, in the short 
term, lost. The uncertainties in this context are enormous. 
This latter factor (and perhaps also the possibility that U.S. private 
enterprise cannot raise the requisite capital) may have led President 
Ford in September 1973 to accept Vice-President Rockefeller's concept 
of a $100 billion Energy Independence Authority for raising capital for 
energy development by private industry. 28 Certainly it is at the root of 
the Carter proposal of 1979 to form an Energy Security Corporation.29 
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The concern over private industry's ability to raise energy develop-
ment capital was more openly acknowledged in a joint statement issued 
by the Departments of State and Treasury and the FEA on 26 February 
1975.30 This statement constituted a proposed addendum to the Interna-
tional Energy Program entered into by the administration but to this date 
only obliquely acknowledged by Congress.31 It was postulated (naively 
it now seems) that efforts here and abroad to develop alternative sources 
of energy would bring down the price of oil. If this happened, it might 
restimulate oil consumption-posing problems for investors in alterna-
tive energy resource development. 
A common internationally agreed-upon "floor price" or a common 
tariff were proposed as solutions to guard against this eventuality. In 
1976 the International Energy Agency finally did adopt a floor price for 
oil prices of $7. The discrepancy between this price and the prices for 
alternative energy sources, however, suggests that the "floor" was little 
more than a gesture. The fundamental problem may be that practical 
men of affairs have, so far, been simply unable to conceive that the 
world may be exhausting its oil supply or that powerful governments 
accustomed to world rule may have lost control of their own economic 
circumstances. 
Thus, although we often hear it said that the United States has no 
energy policy, it appears that we do have a policy. The policy seems to 
be having the effect, intended or otherwise, of driving our most able oil 
and gas developers out of the country and of prohibiting the coordina-
tion of these developers in pooling skilled manpower and specialized 
equipment in this country for the most efficient development of our 
remaining hydrocarbon energy resources. 
Straightforward alternatives run into a thicket of cherished shib-
boleths concerning free enterprise on the one hand and consumer protec-
tion on the other. All of this is overlaid with antitrust laws that are 
spasmodically passed and occasionally enforced. Little of it takes into 
account the driving incentives of private business operated by men 
determined to survive corporately and in the eyes of liberal reformers, 
inured to regulatory government in the manner of insect species geneti-
cally developed beyond the influence of DDT. 
As for solar, geothermal, fusion, nuclear, and other more exotic 
energy sources, the oil, gas, and coal companies with some significant 
exceptions have, the data suggest, neither the resources, the personnel, 
nor much immediate incentive for their development on a large scale. 
The utilities on the other hand, seemingly have neither the access to 
capital nor the managerial innovativeness to help. In their Topsy-like 
development over the last forty years or so they have accumulated many 
Transition 67 
lawyers in their managements as a result of their regulatory environ-
ment. Lawyers are poorly equipped to deal with engineering problems. 
Nor are bankers much help. 
If these new resources are to be developed in a timely manner (before 
oil and gas run out, economically speaking), it seems rather clear that 
research and development and initial capital investment in these areas 
must be heavily funded and initially directed in the national interest by 
the federal government. The large-scale extraction of oil from shale is a 
case in point. Even before the 1977 change in administrations it was 
privately acknowledged among FEA and ERDA personnel, for example, 
that the $2.2 billion research and development funding level of fiscal 
1977 by no means represented an all-out effort. The risks involved 
in pursuing these projects (not all of which will prove success-
ful) cannot be undertaken, many industry people believe, by the private 
sector except under heavy public subsidy. That public subsidy of energy 
is not a new concept in this country was shown clearly in Table 3 .1. 
Support from the administration of 1981 is uncertain. 
Industrial (as opposed to pilot) development of alternative hydrocar-
bon energy resources (coal liquefaction and gasification and oil extrac-
tion from shale) are viewed by industry for the time being, as being too 
risky or, at least, incompatible with their capital resource and borrowing 
capacities-or simply at variance with an immediate opportunity to 
make money on foreign oil. 
The fear persists, however illogically, that OPEC will collapse and 
that the worldwide price of oil will plummet from $30 or more per barrel 
toward 1973 prices. One can understand these fears, firmly based as 
they are on conventional economic wisdom. Some stem from executive 
ignorance or short-sightedness in the business community. Others have 
been encouraged by government naivete, inaction, and seemingly irra-
tional regulation. Processes for coal liquefaction and gasification have, 
after all, existed for many years. 
The German Luftwaffe was flying aircraft and the German army was 
propelling tanks with gasoline produced from coal thirty-five years ago 
during World War 11.32 Admittedly these processes were costly-but 
they worked. And the low-BTU coal gasification in wide use until 1947 
has been mentioned already. Today, South Africa has a large-scale 
synthetic fuel industry based on coal liquefaction and gasification. 
Gasoline produced there in this manner costs about twice what we pay 
in this country at the present. But because of government subsidy and 
the various complicated tax policies involved, this is still much less than 
paid by motorists in most of Western Europe. 
Pure pioneering is therefore by no means involved in the application 
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and improvement of these measures. But doubts die hard, much misin-
formation prevails, and we hear every day discussions of "demonstra-
tion plants" for the production of synthetic fuels from coal. Government 
administrators have tended to compound this confusion. In a panel 
discussion in 1977 sponsored by the New York Times. 33 John F. 
0 'Leary, then Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy, stated: 
"Because we know how to build a nuclear plant or a coal-fired plant, the 
furrow is well-plowed. Everybody has done it. But nobody has ever 
done a coal-to-gas plant. The utilities simply cannot get the approvals, 
they cannot get the financing to build one of these plants." 
To this John Sawhill, then president of New York University, a 
former administrator of the FEA, and now deputy secretary of energy, 
added: "It is not only concern about now having plowed this furrow 
before. There is also a great uncertainty about what will really happen to 
world oil prices. You have to recognize that businessmen see this as a 
very political situation, and they need some insulation from the Federal 
government, not against the technical risks so much but against the 
political risks. " 
Sawhill seemed to believe that there is more risk of OPEC collapsing 
and "dumping" oil on the world market than there is of world oil prices 
climbing as the demand increases for a finite wasting resource--or of 
this supply of oil being denied us again through one mechanism or 
another. 
In any case, it is not just research and development money or even 
demonstration money that is needed for the building of a really sizable 
synthetic fuel industry in this country or even for the development of the 
nascent solar industry. It is, quite probably, largely capital money that 
is in short supply. And that capital money needed for energy invest-
ments is not forthcoming from the private sector at current fuel prices. It 
may simply not be available, as the utility industry already seems to 
recognize. 
Private capital investment alone, then, under current and predictable 
regulatory conditions cannot or will not achieve an orderly development 
of the alternative energy resources deemed by many to be essential to 
the well-being of our society in the time-frame posed by the exhaustion 
of hydrocarbon resources on the one hand and the external threat to 
international oil distribution on the other. Nor, probably, can public 
funds be raised on the scale necessary for this purpose in time to avoid 
societal traumas. These traumas would be severely exacerbated should 
our imported oil supply be cut. 
Underlying all of this is the fact that in spite of incentives to protect 
the (voting) consumer, the government must recognize that the neces-
Transition 69 
sary funds for alternative energy development will not be forthcoming 
from either sector if the price of OPEC-controlled oil is allowed to drop. 
The United States and the Arabs have indeed a mutual vested interest in 
maintaining high oil prices. 
But these high prices exact a toll-as can be shown in the relation-
ship among energy, agriculture, food prices, and votes. Since 1960, the 
United States has exported about 20 percent of its gross farm product. 
Today the entire world depends to a significant extent upon American 
agriculture. In this context, the export of American food also makes a 
significant contribution to the amelioration of the U.S. balance of pay-
ments situation whose adverse condition is otherwise guaranteed by the 
annual flow of money out of the country to pay for oil imports. 
Note, however, that agriculture in the United States, because of its 
energy intensive nature is not labor intensive. Although it is often 
postulated that the import of oil saves American jobs, no one is certain 
about how many jobs leave the country with the enormous annual 
payment to OPEC. 
During the period 1940 to 1970, U.S. agricultural production ap-
proximately doubled, but energy used directly on U.S. farms increased 
by a factor of 4.2 and is still rising. Energy used in the food processing 
industry increased by a factor of 2.9 and is still rising. Energy used in 
food preparation increased by a factor of 2.9 and is still rising.34 
By the time food reaches the supermarket, about 16.9 percent of our 
energy is involved in the overall sense.35 Our ability to produce food is 
acutely sensitive to the use of petroleum and natural gas products, since 
both machinery and fertilizers are involved. Transportation require-
ments are involved here also, and the costs are rising sharply. (These 
statistics, of course, ignore the fact that much U.S. "food" has no 
essential nutritional value at all-but even Tab requires energy to pro-
duce, can, and distribute.) 
Of direct importance to the energy-agriculture relationship in this 
country is the fact that while the general effect of throwing energy into 
food production has been to double this production in a few years, the 
price of doing so in energy terms has been to at least triple agricultural 
energy demands. This movement along a curve of diminishing returns is 
of basic importance in national policy considerations. 
The general voting public's inevitable tendency is to focus on the 
correlation between food prices and inflationary trends in the economy. 
Where election results may tum on the direct and immediate perceptible 
value of the dollar at the supermarket, there is inherently a close correla-
tion among votes, food prices, and the costs of energy in our country. 
The same correlation exists in all commodity and production areas of 
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the economy but with, perhaps, less immediate effect, except in the case 
of the price of gasoline and heating oil. 
The urgency of our national energy predicament has been submerged 
or at least obscured periodically by the economic recessions and atten-
dant inflation of 1975 and 1979. Indubitably these recessions and in-
flationary trends were occasioned partly by the enormous sums now 
flowing from our purses to the Middle East for oil (about $24 billion in 
1974, $27 billion in 1975, $37 billion in 1976, $45 billion in 1978, and 
perhaps $60 billion in 1979). 
Events in Iran and the OPEC oil price rises of 1979 have now induced 
uncertain conditions again; the recent price rises are undoubtedly the 
precursor of future increases. OPEC members have strong incentives to 
raise oil prices in the face of inflation among oil consumers. 
In spite of periodic slumps, the energy demand in our country has not 
appreciably abated, even though its rate of increase has moderated. Oil 
consumption reached a peak of 20 mbpd in January and February of 
1977 as compared to a high of 17 mbpd in 1973. By February of 1980 
total domestic consumption had dropped back to 18.6 mbpd. But fol-
lowing the current recession there will be pressures for it to climb again. 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, in examining the various profiles of our 
national census reports, has concluded that whereas the general popula-
tion of the United States is now leveling off, the most economically 
significant (and hence the major energy-consuming) element of our 
population, the 20- to 35-year-old group, is probably increasing on the 
order of 44 percent (19 million people) between the years 1970 and 
1985.36 The increase is inevitable; these people are all alive today. In all 
probability this estimate is low since it does not include all immigration 
data on aliens, legal and illegal. 
There is, in addition, a less calculable but nevertheless real source of 
increased energy demand. Many of our stated national social-
improvement goals and even some ecological goals, if actively pursued, 
will require large quantities of energy primarily in the form of electric 
power for their realization. The need for assured liquid fuel supplies by 
the defense establishment is also acute and inadequately supported. 
Cleaner automobile emissions now cost us directly about 1 mbpd of oil 
and will probably cost more as standards rise. 
On balance, then, in view of the fact that our economy is largely 
dependent on oil and gas for its energy needs, steps should logically be 
taken to either (1) increase the supply of oil and gas, (2) develop alterna-
tive energy resources, or (3) encourage a conservation ethic in the 
national consciousness to permit us to live within our energy means. In 
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view of the facts, all these measures are probably now necessary with 
conservation taking first but by no means exclusive priority. 
The question that faces us in terms of political economy is whether 
our existing social, political, and economic structures can produce the 
indicated changes without themselves undergoing severe and det-
rimental alteration. In terms of national defense the question arises 
whether the weakness of our energy situation during the years of transi-
tion will invite or provoke economic or military confrontations severely 
threatening our general security. 
To consider these questions we need further data on energy de-
velopment ideologies, conservation, economic growth, and energy-
supported jobs. These are addressed in the next two chapters. 
Energy Ideologies 
Not all of the ideological disputes that arise from our energy situation 
reflect the traditional liberal-versus-conservative argument. One cluster 
of disputes is directed at the reality of the energy crisis. Another con-
cerns the nature of the changes that a prolonged shortage will bring-
that is, will they increase the world's misery or will they be at least 
partially beneficial? In taking sides on such questions organized interest 
groups, both within political parties and independent of them, influence 
energy policy making. In this process we find alliances between strange 
bedfellows amid the usual heterogeneity of the American ideological 
scene. 
Some apparently informed, and certainly vocal, individuals in this 
country maintain that the energy crisis of 1973-1974 was entirely a 
contrived situation, vanishing when the aims of the oil-exporting coun-
tries had been (for a while) realized and the giant international corpora-
tions dealing in energy products had raised their prices and improved 
their competitive positions against the small independent companies of 
this country in the petroleum producing, refining, transportation, and 
distribution areas. This group, which includes M.A. Adelman, believes 
that there is more likely to be a glut of oil than any real shortage in the 
foreseeable future. 
The point of view of this group was bolstered by the popular press 
reporting of the natural gas crisis of the winter of 1976-1977, which 
reflected generally a rather shallow perception of immediate events. In 
fact, it essentially mirrored only popular reaction to these events and did 
nothing to extend the notoriously short memory of the public. Many 
reporters seemed to share the popular conception (which includes a few 
manifest elements of truth) that "there's gas out there and they're not 
getting it to us-at the usual price." "They" in many cases are the same 
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companies presumably responsible for all of the trouble earlier in the oil 
business, although it was normally the utility companies who received 
most of the blame from the public this time. The same cycle was 
essentially repeated during the summer of 1979 as a result of the Iranian 
Revolution. 
To the extent that the administration or Congress has acted as if there 
might be an energy crisis, there is an (even less intellectual) body of 
opinion, closely allied to the first described, in which the administration 
and the Congress are held as the dupes, or even the willing accomplices, 
of vested interests. This form of populism is by no means dead in 
America. The drastic increase in oil company profits during 1973 and 
1974 and again in 1979 and 1980 is taken by this second group to be 
indicative of wrongdoing and chicanery in the corporate and, possibly, 
governmental structures. The rather frenetic investigations undertaken 
in the House of Representatives into the possible withholding of natural 
gas during the winter of 1976-1977 seemed to indicate a fervent inten-
tion to dispel the notion of governmental implication, if not simply a 
desire for headlines. 
There is also a group which proclaims with some sardonic relish that 
we are now beginning to meet reality (after a long "free ride") on a 
planet where fossil fuel (and uranium) resources, whatever their exact 
current status, are finite and, once consumed, are never to be found 
again. This latter group views the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo to some 
extent as a blessing and tends to side with the environmental protec-
tionists who argue against the virtue of growth per se and who point out 
that the cost of energy consumption must include the cost of any adverse 
impact on the environment. To them, energy costs include the costs of 
avoiding pollution, of immediately rectifying the effects of pollution, or 
paying, ultimately, the price of unnecessary scarcities or in the costs of 
a sick and ineffective population. 
All of these groups have at least one thing in common. They have 
access to uncertain data on both energy supply and predictable demand. 
Since what data exist on energy supply are today mostly supplied by the 
oil companies, public policy involving to a large extent the regulation of 
private industry is provided its decisional data base, without audit, by 
the private sector. But the private sector in spite of claims to the con-
trary is largely composed of disparate entities whose individual interests 
involve mutual secrecy. Essentially no one, then, has all the facts of 
energy upon which to base contending positions. Therefore the posi-
tions of these various groups, to a greater or lesser degree, are based 
upon ideological outlooks rather than knowledge of the facts. 
7 4 Energy and the National Defense 
In an article published during the winter of 1972-1973, M. A. 
Adelman probably articulated most precisely the position of those who 
feel that the oil shortage is "unreal" in economic terms. 1 Adelman 
believed that the so-called energy crisis resulted from a "confusion of 
two problems." First he held that environmental policy costs were slow-
ing down electric power growth and, second, that the gradual exhaus-
tion of lower-cost oil and gas resources in the lower forty-eight states 
was due to the absence of profit incentives. Fundamentally, Adelman 
and the other economists of his school refuse to consider oil and gas as 
being present on earth only in finite quantities. Their analyses, based on 
the history of previous investments and discoveries rather than on 
geological considerations, lead them to believe that oil and gas are 
discovered in proportion to the money invested and the expectation of a 
return-and that this process is by no means in danger of coming to an 
end. 
The banding together of the oil-exporting nations to form OPEC, 
Adelman thought, was encouraged by the ineptness of the State De-
partment. He concluded that the creation of this cartel had reduced the 
international oil companies to the status of tax collectors. And he of-
fered the opinion that Arab-Israeli strife was "irrelevant to oil." It is 
noteworthy that the respected London Economist agreed substantially 
with the Adelman position in July of 1973 and to this date maintains that 
our energy problem is artificial and ascribable to "the west's price 
controllers and environmentalists. "2 
Events have proved Adelman correct in his assessment of the plight 
of the international oil companies; they have indeed lost a good deal of 
control over foreign oil production, if not its distribution and terminal 
price. But today the theory that Israeli-Arab strife has nothing to do with 
oil seems very questionable. 3 
Adelman has naturally continued to elucidate his position, it is being 
hammered out in the public arena to the extent that some of the jargon, 
assumptions, and outlooks peculiar to economists are being shed. 
Seemingly his experience has led Adelman to undertake a vendetta of no 
mean proportions against what he terms the Arab oil cartel. On 12 
January 1977, he testified before the U.S. Congressional Joint Eco-
nomic Committee as to ways and means of breaking up the cartel which 
he regards as the archenemy of peace and tranquility in the western 
world.4 Nevertheless, Adelman refuses to consider oil as a fmite re-
source: "Fear lest there be 'not enough' oil for our needs is confusion. 
There will always be enough oil-at a price .... The 'shortage' or 'gap' 
is a fiction no matter what you assume about reserves, demand, etc." 
The logic and narrowness of Adelman's position are justifiable from 
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the viewpoint of his discipline. His advice concerning action to take 
against the cartel is probably well worth considering. The isolated 
price-supply relationship concept is also reflected in some oil company 
and government circles. In April of 1973, for example, Claude S. 
Brinegar, secretary of transportation at the time, stated in a press con-
ference that there was no energy shortage in this nation, or for that 
matter, in the world.5 Brinegar, who had previously been senior vice-
president of the Union Oil Company, blamed localized shortages of 
gasoline and heating oil on maldistribution. 
R. J. Gonzalez, who has been a member of the secretary of the 
interior's Advisory Committee on Energy and a member of the National 
Petroleum Council, responded directly to the Adelman article cited 
above by a letter published in Foreign Policy. 6 Gonzalez emphasized 
that the Middle Eastern nations would decide that rapid depletion of 
their nonrenewable resources was not in their best interests. He pointed 
out that the oil-consuming nations would be able to improve their bar-
gaining positions with the OPEC cartel only by developing viable alterna-
tive resources. He contested the notion, advanced by Adelman, that a 
consortium of oil importing nations could somehow "compete the prices 
down." 
Walter J. Levy in another Foreign Policy article7 in the summer of 
1973 proposed concerted action by the Atlantic nations (including the 
United States) and Japan towards the development of a joint energy 
policy. Levy, who is closely connected with the major oil companies, 
noted that exploitation of the total domestic energy resources of the 
United States, including coal, shale, and nuclear power, would signifi-
cantly reduce the competitive bidding for and depletion of world oil 
resources. In other words, energy conservation and the development of 
alternative energy resources by the United States, in view of its friends' 
utter dependency on Middle Eastern oil, is essential to the total energy 
balance of the Free World. It was not until the Tokyo Energy Summit 
Meeting in the summer of 1979 and more specifically the International 
Energy Agency meeting of 10 December 1979 in Paris that the twenty 
western nations of the International Energy Agency agreed to take posi-
tive steps to limit, if not reduce, the amount of oil to be imported from 
OPEC.8 
Many Americans have become convinced that the oil companies 
have caused our energy problems. Congressman Les Aspin (D-
Wisconsin) took an early and somewhat shrill lead in alleging the 
monopolistic position of the twenty largest U.S. oil companies. In a 
November 1973 article Aspin recommended essentially the dismantling 
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of the domestic oil corporations' integrated production, transportation-
by-pipeline, refining, and marketing edifices in order to increase com-
petition and to lower consumer prices.9 Aspin expressed the belief that 
this would encourage domestic exploration and, ultimately, oil and gas 
production. A bill generally implementing this concept was defeated by 
a not-very-wide margin in the Congress, and debate over the issue 
continues under the title of "divestiture." The threat of "vertical" dives-
titure discussed by Aspin is now joined by the possibility of "horizon-
tal" divestiture which, for example, would prohibit oil companies from 
owning coal mining companies (and, presumably, vice versa). 
Starkly opposed to Aspin 's views was the position taken by Frank N. 
Ikard, then president of the American Petroleum Institute, and himself a 
former congressman. Ikard spoke for the oil industry when, on 5 June 
1973, he addressed the National Governors' Conference. 10 He dis-
missed the notion of any contrived gasoline and distillate (i.e., heating 
oil and diesel fuel) shortage. He indicated that U.S. refinery production 
was at a record high but that unprecedented consumer demands were 
causing inventories to drop. Ikard argued that oil company profits were 
not exorbitant and that, in any case, they were necessary for improve-
ments in our national energy posture. The position taken by Ikard con-
cerning oil industry collusion has been challenged, but, it must be 
noted, with little success in terms of court prosecution. Whether or not 
this represents a lack of appetite by various administrations is discussed 
by John Blair in The Control of Oil. 
On 31 May 1973 Senator Henry M. Jackson, in his capacity as 
chairman of the Senate Study of a National Fuels and Energy Policy, 
asked the Federal Trade Commission to investigate whether the fuel 
shortage was a "deliberate conscious contrivance of the major inte-
grated petroleum companies to destroy the independent refineries and 
marketers." The FTC responded to Senator Jackson's request by means 
of a rather accusatory "Preliminary Staff Report. "11 Though it was 
requested that the report be held privately, it was leaked to the press, 
duly causing a sensation. As a result, Senator Jackson ordered the report 
published, together with a strongly dissenting analysis by Douglas L. 
McCullough, senior staff advisor to the deputy secretary of the Treasury 
(at the time William Simon, in his capacity as chairman of the Oil 
Policy Committee). 12 The FTC report concluded that the major oil com-
panies had indulged in actionable competitive practices. The McCul-
lough report strongly contested the factual accuracy of the FTC study and 
charged its authors with bias. The press quickly lost interest. The public 
never had been interested. Senator Jackson dropped the matter. 
On balance, while these questions will undoubtedly provide em-
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ployment for lawyers for many years, it seems that the major oil com-
panies cannot be fairly charged at this time with specific illegal proce-
dures, even though it is increasingly dubious that their short-range re-
sponses have been or will be in the long-term national interest. But 
clearly they are not the only ones to bear this stigma. Additionally, their 
diversion of capital resources, materials, and personnel to foreign oil 
fields (all of which has reduced domestic supplies) has apparently been 
in response to earlier initiatives of the executive branch of the federal 
government. This is acknowledged by so strong a critic of the oil indus-
try as Robert Engler and is reemphasized by Leonard Mosely .13 
Essentially the same argument that has been illustrated above for oil 
is repeated with minor variations in the energy resource areas of coal, 
natural gas, and uranium, although with predominantly domestic over-
tones.14 The questions of "When will we begin to extract oil from our 
shale reserves," "When will we take advantage of the potential of solar 
energy," or "When will we undertake a conservation program" are 
similarly answered either with "When the price is right" or "When 
political conditions so dictate. " The rather obvious probability that the 
factors involved in these two viewpoints interact one upon the other is 
seemingly ignored-reflecting, perhaps, in the real world the polariza-
tion between political science and economics in the academic world. 
But some other fundamental considerations involve ideological per-
ceptions only indirectly connected with the traditional liberal versus 
conservative dialogue. These additional perceptions have much to do 
with views of economic growth and its attendant benefits or perils, 
depending upon the outlook. Disparities between these views are ad-
dressed more thoroughly in the next chapter under the rubric of energy 
conservation; here it is sufficient to note that while the American indus-
trial, business, and labor establishments basically advocate the concept 
that "bigger and more is better," environmentalists argue that "less is 
better" and "small is beautiful." Both views have their merits, but both 
have costs. 
A growth economy permits avoidance of the very uncomfortable 
question of enforced extensive redistribution of wealth between 
"haves" and "have-nots. "15 The energy situation is posing the question 
in this country of whether or not there are any near-term physical bar-
riers to growth in the economy. To understand this it is useful to inquire 
into the nature of the environmental movement as it impinges on energy 
and to weigh the organized opposition that has appeared. 
Although environmentalism and ecology are taken to be virtually 
synonymous in the popular imagination, for the purposes of this book it 
is necessary to draw a relatively sharp distinction between them even 
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while acknowledging a substantial overlap in group membership. Most 
ecologists are environmentalists, whereas environmentalists per se are 
by no means necessarily ecologists. 
An environmentalist, for purposes of assessing his impact on policy, 
may be defined as a person fervently interested in one or more aspects of 
environmental protection (e.g., wildlife protection, water pollution 
abatement, atmosphere pollution control, scenic preservation, birth con-
trol). The environmentalist is further identifiable by paid membership in 
an organized group formed to advance his or her particular cause. While 
this group's staff may generate or subsidize such a quantity and diver-
sity of literature as to suggest a general or holistic approach to the 
protection of the planet earth, in actuality, because of the rather 
single-minded, often less-than-informed, sometimes even socially ir-
responsible (though passionately felt) goals of the individual member-
ship, environmentalism is essentially reductionist in nature. Further, it 
is held by some to be essentially a cause of the rather comfortable 
middle class .16 
The societal impact of environmentalism, vis-a-vis energy at least, 
has on the whole been of a delaying, obstructive, and negative nature. 
Its goals are largely perceived through the funding of court actions 
pleading for injunction against, or delay of, central power stations, the 
use of coal or nuclear power, hydroelectric development, shale oil de-
velopment and so on. It usually supports solar energy but not the cen-
tralized production of electrical power through solar means. In some 
cases demonstrations and sit-ins have been resorted to but generally 
these lack the overt support of national organizations. Environmen-
talism is, above all, officially respectable even if at the individual level 
sometimes less than socially responsible. 
It cannot be said that environmentalists are wrong in any absolute 
sense any more than are the energy corporations. In many cases they 
have been quite right. Many individual achievements of the environ-
mental groups have contributed very beneficially to society as a whole. 
But these groups constitute a minority influence at strong variance with 
other contending groups in our society. And the well-funded environ-
mental movements have taken to hard-core politics and are now or-
ganized factions to be reckoned with by politicians and would-be office 
holders at the local, state, and federal levels in this country. 
During the 1976 presidential campaign, for example, a number of 
prominent environmentally inclined energy experts moved into the Car-
ter campaign staff after his nomination. At least some of these persons 
subsequently used this position for vigorous advancement of environ-
mental aims on a regional and state basis somewhat at variance with the 
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campaign staff's ostensible goal of assisting in the national election of 
the candidate. 
In one particular case, without the candidate's knowledge or con-
currence, Congressman Mike McCormack (D-Washington) was tar-
geted by a Carter staff member as a proponent of nuclear reactors and 
a general advocate of a high-technology energy society as opposed to a 
low- or soft-technology (or even no-technology) energy society. 
McCormack was proclaimed as public enemy number one in his home 
state during his (nonetheless successful) reelection campaign. 
The repercussions were considerable in the energy-oriented political 
sphere, since not only was McCormack a key figure in House energy 
affairs; he also basked in the warmth of sponsorship by the then very 
powerful chairman of the House Committee on Space and Technology, 
Olin Teague (D-Texas). And, of course, McCormack was a colleague 
of the influential Senator Henry Jackson in the sense, at the very least, 
of sharing membership in the congressional delegation from the state of 
Washington. 
Carter headquarters eventually disavowed the individual concerned, 
but the incident served to highlight a seeming schism between environ-
mentalists and technologists in our society, a division probably destined 
to result in more severe confrontations over the conservation versus 
synthetic fuels issue in the years ahead. 
Ecologists with their holistic perceptions assist us in policy analysis 
in the energy field. In their terms we can classify societies in terms of 
developed (high-energy) and less-developed (low-energy) categories. 
The connecting threads among nations and their hierarchical positions 
of the moment can be described in terms of energy transfers, energy 
systems, and energy availability P It need not be assumed in this con-
text, however, that the most developed societies are necessarily the 
most durable. 
Clearly, while ecologists must be environmentalists in the context of 
this work, environmentalists per se are by no means necessarily 
ecologists. But the interest-group affiliations in this area that have be-
come politically powerful (Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, etc.) are at 
present dominated by the reductionist approach of environmentalism. In 
their courtroom and media combat with specific conflicting interests 
they have often tended to complicate rather than to assist in any holistic 
approach to a solution of the energy dilemma. This statement will 
naturally affront ecologists as well as environmentalists, since it is the 
intellectual powers and academic status of the former which give valid-
ity to environmental claims of even the more wildly exaggerated and 
minority-oriented category of the latter. 
80 Energy and the National Defense 
But moderation and disciplined, reasoned discourse have never been 
prominent features of the American political scene. Adversary relations 
are the norm even in our courtrooms. And the environmental movement 
is a political movement with strong ideological overtones. 
The environmentalists are by no means the only group in our society 
who approach energy questions with zeal appropriate to a holy war. The 
first consolidation of business, industry, and labor interests into an 
effective political force urging energy development against the en-
vironmental movement urging energy development deferrals or abate-
ment or cancellation probably occurred in our western states during the 
period 1975-1976. 
The immediate incentives for this consolidation were the popular 
referenda proposed in some of these states either to prohibit further 
nuclear power development or to impose such heavy legal restrictions 
and penalties upon nuclear power plant developers and operators that 
their projects could not be economically supported. While there was an 
outpouring of very expensive propaganda from both camps, in the final 
analysis door-to-door campaigning quite possibly carried the day. The 
proposed referenda were defeated. Six states voted down attempts to 
restrict nuclear power: Ohio, Arizona, Washington, Montana, Col-
orado, and Oregon. The California defeat of the nuclear referendum 
took place in the spring of 1976. 
The nuclear advocates were brutally direct in their stimulation of a 
grass-roots effort. In industry after industry in California and Arizona, 
and in practically all public utilities employees were reportedly brought 
together on company time and given a simple situational exposition: 
"The 'Crazies' are after your jobs." 
The subsequent door-to-door campaign carried out, on their own 
time, by these employees was said to be marked by enthusiasm and 
dedication unusual for a political campaign. It was supplemented in 
some states by executive-level resort to political connections and estab-
lishment leverage. At Arizona State University student supporters of a 
movement to place nuclear development questions on the 1976 ballot 
were reportedly harassed, arrested, and even jailed for questioning on a 
variety of general charges. 
While the 1976 effort in the western states to prohibit expansion of 
the nuclear power production capability may have failed (it was 
matched in the East by "foot-dragging" legal maneuvers on siting regu-
lations), its impact across the nation was substantial and resulted in an 
increased public awareness of some of the problems associated with 
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nuclear power plants specifically and, to a lesser extent, high-energy 
development programs in general. The political confrontation has by no 
means abated. It has been exacerbated by the Three Mile Island acci-
dent. 
The overall balance of power today is by no means clear. The "anti-
environmental" forces prevailed, at least temporarily, in the West. Car-
ter lost California's enormous electoral vote. There might have been 
some connection. And James Schlesinger, widely regarded as danger-
ous by environmentalists, was named as the secretary for energy. 
Nevertheless, prominent environmentalists continue as highly effective 
working members in the administration. In the 1977 legislation estab-
lishing the Department of Energy, an assistant secretary for the envi-
ronment was included, the existing environmental protection functions 
of the Department of the Interior were left untouched, and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, as a quasi-autonomous government entity, 
was specifically left intact and separate from the new DOE. 18 And suits 
brought by environmental interests against energy developments prolif-
erate, especially where synthetic fuel projects are proposed. 
Organized opposition to the environmental movement likewise gains 
momentum. It seems clear, for example, through the formation of 
Americans for Energy Independence, a lobby group supporting the "de-
velop energy resources" concept, that the American business/ 
industrial/labor establishment intends to develop a cohesive and viable 
political base capable of impact upon the energy policy scene, if not 
domination of it. The task, however, will not be easy. This establish-
ment is composed of at least two groups traditionally opposed to each 
other in American politics and privately not much connected by social 
ties or bonds of trust. For another thing, two of the subunits of the group 
are more familiar with the process of putting money into campaigns and 
policy development than they are with organizing grass-roots ap-
peals-although they have considerable experience in writing special-
interest legislation. 
Before the emergence of the synthetic-fuel issue, the electrical ques-
tion was a major focus of antagonism between the environmental groups 
and the business/labor coalition. This focus is of concern to national 
security because many of the alternatives to imported oil involve elec-
trification schemes. Coal burned in power stations can provide electric-
ity for electrical automobiles, as can nuclear power. In a superficial 
sense, the easiest (if not the cheapest) way to become less dependent 
upon oil (and natural gas) is to become more dependent upon electricity 
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produced by coal and uranium. For heat-produced electricity an increase 
of one unit in electrical output requires a threefold increase in energy 
input. The problem is obvious. 
The case for extensive electrification of our society has strong 
ideological and political support in this country and in other countries of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD) as 
well. 19 In 1975 over one-half of public funds expended in the United 
States for energy research and development were spent in support of 
electric power development. 20 
The notion that conferring the benefits of centrally distributed elec-
tricity is synonymous with offering civilization and progress is deeply 
imbedded in the American psyche. The passage of the Rural Electrifica-
tion Act of 1936 illustrates that rural electrification is accepted as a 
legitimate policy of the American government. The main supporters of 
this concept, particularly those employed in expansion of electrical 
service by either the public or the private sector, view their work as 
advancing the lot of man. Many claims have been made concerning the 
connection between various social uplift programs and the availability 
of electricity. 21 Supporters of the electrical society see efforts to reduce 
electrical demand or to suggest a disparity between their goals and real 
social needs as inherently antisocial activities which are misguided at 
best and threatening to society at worst. Our present concepts of how to 
produce electricity put a considerable premium on economies of scale 
and hence centralization which is in itself under attack as undemocratic. 
Partisan sentiment on the question now seems to be polarizing 
around two opposing social views. One may be considered the high-
technology, hard-science view and the other the low-technology, soft-
science view. 
The former supports a high-technology road for the development of 
energy, particularly electrical energy, with limited emphasis on energy 
conservation (even though acknowledging the need to reduce waste). 
Only a high (i.e., complex and sophisticated) and centralized applica-
tion of technology can now, according to this concept, support electrifi-
cation. Proponents of nuclear energy (which can only generate electric-
ity at present), proponents of large centralized solar-powered electrical 
generating stations on earth or suspended in space, and proponents of 
breeder reactors, all fall into this category. 
The second social view decries the centralized electrical orientation. 
Instead it places primary emphasis on conservation of existing resources 
through the elimination of waste and the development of home and 
office heating and cooling devices powered by renewable energy re-
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sources including solar energy. The focus is away from the central 
distribution of power and toward the use of decentralized energy sys-
tems. It supports cogeneration of electricity, for instance, in factories 
with steam available in excess of manufacturing needs. With or without 
justification, this group tends to classify its efforts as appropriate 
technology. 
Amory Lovins, a young American employed in Great Britain by 
Friends of the Earth, Ltd., is currently emerging as one of the foremost 
exponents of the "soft" or "low" or "appropriate" technology ap-
proach. His 1976 article in Foreign Affairs has been widely discussed in 
the popular press and has been read into the Congressional Record. 22 
His exposition is brilliant and lucid. It is in the ecological tradition 
despite his own environmentalist proclivities. Yet the warm reception 
properly accorded Lovins's work was possibly less than deeply percep-
tive. 
Lovins abhors the "technocrat elite" society toward whch he sees the 
high-technology road leading. He accepts a considerable reduction in 
currently sought economic conditions if this is the price necessary to 
stop the growth of energy use and what he visualizes as its accompany-
ing evils. He paints a picture of man's ultimate ability to develop abun-
dant safe renewable energy resources and to do so in a decentralized 
society. 
Barry Commoner, an experienced espouser of causes, makes a 
strong case for a society fueled by solar-renewable sources in The 
Politics of Energy. 23 Unlike Lovins, however, Commoner is frankly 
socialistic in his approach, believing that his recommendations should 
come to fruition under strong and centralized government control. 
Yet many of the admirers of these prophets are only now beginning 
to realize that these developments, assuming they are entirely benefi-
cial, are probably only to be achieved in their full scope two or three or 
even four decades from the present and at considerable economic and 
social cost. What happens in the meantime is becoming at once more 
important and less clear. 
Lovins emphasizes that the great expenditures (energy conservation 
and decentralization will cost money too) and the social commitments 
entailed in taking either the "high" road or the "low" road may well 
preclude turning back. A striking feature of the Lovins argument seems 
to be, as Perry and Streiter have pointed out, that a highly centralized 
decision would be required to take the decentralized low or soft path in 
energy. 24 In the end we seem to come to the question of who is to be the 
philosopher king. 
84 Energy and the National Defense 
In all truth, the majority of Americans, given the option, will proba-
bly disbelieve that the high energy paths and the low ones are mutually 
exclusive. In an instinctive, groping way they will probably sort out a 
pragmatic compromise between them and will make tradeoffs between 
synthetic fuels development and environment. The main question is 
whether or not there is time available for this process. We are not alone 
in this world and we are not necessarily surrounded by friends. 
Energy Conservation, 
Economic Growth, and Jobs 
It is the sense of the preceding chapters that during the next decade no 
single or combined alternative energy resource development can totally 
rescue us from substantial dependence on uncertain supplies of imported 
oil. Conservation of energy is therefore mandatory in a national security 
context. Our ability to conserve energy may be the key factor in avoid-
ing war or in successfully prosecuting a war if it is forced upon us. 
Conservation, however, is another ambiguous term. As President Taft 
once put it, "A great many people are in favor of conservation no matter 
what it means." 
Energy conservation can involve increase in use efficiency, the 
elimination of waste, the societal decision to use less energy, or all 
three. The purpose of this chapter is to examine our ability to conserve 
energy and to note some of the various effects conservation might have. 
Waste per se is a formidable factor in the energy equation of our 
society. Over 50 percent of all primary energy "inputs" in our society 
are wasted in the sense that the units of energy involved (e.g., BTUs) 
perform no useful function and may, in fact, pollute the environment. 1 
Our conversion of fuels (whatever their nature) to electricity gener-
ally wastes 65 percent of the input energy in the form of heat. Through 
conservation procedures (and financial expenditures--conservation is 
seldom "free") there is the prospect of recovering and using some of 
this otherwise wasted energy. In countries where operating energy costs 
are high we see acceptance of the capital expenditures for secondary use 
(termed "cogeneration") of power plant waste steam for space heating 
and so forth, and the concomitant appropriate siting of electrical plants 
in relation to factories, offices, or residences. Nevertheless, the losses 
involved in generating electricity other than by hydropower are inher-
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ently high. The transmission losses in currently used techniques and 
equipments are also high, ranging from about 10 to about 14 percent. 
Electricity is an extremely useful and versatile form of energy but it is 
not necessarily a panacea where conservation of primary fuels is a key 
consideration. On the other hand, some fuels (e.g., uranium), at our 
present level of technology can only be used to generate electricity. 
The internal combustion-powered automobile, truck, train, or 
airplane is another case in point. The general overall energy efficiency 
of trucks and automobiles is no more than about 15 percent.2 Eighty-
five percent of every gallon of gasoline or diesel oil is simply wasted 
with almost no chance of recovery. Less than 1.5 pints from each gallon 
produce useful work. This figure can be marginally improved but we are 
already apparently approaching, with present-day engines, points of 
diminishing returns. This does not mean, however, that we cannot save 
a good deal of gasoline with lighter cars and smaller engines. 
Use of electric motors in urban/suburban cars is a frequently dis-
cussed possibility. This has significant atmospheric pollution attractions 
and saves oil, but in terms of overall energy conservation, considering 
the losses involved in generating and transmitting the electricity in the 
frrst place, only a dubious total energy bargain is involved. From a 
national security perspective, however, if oil is our major problem, 
electricity can be generated from burning coal or splitting the uranium 
atom--or even burning wood-and accepting the inefficiencies. 
What has just been said can perhaps be better grasped by reference to 
Figures 6 .1 and 6. 2. Figure 6.1 , portraying the circumstances of 1970, 
may be taken as reasonably accurate, since it is based upon material 
developed by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory on information re-
leased by the Department of the Interior and the National Petroleum 
Councii.J The year 1970 was a crucial one in terms of energy in this 
country. It was the end of a decade of enormous expansion in the use of 
natural gas. It saw the peaking of U.S. oil production. It saw the 
beginnings of a (now uncertain) surge in electrical power demand. It 
saw the end, for a while, of the relatively more efficient high-
compression automotive engines requiring the use of tetraethyllead in 
gasoline. 
Figure 6.2 must be viewed more cautiously. It was developed as a 
projection of events in 1980 based on data available in 1973. Some of 
the trends involved did not fulfill their promise or may have been 
misread at the time. The unforeseen recession of 1974-1975 and the 
post-embargo oil price rises also left their marks. We do not import as 
much oil as expected. We do not produce as much as predicted. Never-
theless the figure conveys a powerful sense of increasing energy conver-
Figure 6.1 Total U.S. Energy Flow Pattern, 1970 (in Mbpd Oil Equivalent) 
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Figure 6.2 Total U.S. Energy Flow Pattern, 1980 (in Mbpd Oil Equivalent) 
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sion losses, both proportional and real, as the economy expands, par-
ticularly in the transportation sector. Small may or may not be beautiful, 
but big seemingly is inherently wasteful in its use of present energy 
resources and institutionalized energy resource conversion procedures. 
The two figures taken together underline the enormous waste inher-
ent in the ways we convert energy, the ways we use it, and where we 
obtain it. 
Something less than 50 percent of the energy we dig up out of the 
ground is available for savings if we maintain the present structure and 
infrastructure of our society. We have enormous en~rgy investments as 
well as capital investments in present-day power stations, transmission 
facilities, buildings, machines, processing plants, vehicles, ro11dways, 
and, significantly, military apparatus. These things must themselves be 
changed if major energy savings are to be realized. "How?" and "To 
what extent?" and "Which first?" will take some time to sort out. 
In the meantime, there is the portion of energy expenditure which we 
control personally. While no more than about 25 percent of our total 
energy budget is involved here, it may be that in this marginal area we 
will find the time, buy the time if you will, to adjust our national energy 
budget to reality. This very much depends on decisions by actors out-
side our direct zone of influence. It also depends on attitudes among our 
own citizenry. 
The technological limitations mentioned above suggest that conser-
vation requirements will lead to consideration of augmented per capita 
energy usage (including round-trip loading of intercity trucks) when 
unnecessary usage has been diminished by price increase, education, 
tax incentives, or arbitrary fiat--or some combinations of all of these. 
What is unnecessary and what is necessary energy use depends 
largely on normative considerations and very subjective outlooks. 
While the worker in New York may be spared a burden if he is without a 
car, his fellow citizen in the same situation in Los Angeles is usually out 
of a job. In general, furthermore, there seems to be a general feeling that 
an American is free only if he, or she, is alone in an automobile on a 
highway jammed by tens of thousands of fellow Americans in the same 
condition. 
Before leaving the automobile and truck question, it should be noted 
that, quite apart from the "obey the law" ethic, which does not seem to 
affect all of us equally in the absence of speed-law enforcement by the 
states, few Americans seem to think it necessary to take advantage of 
the approximately 20 percent savings in fuel consumption inherent in 
slowing from seventy to fifty-five miles per hour, even though gasoline 
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prices by early 1980 have climbed to the dollar and twenty cent range. 
For those who consider that substantially higher gasoline prices 
might have a significant effect on driving speed, small comfort is af-
forded by the European example. In France, Great Britain, and West 
Germany, where gasoline prices average about three times the U.S. 
price, no "slow down to save" syndrome is apparent. France has only 
recently instituted an eighty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit on her major 
highways. The British limit on trunk roads remains at seventy miles per 
hour with scant enforcement, and the German Bundestag has recoiled 
from the notion of imposing any speed limit on West Germany's major 
autobahns for the intrepid German driver. For the most part, of course, 
smaller, more fuel-efficient cars are involved. 
Energy conservation attitudes have been changing over the years 
since the Arab oil embargo. Reported attitudes and actual performance, 
however, have only slowly come together. 
In a detailed poll taken by Cambridge Reports, Inc., in 1977 it 
appeared that a majority of respondents believed that conservation was 
one of the cheapest solutions to the energy crisis, that individual actions 
(for instance in household conservation) could be meaningful, and that 
investments in energy-saving devices would be wise.4 But in the area of 
transportation, few respondents were actually participating in car pools 
or using mass transit, attempting to minimize driving miles, or purchas-
ing small cars. Basically, energy conservation was equated with a low-
ered standard of living and was resisted accordingly. 
By June of 1979, according to a New York Times/CBS News Poll 
taken during the summer gasoline crisis, there was still indication that 
the American public did not believe there to be a bona fide oil crisis 
necessitating changes in our modes of transportation. 5 In the same poll a 
general preference was expressed for gasoline rationing, if it came to 
that, rather than higher prices. By early 1980, however, regardless of 
the results of polls it became apparent, to Detroit's consternation, that 
Americans were no longer buying large or energy-intensive automobiles 
but had shifted radically towards the small-car market. Mass transit use 
has yet to manifest sharp increases, accounting, as it does, for only 5 to 
6 percent of urban passenger travel. 6 For the time being America is 
giving every indication of clinging to the private automobile. This indi-
vidualized and flexible, if energy intensive, mode of transportation is 
undoubtedly a prized fixture of American society. 
The interpretation of energy polls will necessarily preoccupy a good 
many seekers of public office during 1980. As a followup to the 
Cambridge Reports poll, Gene Pokorny reported at a board of directors 
meeting of the Alliance to Save Energy on 18 November 1977 that 
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whereas in the early summer of 1977 after the president's speech 33 
percent of Americans viewed the energy situation as serious, only 25 
percent did so by fall. A rapid fall-off in attention seems to follow any 
public focus on energy. 
Underlying all the attitudinal questions, which after all indicate only 
potential reaction at the voting booth, is the main question: "When will 
the American people become vitally interested in what is done about 
energy as opposed to what is said about energy?" This is a matter of 
acute concern for the well-informed practicing politician because he or 
she generally knows that when it comes to major new events surrounded 
by uncertainty, polled attitudes are remarkably unstable. "Any new 
major event may radically alter groups' and persons' sets of attitudes 
about the energy situation.,,., Thus the inattention of public figures to 
energy and national security issues can be expected to shift to highly 
visible concern in times of crisis. 
In the industrial area it is commonly assumed that attitudes play no 
role because rational management will respond quickly to higher energy 
prices and reduce energy waste accordingly. The reduced consumption 
of energy in the U.S. industrial sector during 1974 and 1975 and there-
after is frequently cited as supporting this assumption.8 But that energy 
costs per se were largely responsible for the phenomenon observed-
particularly in view of the pass through of inflated prices for manufac-
tured goods-is perhaps questionable. 
Nevertheless, this "industry saves" concept has more than superfi-
cial validity and is explicitly carried into the specifications of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. Here automobile manufacturers 
are given mandatory fuel consumption goals not necessarily in conso-
nance with concomitant antipollution goals. Appliance manufacturers 
are threatened with penalties if they fail to label their wares with energy 
use data. Industry in general, however, is required, under penalty of 
the law, only to report what steps have been taken to improve energy 
efficiency in the industrial processes themselves. 
The underlying assumption of this law in the industrial conservation 
area can be challenged. The manufacturer beset with energy price rises 
can, up to a point, pass on his costs as in the normal case of inflationary 
price spirals. Where substantial capital investment is required if he is to 
undertake energy conservation, he has considerable incentive to vacil-
late and to respond only incrementally. This is particularly the case 
where it is uncertain whether the price-reflected energy shortage is 
transitory or permanent. 
While many vigorous energy-saving steps have been taken in the 
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United States in large plants possessing the means to do so, interviews 
in Georgia and Ohio suggest that in these states, at least, the average 
small manufacturer or businessman, like the average city/town council, 
generally does not have access to the expertise necessary to conduct an 
energy audit. Organizations of this size have no real concept of their 
energy budgets. Thus they have no rational basis for reviewing man-
ufacturing or transportation options or even, in the case of industry, for 
considering alternative product manufacture. So far, energy (and 
money) savings through conservation have resulted from improved 
housekeeping measures, such as elimination of steam leaks, installation 
of monitoring devices, and the like. An energy-audit field service com-
parable to the farm extension service program is greatly needed. In fact, 
such a service may be necessary to prevent the disappearance of small 
industrial enterprises in this country as energy prices rise. Whereas 
concerns whose sales average over $800,000 per year incur 1.5 percent 
of their costs for energy, the small firm with sales of less than $50,000 
per year encounters costs of about 7. 3 percent for energy .9 
The householder facing the question of whether or not to insulate 
must consider some of the same problems on a smaller but, to him or 
her, no less significant scale. In both areas uncertainty about energy 
data has been paralleled until late 1978 by uncertainty about government 
intentions in terms of energy resource regulation, price, tax, or subsidy 
action. Some of these uncertainties have been resolved by Congress. 
Others persist. 
No questions are asked in our society of the industrial sector as to 
whether or not our energy situation can rationally support what is being 
manufactured. The market is supposed to attend to this. Considering the 
extremely energy-intensive process of converting bauxite to aluminum, 
however, it is an interesting philosophical question whether Coca-Cola 
or Budweiser, for example, can properly be allowed to package their 
products in aluminum cans instead of returnable bottles. The answers 
must be highly normative, of course, very subject to dispute, and, under 
our system of government, probably of constitutional import. 
With the general uncertainties concerning data reliability and possi-
ble government actions, the generally very useful decentralization of 
decision-making implicit in our quasi-free enterprise society can result, 
in this case, in no decisions at all. This hiatus has its effect on our 
understanding of the relationship between energy consumption and eco-
nomic well-being. 
The optimum correlation between energy consumption and economic 
well-being in this country is indeterminate. The general correlation is in 
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strong dispute. There is, in fact, a considerable intellectual debate brew-
ing over the benefits of a strong-growth economy versus a limited-
growth economy or even a no-growth economy .10 
There have been some attempts to separate this debate, which has 
clear ideological roots but as yet rather undefined parameters, from the 
energy question. These attempts are rationally unsuccessful. While a 
"conserve energy" policy may, up to a point, have little impact on 
economic growth potential, it is inescapable that if this policy is ex-
tended to a limitation of energy availability then the economic growth of 
an industrial society (if not others) cannot exceed that permitted by the 
energy supply situation. Facing this point generally inspires a shift in 
position from the limitation of economic growth in general to the limita-
tion of industrial growth in particular (the service economy concept). 11 
Carried to an extreme this has rather considerable but generally unstated 
implications concerning the demechanization of industry, including the 
farming industry, and a general reemphasis on human labor. (It also has 
something to do with defense considerations, since modem warfare is 
heavily dependent on machines.) 
Therefore, the "energy, employment and the economy" question is 
at heart a philosophical argument with strong ideologic overtones, con-
ducted among the intelligentsia. The argument is over the preferred con-
dition of Man-meaning, in general, other men and women. Most of the 
argument is being conducted by people who probably foresee little 
possibility that they might personally substitute manual labor for the use 
of energy-intensive laborsaving devices. The occasional fate in recent 
years of the Chinese intelligentsia put out to labor on the farming com-
munes of a contemporary if distant society offers an interesting perspec-
tive. 
Over the years there has been a strong positive correlation in the 
United States between increasing per capita energy use and per capita 
economic growth measured in terms of Gross National Product or, in 
Samuelson's phrase, Real Gross National Product. 12 Although the so-
cial validity of the GNP may be subject to challenge, the use and implica-
tions of the GNP concept have had, and continue to have, a powerful 
effect on popular American thinking. Americans love scoreboards. The 
GNP provides one. 
The conservative viewpoint that energy, the economy, and jobs are 
directly related is perhaps most cogently presented by John Winger, 
John Emerson, and other members of the Chase Manhattan Bank's 
Energy Economics Division. The statistics presented below are taken 
from their work. 13 Figure 6.3 illustrates the relationship, according to 
1970 statistics, between population, energy consumption, and GNP in 
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Figure 6.3 Distribution of World Population, Energy 
Consumption, and GNP, 1970 
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the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and all the rest of the world 
lumped together. This figure presents some puzzling considerations, 
especially when one introduces a waste factor calculation. Nevertheless 
it supports the notion that a high energy consumption relates to a high 
GNP (or perhaps vice versa). 
On the other hand the figure obscures some interesting details. By 
totaling energy expenditures, lumping the countries of Western Europe 
together as an economic entity, and by pursuing GNP instead of per 
capita wealth (another measure of economic well-being), it hides the fact 
that several of the Western European subeconomies (or "nations" if you 
will) have achieved individual per capita wealth higher than that of the 
United States with a considerably lower per capita expenditure of 
energy. This, of course, may reflect political success in maintaining 
small economic enclaves in spite of Europe's increasing economic con-
solidation. But it may not. 
The energy economies of these rather small and compact countries 
are not in all respects directly and legitimately comparable to the giant 
and heterogeneous energy economy of the United States. Some unre-
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Figure 6.4 Energy Use/GNP Ratio in the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan 
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1975 
solved anomalies exist. But the figures produced by Lee Schipper of the 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California at Berkeley, 
comparing Sweden's efficient generation of electricity to the less effi-
cient process in the United States bear close scrutiny. Electricity is, after 
all, electricity. It knows no nationality. 14 
Reverting now to the thrust of the Chase Manhattan argument, Fig-
ures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate that the relationship between energy use and 
GNP and the relationship between energy (especially oil) use and GNP 
per employed person correlate closely in a historical sense over the two 
decades ending in 1975 in the United States, Western Europe, and 
Japan. 
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Figure 6.5 Energy Use and GNP per Employed Person in 
the United States, Western Europe, and Japan 
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Chase Manhattan analysts invite attention to the close correlations of 
the trend illustrated in these curves over the period indicated. They point 
out that the larger use of energy in the United States correlates with (or, 
as they claim, has resulted in) a large GNP per employed person. They 
are correct in stating that no documented evidence indicates future 
change in "the long-lasting, consistent relationship between energy use 
and GNP. " 15 
On the other hand, Figure 6.5 shows with uncomfortable clarity that 
the practically equivalent increase in GNP per employed person achieved 
respectively in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan between 
1955 and 1975 was achieved with extremely disparate energy input 
increases of 35, 116, and 430 percent, respectively. The implications of 
this are far from clear. Energy and GNP may not necessarily be as 
closely linked as thought. In fact, in the projections made by Exxon in 
1978 for the period 1980-1990, a GNP growth rate of 3.6 percent was 
assumed with an overall energy growth rate of only 2.3 percent. 16 This 
would give an energy growth rate to GNP growth rate ratio of 0.64. This 
is comparable to, but more conservative than, the ratio of 0.56 used by 
Schurr and his fellow authors for the period 1976 to 2000 in their study 
Energy in America's Future. They envisage an annual energy growth 
rate of 1.8 percent and a GNP growth rate of 3.2 percentY An even 
greater but less explicit optimism about high GNP growth with low 
energy-use growth characterizes the Harvard Business School's 1979 
Energy Future edited by Stobaugh and Yergin. 18 By the end of 1979, 
however, Exxon was predicting a GNP growth rate to the year 2000 of 
2.7 percent and an energy growth rate of 1.35 percent. This would 
indicate a ratio of 0. 5. This should be compared to the direct one-to-one 
ratio which pertained during the period 1960-1973 when GNP growth 
rate and energy-use growth rate averaged 4.1 percent. 19 
The idea that prosperity and energy use are inextricably tied together 
has been challenged, as has the idea that growth and happiness (only 
personally definable) are necessarily intertwined. The late E. F. 
Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful has become a bible for certain cul-
tists.20 But like the Christian Bible, it is seemingly more often quoted 
than read. The uncertainties all around make a fertile ground for ideolog-
ical argument with very large potential margins of error. 
Denis Hayes is prominent among those who advance the concept 
that the cheapest potential source of energy available to the United 
States today is that which we can obtain by conservation. Opponents of 
this view take the position that this concept ultimately involves attack on 
the GNP as an appropriate measure of overall human well-being, since 
98 Energy and the National Defense 
Figure 6.6 Energy Use and GNP, 1947-1974 
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for them the historic connection between GNP changes and energy use 
changes is fairly well established as shown by Figure 6.6. 
Hayes cites the "enormous variability in the energy-GNP ratio and-
its long term downward trend. "21 This is shown in Figure 6.7. Clearly, 
a comparison of Figures 6.6 and 6.7 suggests significant uncertainties 
for energy policymakers. 
Hayes considers energy itself as a production factor. This concept 
represents a departure from traditional economic thinking which was 
premised on the cheap cost of natural (including energy) resources.22 A 
line of thinking similar to Hayes's is reflected in the studies of the Ford 
Foundation Energy Policy Project discussed later. If it has validity then 
it would account for a portion of the disparity in GNP/fuel consumption 
figures encountered in different economies, since the ratio depends 
upon the particular mix of goods and services produced in each country. 
With all the changes taking place in the energy field and with the 
novelty of recognizing energy as a crucial and perhaps controlling factor 
in our lives, we don't know what kind of country we want because we 
are still very uncertain about what kind of country we can have, given 
future energy constraints. 
While the case for energy conservation seems to be gathering head-
way and is well financed, there is little question but that the case for 
"more energy means more jobs in a healthier economy" has been ac-
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Figure 6.7 The U.S. Energy/GNP Ratio 
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cepted as an article of faith by a large number of Americans. A Harris 
poll conducted in July of 197923 indicated, among other things that (1) 
by 75 to 19 percent a sizeable majority of Americans favors risking 
federal funds to guarantee the backing of plants that can convert from 
oil to natural gas; (2) by 61 to 30 percent a majority also favors the 
potential spending of up to $1 0 billion by the federal government to 
buy the synthetic crude produced by the conversion of oil shale and 
tar sands; (3) by 71 to 19 percent, a majority of the public also 
supports backing of plants that can produce gasohol. 
The opponents of these outlooks remain vocal; their viewpoint con-
cerning environmental impacts has not been disproved, and their lob-
byists engage in frenetic activity. Much of the considerable uncertainty 
involved has to do with the time perspective adopted. To the practicing 
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politician or the worker, a depression of two or three years duration is a 
devastating phenomenon. To the academic economist it is a less serious 
matter, illustrating as it were the corrective tendencies of the market in 
restructuring the society. 
As Chase Manhattan suggests, the survival and growth of large and 
small business depends upon adequate energy supply. "Every member 
of organized labor has a share in the adequacy of the supply of 
energy-their jobs depend upon it. "24 A powerful lobby group, Ameri-
cans for Energy Independence, has been organized. Prominent labor 
executives as well as business leaders have sought and achieved 
governing-board membership in the group and have facilitated the de-
livery of its message to workers and the public through labor and busi-
ness organization channels. 25 
"Develop more energy" has become a definable political theme, 
backed by an increasingly definable political movement, which may be 
just as reductionist and, in a total societal sense, irresponsible, as en-
vironmental cultists who seek energy limitations on all fronts. 
In all probability an optimum energy policy is not to be found in 
either movement, but somewhere in between. For the practicalities of 
policy development and analysis in the national security area, the de-
veloping political clout of the two sides and the nature of their confron-
tation merit both public and political attention. The fact of confrontation 
may be a necessary prelude to appropriate energy policies vis-a-vis 
national security or it may indicate an inability in our polity to take 
defensive measures before emergencies and chaos are upon us. 
An increasing number of studies are being undertaken to examine 
how much our energy consumption can be bridled through conservation 
measures. Most of these are optimistic concerning our ability to live 
well with less individual energy expenditure in the future. For example, 
Stobaugh and Yergin cite the conclusion of the National Academy of 
Sciences panel that in the year 2010 "very similar conditions of habitat, 
transportation, and other amenities could be provided in the United 
States using twice the energy consumed today, or almost 20 percent 
less than used today. "~6 Presumably this is 20 percent less per capita. 
The key element, however, is that a very significant increase in total 
energy demand is assumed regardless of our best conservation efforts. 
Another significant factor is that these are aggregate projections and to a 
large extent assume an exchangeability of fuels that may or may not 
exist-particularly in the area of liquid mobility fuels. Finally, a period 
of twenty to thirty years is involved in our adjustment. 
Since 1972 a number of conservation studies have been performed by 
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the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Shell Oil Company, Exxon 
Corporation, and the FEA. All of these studies were performed with the 
basic idea of trimming waste and increasing the efficiency of energy 
use. A certain institutional bias is involved since in 1973 Exxon and 
Shell, companies that sell oil, expected less conservation than the Office 
of Emergency Preparedness, which was then charged with the reduction 
of oil imports. 27 In late 1974 when the Project Independence Report was 
issued, the impact of quadrupled oil prices was inducing conservation 
and by 1978 Exxon was projecting the same savings in energy for 1990 
as the OEP had projected in 1972. (The term savings here means the 
reduction in energy use from that which would have resulted had previ-
ous trends continued.) 
While current conservation estimates are no longer bound by the 
assumption that the growth rate of the GNP must be supported by an 
equivalent energy-use growth rate, nevertheless, there remains consid-
erable uncertainty about what the optimum ratio between the two might 
be, and when it might be obtained. This situation is complicated by 
equivalent uncertainties as to future energy prices (particularly oil 
prices) and the impact of price rises on inflation and on the general 
viability of our society. In a sense we are witnessing one of the great 
controlled socioeconomic experiments of history. The disconcerting 
element lies in being the subject of the experiment, since we do not 
control it. 
The ultimate ceiling of OPEc's price rises is impossible to predict. 
But prices per barrel of thirty-five and forty-five dollars or more are 
probably already being discussed as target prices in OPEC circles for the 
period circa 1980. Apparently, at a minimum we can expect world oil 
prices to be indexed to the consuming nations' inflation rates. 
The prices noted above were introduced during interviews in London 
during the summer of 1976 by men familiar with OPEC questions and 
particularly the finances involved. Such estimates seemed fantastic. 
With the issuance of the CIA report The International Energy Situation: 
Outlook to I985 in April 1977, however, they appeared more reason-
able if no less threatening to the structure of our present society. Follow-
ing the events of Iran they appear inevitable. 
James Akins, an astute student of Arab oil policies, has confirmed 
the prospect of "indexing" by OPEc.28 In the United States, for exam-
ple, assuming an inflation rate of 12 percent (a low estimate), if the 
"real" world price of oil remained constant at $30 per barrel (an un-
likely event) this would result in an oil price of better than $54 per barrel 
by 1985 with a concomitant rise in food prices-if the oil remains 
available and if a prolonged recession does not intervene.29 The eco-
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nomic and social chaos implicit in this conclusion for energy-dependent 
nations (including our own) experiencing even higher rates of inflation 
is evident. And at the same time, higher oil prices are quite likely the 
single most important factor in inducing conservation and the develop-
ment of alternative energy resources. 
The conservation studies reviewed above were ostensibly undertaken 
on the premise that the nature and impetus of our economy would not be 
substantially changed. They were calculations of possible waste elimi-
nation, and their results varied, in accordance with the perspective of 
the analysts, only as to what was permissible in terms of government 
control. 
Other studies in this area have been made from the primary perspec-
tive of reducing the growth rate of energy use. Prominent among these 
are the reports of the Ford Foundation Study directed by S. David 
Freeman and the report of the Trilateral Commission, all issued in 
1974.30 These studies concluded that a 2 percent energy-use growth rate 
was a viable and necessary goal for the United States. At the time these 
studies were made, the national energy growth rate was about 4 percent. 
Freeman arrived at his conclusion from the premise that less energy 
growth would result in a better society. The authors of the Trilateral 
Commission report took the position that a rate of energy growth greater 
than 2 percent in the United States would essentially fragment the struc-
ture of the OECD and would eventually destroy what is known as the 
industrial West (including Japan). 
In 1973, in response to a perceived, but at the time unquantifiable, 
coming emergency, Senator Jackson proposed stringent energy-use re-
duction measures to be taken within ten days of implementation, and he 
called for up to a 25 percent reduction within four weeks.31 These 
proposals did not become law. If they had, it seems possible that the 
life-styles of individual Americans would have been far more deeply 
affected than they were in the actual embargo that ensued as Senator 
Jackson had predicted. But the measures envisioned by Senator Jackson 
may well presage the energy deprivations to be visited upon this nation 
if we become engaged in a war in which our foreign oil imports are 
interrupted. 
The effects of the 1973-1974 embargo (with the minor exception of 
the 1979 gasoline scare) currently provide the only factual data we have 
on the impact of energy availability reductions in this country. While 
still the subject of some analytic dispute, they offer more certain indi-
cations than the energy impact statistics discussed in the popular press 
during the natural gas shortage of the winter of 1976-1977 or the 
gasoline scare in the summer of 1979. 
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The analysis of the embargo's impact has been enormously compli-
cated because of disagreement over specific primary cause and overall 
total effect. Was the Western world in general and the United States in 
particular already heading into a period of recession at the time of the 
embargo? Did the embargo cause the recession or did it merely exacer-
bate it? The answers are still not clear. They may never be. Added to 
this confusion is the claim by Richard Mancke that the allocation con-
trols imposed by William Simon's Federal Energy Office actually 
created the fuel shortages, rather than the embargo itself.32 Accusations 
of government misallocation occurred also during the 1979 gasoline 
scare and were generally admitted within the Department of Energy. In 
1980 the General Accounting Office described the allocation effort as a 
"chaotic program in need of overhaul. "33 
To judge from a composite view of several studies, it seems probable 
that the embargo (including our reaction to it) caused a 10 to 12 percent 
reduction in the immediate availability of liquid fuels (and some pro-
pane, which is derived alternatively from petroleum or natural gas), a 
rise in the price index of 5 percent, and the immediate unemployment of 
about 500,000 persons in the United States. A general and vague esti-
mate of about a 10 percent immediate negative impact on the GNP ac-
companies this figure,34 but the reliability here is obscured by the OPEC 
oil price rises that accompanied the embargo decisions and led to an 
adverse balance of trade. The impact of this was felt increasingly in the 
economy as the embargo was gradually mitigated and then lifted. 
Ostensibly, on a. straight-line basis, if 500,000 persons were left 
jobless in the circumstances pertaining in 1973-=1974 when we were 
receiving about 12 percent of our oil imports from Arabian sources, 
about 1,500,000 people could be so affected, ceteris paribus, under 
similar circumstances in 1980 when we are receiving 32 to 38 percent of 
our oil imports from the same interruptable sources. It is probably, 
however, that we are not dealing with a straight-line situation. Prudence 
demands that we consider the possibility of an exponentially advancing 
condition where a much more severe impact could result. A 12 or 14 
percent unemployment level has been predicted. This leans steeply to-
ward the "depression" instead of "recession" category. 35 Our sensitiv-
ity to reductions in oil supply is acute, as illustrated by Figure 6.8. 
In reviewing the overall concept of energy supply and use reduction 
in our society, it seems quite clear that great uncertainties are involved. 
Mandated conservation efforts taken without regard to our very specific 
liquid fuel dependence could have severe even though unquantifiable 
impact. 
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Figure 6.8 Estimated Effects of an Oil Supply Problem 
CQ 
-
-
... 
~ 2~----~----~--~~~--~----~----~----~----~ 
C/) 
"C 
a. 
.c 
::E 
0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
Percent Decrease in GNP 
Source: National Petroleum Council 
-7 -a 
Substantial reductions in energy use in various sectors of the econ-
omy imply social changes of great magnitude. At the present time, for 
instance, about 4 million Americans are employed in farming. This 
farming, as we now practice it, consumes enormous amounts of energy. 
Nitrogen fertilizer alone accounts for about 68 million barrels of oil 
annually. It has been estimated that 31 million farm workers (instead of 
4 million) plus 61 million horses and mules (instead of 3 million) would 
be needed to maintain a substantially de mechanized farm economy. 36 
This prospect, while appealing ideologically to some, cannot be as-
sumed to be attractive to those who would most probably be directly 
involved. 
While American industry may be very wasteful in its energy habits as 
compared, for example, to West German industry (see Figure 6.9), it 
remains a fact that meaningful conversion of American industry to a 
leaner energy economy will take considerable time and money. German 
(and Japanese) industry had to be essentially rebuilt after World War II, 
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Figure 6.9 Industrial Energy Efficiency in the United States 
and Germany 
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and this was done along modern, more efficient lines. The rebuilding, it 
may be remarked, was largely accomplished by U.S. money and 
technology provided from World War II-vintage plants and equipment 
in America. 
While the need for energy conservation in our society has probably 
now approached the critical point, we must be cautious in estimating 
what conservation can do for us in the next decade. The Energy Infor-
mation Administration, even with estimated conservation figured in, 
projects a consumption of petroleum products on the order of 19.6 mbpd 
in 1990 (compared with 18.4 mbpd in 1977). It projects a domestic 
production of petroleum of about 8 mbpd in1990. Exxon projects a 
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consumption of about 16.5 mbpd in 1990 and a production of about 6 
mbpd.37 Granting the necessarily inaccurate assumptions involved in 
making economic models of the future, it nevertheless appears that we 
face a deficit of about 10 to 12 mbpd in liquid fuels in the year 1990. 
Undoubtedly some of this deficit can be eliminated by more stringent 
conservation efforts than have heretofore been contemplated-by ra-
tioning, for example. But clearly, if we are not to increase our imports 
radically, the deficit must be made up by synthetic fuels. Hence, one 
concludes that conservation is no substitute for synthetic fuel produc-
tion, any more than synthetic fuel production is a substitute for strict 
conservation. The two are complementary even though they are being 
discussed in adversary terms today in our society. 
International Dimensions 
of the U.S. Energy Situation 
Our domestic energy policy and our international policies touching upon 
energy are, as the reader will by now have suspected, inextricably 
intertwined. But the salient importance of the energy issue has only 
recently begun to intrude on the consciousness of the world's statesmen. 
In 1975, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed out: " ... no 
issue is more basic to the future than the challenge of energy. The 
fundamental achievements of our economies, and the modern civiliza-
tion they sustain, have been built upon the ready availability of energy 
at reasonable prices. "1 
Kissinger went on to say that the energy crisis of 1973 first brought 
home to the nations of the oEcD the full implications of the new reality 
of global interdependence. He postulated that energy stands as the first 
and most fundamental of problems facing the OECD, its magnitude 
compelling these nations to cooperation. Without that cooperation, 
Kissinger stated, we risk a return to nationalistic rivalry and economic 
decline comparable to the bitter experience of the thirties. 
And again, after noting that the energy crisis was "the most severe 
challenge to industrial civilization since the Second World War," Kis-
singer stated further: "The embargo and price rises of 1973 taught us 
how vulnerable we had become. We saw that neither the supply nor the 
price of a central factor in our economies was any longer under our 
control. Our well-being and progress had become hostage to decisions 
in which we could not take part. "2 Kissinger stressed that a major 
problem for the OECD would be to ensure that sufficient financing was 
available for energy development. He noted that enormous amounts of 
capital would be required, perhaps a trillion dollars in the next ten years. 
For this and other reasons he proposed establishment of an International 
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Energy Agency (lEA) framework for project-by-project energy coopera-
tion, including joint guarantees or other financial assistance to large 
cooperative projects. 
The problem of what Kissinger described as disruptive competition 
also came up in this speech. Kissinger noted that for much of the Persian 
Gulf, production costs are only about twenty-five cents a barrel. Most of 
the major continental energy sources-new Alaskan North Slope oil, 
the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf oil, North Sea oil, nuclear power 
everywhere-will be many times more costly to produce. If OPEC de-
cided to undercut alternative sources by temporary, predatory price-
cutting, investment in alternative sources could be inhibited or aban-
doned. Producers' pricing policies would thus keep us in a permanent 
state of dependence, and we would hardly have assurance that the price 
would not be raised again once our dependence was confirmed. To 
guard against this, a minimum safeguard or floor price was proposed: 
"Only if consumers develop massive new energy sources will the oil 
producers lose their ability to set prices at high, artificial levels. But 
these sources will not be developed if producers retain the ability to 
thwart our energy programs by temporary, predatory price cuts. A 
minimum safeguard price-well below the current world price level-
can help ensure that these alternative sources will be developed. "3 
Kissinger's Paris speech reflected a calmer and more mature ap-
praisal of contemporary international energy events than existed in 
Washington in 1974 during the disturbing and chaotic aftermath of the 
Arab oil embargo. Reactions then ranged from threats to take punitive 
military action to the concept of creating a consumers' cartel to force oil 
prices down. This latter idea was probably the basic inspiration for the 
lEA and its program. But at the Paris Conference of May 1975 there was 
still only the glimmering of comprehension that oil prices would be, for 
the time being, determined by OPEC, not by the OECD. 
The tremendous uncertainties and dangers attending military action, 
and the inability of nations to do without the imported oil to which they 
had almost unwittingly allowed themselves to become addicted, led 
eventually to the position advanced by Kissinger: the industrial nations 
can save themselves from alien domination only if they develop alterna-
tive energy resources on a large scale. This developmenf effort is 
jeopardized unless some mutually agreed upon safeguard is instituted to 
protect the heavy capital investments necessary to create alternative 
resources. 
The problem is common both to countries emphasizing investment of 
private funds and to those emphasizing public investment. Stretched 
between all the industrial countries like an invisible web and a common 
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language is the international monetary system. This system is subjected 
to enormous and unforeseen strains by the huge sums of petrodollars 
suddenly flowing into OPEC hands. Survival of the international mone-
tary system is one of the problems and questions of energy. 
In this chapter we will briefly examine the evolution and operation of 
the IEA, some of the problems to be considered should it fail to provide 
solutions to the international energy problem, and energy-related ques-
tions of national security. 
The industrial nations of the West share common energy 
attributes-and problems. To an overwhelming extent, their predomi-
nant sources of energy consist of finite (and diminishing) supplies of 
fossil fuels. For a number of technological, social, and economic rea-
sons, oil and natural gas are the fuels in greatest use. Few of these 
nations possess reserves of these premium fuels sufficient to meet their 
own indigenous needs. For those who would raise the question of the 
great North Sea oil find, it has been estimated in international banking 
circles that the North Sea could supply about 25 percent of Western 
Europe's total oil requirements by the early 1980s.4 Its greatest benefit 
may be that of buying the necessary time to develop alternate sources of 
energy. Although other analysts and scholars, notably Peter Odell of 
Erasmus University in Rotterdam, have shown that estimates published 
by oil companies of their discoveries in the North Sea have been sub-
stantially on the low side,5 the fact seems to remain that the North Sea 
fields will not save Europe or even the few countries actually possessing 
the fields except in the short term. 
This pessimistic appraisal is essentially reflected in the CIA report of 
1977, The International Energy Situation: Outlook to /985. 6 In this 
report it is postulated that in spite of all other resources, the dependence 
of Western Europe (and Japan) on Middle Eastern oil will remain ex-
treme for many years. In a more recent report, the CIA predicts that the 
North Sea fields will peak in their output in 1982 or 1983.7 
The fact is that to meet national and regional requirements, enormous 
quantities of oil are imported by these countries largely by sea and 
mostly from the Middle East. Of utmost importance here is that fully 
half of the world's present proved oil reserves are located in the area 
around the Persian Gulf.S This estimate is hardly affected by North Sea 
finds or the Mexican oil development. Therefore, so long as no substi-
tute is made available to, or by, these nations on a large scale, energy, 
for them, must mean oil-primarily Arabian oil. This oil is present in 
finite quantities. It will one day for all practical economic purposes run 
out, and this day could arrive within three decades unless oil consump-
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tion is moderated. Increased demands would, of course, reduce the time 
available in which to seek out and put in place suitable alternatives. 
Doubtless, depression or similar calamities might reduce demands. 
Through a variety of mechanisms (as demonstrated by the Arab 
embargo and the Iranian Revolution), oil flow to the industrialized West 
and Japan, while it lasts, is not to be taken for granted as an automatic 
"given" in the Western economies and political arenas, or in our future 
plans. According to our Department of State, a large first step in provid-
ing a hedge against this uncertain situation was the establishment of the 
lEA. 
When Richard Nixon announced on 7 November 1973 that we faced an 
energy crisis, he ended months of temporizing with such terms as 
"energy problem" and "energy challenge. "9 The Arab oil embargo 
seemingly jarred the administration into realizing that the calculations of 
oil sufficiency under embargo made by the president's Cabinet Task 
Force on Oil Import Control in February of 1970 were invalid. Certainly 
the general assumption that the oil-producing nations were incapable of 
forming an effective cartel and then using it as an effective political 
weapon was dispelled. 
While the purpose underlying the U.S. decision to press for the 
establishment of the lEA following the 1973-1974 oil debacle was to 
establish a "counter-cartel" of oil-consuming nations in order to some-
how force down the price of oil which had risen over fourfold, this 
expectation was doomed from the beginning. The best that could be 
expected from lEA membership, as Vincent Davis has suggested, was to 
"share the pain "10 more or less in the manner openly stipulated in the 
International Energy Program eventually established within the OECD 
framework on a provisional basis on 18 November 1974. 
The lEA initially included twelve member nations and presently in-
cludes twenty: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxenbourg, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Norway participates under a 
special agreement. France, conspicuously, does not participate. 
The agreement to which these twenty nations have nominally com-
mitted themselves, pending final review or concurrence by their various 
legislative bodies under prevailing constitutional provisions, features 
the following major elements or provisions: 11 
1. Cooperation with both oil-producing and developing countries. 
2. Efforts on a long-term cooperative basis to lessen the dependence of 
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the participating countries on oil. This includes a commitment to 
reduce oil imports of participating countries by about 10 percent (the 
U.S. share of this import reduction would be somewhere between 
one and two million barrels per day). Development of alternative 
energy sources is featured although only in general terms. Specifics 
of energy sources and their funding are not discussed. 
3. An emergency system of demand-restraint, allocation, and sharing 
of oil among the participating countries, based on a concept of equal 
sacrifice for every nation concerned. During an emergency, available 
oil would be pooled under the control of governments. Emergency 
oil reserves initially amounting to a sixty-day supply of imports are 
to be established. These reserves are to be increased to a ninety-day 
supply eventually. 
4. A permanent information system to gather facts on the oil companies 
and their activities. 
5. Voting rights on the lEA governing board predicated essentially upon 
weights based upon a country's oil consumption, giving the United 
States far and away the greatest number of votes. No veto provisions 
as such. 
While formation of the lEA is indicative of a renewed postembargo 
solidarity among the oil-importing nations, the record of implementa-
tion since the signing of the agreement is somewhat spotty at best. It 
appears that internationally, as domestically, it may be easier to agree 
upon an agreement than to develop and carry out a specific energy 
strategy. Some uncertainties in each of the five areas of commitment 
should be pointed out. 
Beginning in 1975 OPEc's earlier demand that lEA's consumer-
producer conferences include Third World raw material suppliers in 
general-not just oil producers-gained considerable momentum. 12 At 
first somewhat angrily opposed by the United States, this apparent 
movement to create a "super cartel" of exporters to the industrial West 
is now being given very serious treatment. 
According to State Department sources, it can be anticipated that 
U.S. negotiators will oppose raw material price-indexing fixed to the 
price inflation of manufactured goods the Third World purchases. They 
will probably also oppose any concept of wiping out the old indebted-
ness of the raw material-exporting nations. 
In all probability, however, one must soberly conclude that the 
United States will in the end be forced to accede in large measure to 
these and other demands if it desires to preserve lEA integrity. And lEA 
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integrity implies OECD integrity-the integrity of the "Free World" 
whose virtues have aroused so much rhetoric if not positive action. 
The problem here is that as an individual nation we have by no means 
the leverage on OPEC that our power might lead one to suspect. Nor, for 
that matter, are we necessarily in a position to exercise such power as 
we have. We are not the only market for OPEC. And as we found during 
1973-1974, the non-Arab members of OPEC such as Venezuela and Iran 
are not able to make up the U.S. oil deficit created by an OAPEC em-
bargo. 
Besides its very heavy dependence upon OPEC-controlled Middle 
Eastern oil, the European community imports something between 80 
and 100 percent of its phosphates from African sources.B Its depen-
dence upon that continent and its peoples is acute. While the specter of a 
cartelized, price-raising Third World may be traumatic, Western Europe 
must deal with it. 
For that matter the United States, even with its strategic raw material 
stockpile (diminished by the Nixon administration), is by no means 
immune to this problem now added arbitrarily to the energy situation. 
We import perhaps 50 percent of our raw materials, and while in some 
cases we do have the capacity to substitute lower grade ores,14 drasti-
cally higher prices for raw materials would probably in the long run 
adversely affect us as they would any other importing nation. 
Regardless of how one might view the rather heavy-handed efforts of 
Third World nations to redress their situations, it is important to under-
stand that the present and prospective price of oil puts them in nearly 
desperate condition. Whereas only a few years ago many of them were 
able to look forward with some confidence to joining the ranks of 
industrialized powers, this prospect has now been considerably dimmed 
except for those nations which are themselves oil producers. 
In general the Third World nations greeted the initial great oil price 
boost by OPEC with approbation. It constituted for many of them a very 
welcome example of twisting the lion's tail or of getting even with 
former colonial masters. As the months went by, however, it became 
apparent that the Green Revolution by means of which many nations 
had hoped to feed their peoples was in reality a Black Revolution, this 
being the color of the oil necessary to fuel the tractors, operate the 
irrigation machinery, and provide the fertilizers and pesticides upon 
which the new agricultural techniques depend. At risk now instead of 
industrialization is the even more basic question of food. 
Today the energy needs of the Third World constitute a major chal-
lenge to the members of the IEA. It cannot be supposed that the Third 
World nations will long accept the role of "milch cows" to the OECD if 
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they have other options. As the basic source of raw materials for the 
West they do indeed have options, but their exercise involves pain and 
trauma and possibly war. Thus, while our cooperation with the oil 
producers is clearly inevitable, this same cooperation must probably 
extend to the whole Third World if the Free West is to preserve its 
integrity. Even so, success is uncertain. 
While praising this country's Federal Energy Administration for its 
comprehensive public education efforts, the IEA 's first report on the 
status of members' efforts to reach agency goals made rather specific 
note of the U.S. failure to establish any semblance of an energy conser-
vation program or to reduce (let alone halve) the rise in oil imports. 15 
This situation has improved in 1980 but remains serious. 
The United States now imports about 43 percent of its crude oil 
requirements. 16 We are not alone in this regard, but it is increasingly 
clear that U.S. actions in the energy field sway the IEA membership to 
the extent that some European officials remark privately that their coun-
tries cannot establish solid energy strategies until the United States-the 
instigator and dominant figure of lEA-puts its own house in order and 
gives a clear operational indication of what it has decided to do. Appar-
ently the spate of energy legislation passed in the fall of 1978 does not 
meet this criterion in foreign perceptions. Nor, rationally speaking, 
should it. President Carter's pledge to limit oil import rises in the 
summer of 1979 carries some weight, but the ability to carry out his 
pledge never again to exceed 1977 import levels remains uncertainP 
Following the general agreement at the Tokyo Energy Summit Con-
ference in the summer of 1979, the members of the lEA met in Paris in 
December to make specific agreements on quotas to limit oil purchases 
from OPEC. 18 This process had the backing of moderate OPEC countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, and the agreement was intended to persuade OPEC 
members in general to hold down oil price increases. This did not occur. 
And a serious problem is presented to the United States. The agreement 
to limit imports to 8,787,700 barrels per day in 1980 and 8,783,600 
barrels in 1985 means that we may not be able to continue filling 
our strategic oil reserve without the imposition of rationing. Ration-
ing may be necessary during the 1980s in any event for a variety 
of reasons, but to impose it in the absence of obvious crisis may be 
beyond the capability of our government. 
In the area of developing an alternative to oil as a source of energy, 
the feelings and the results are more mixed. The U.S. Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report of October 1975 on the 
ERDA Energy Research and Development Plan and Program criticized 
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the lack of scope and direction of planning in the area of international 
cooperation. 19 Presumably improvement has been made in the years 
since, at least organizationally, and in any case the original OTA report 
itself, like many intra-government observations, tends to be more carp-
ing than helpful. But some Europeans engaged in cooperative energy 
development schemes with the United States (all funded at quite low 
levels at the present) make the point that just because America runs on 
wheels it need not think it invented the wheel. Many energy substitute 
developments are of European origin in the first place and in certain 
other areas European developments are substantially ahead of compara-
ble U.S. efforts. This is surely the case, for example, in breeder reactor 
work and probably in coal liquefaction and gasification schemes. 
The United Kingdom breeder reactor demonstration program in 
northern Scotland has encountered technical problems over the years in 
the form of leaks due to the corrosive properties of the liquid sodium 
primary coolant. An intense debate has raged in Great Britain over 
whether to proceed with further development. As of early 1980 the 
argument seems to have been resolved in favor of proceeding with 
breeder developments because many of the problems earlier deemed 
insurmountable have been solved.20 The French "Phoenix" breeder 
reactor has reportedly encountered fewer problems and has apparently 
profited from assistance by the Soviet Union, which has a power-
producing breeder operational. 
During the period 1975 to 1978 the rather frenetic and seemingly 
independent (if not uncoordinated) efforts of FEA, ERDA, and State De-
partment staffs devoted to international energy problems were judged to 
be largely unproductive on Capitol Hill. It remains to be seen whether 
more meaningful efforts will be developed by a reorganized Department 
of Energy. It seems clear that the various United Nations and Third 
World resolutions on energy matters have had little substantive effect. 
The first step in this country toward a plan for emergency rationing 
and international sharing of oil and the establishment of reserves was a 
feeble one. Public Law 94-163, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
of 1975, was passed in December 1975 by a Congress apparently anx-
ious to avoid the stigma of a "do-nothing" label in the energy area. It 
was signed on 22 December 1975 by President Ford apparently for 
about the same reasons. It did not substantially support his adminis-
tration's programs. As the first IEA report points out, the provisions of 
the act holding U.S. oil and gas prices below world market prices, 
together with relatively low fuel taxes, have contributed to the failure of 
any proclaimed energy conservation program.21 
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The law cited above did in fact authorize the preparation of both an 
emergency rationing plan and a strategic oil reserve. The emergency 
rationing plan was later proposed by the president and rejected by Con-
gress. The strategic reserve has only begun to be implemented. Admin-
istrative confusion has beset the program. At this writing about 91 
million barrels have been stored (about eleven days worth of foreign oil 
imports). The ability to retrieve even this amount is uncertain.22 The 
target of 500 million barrels in reserve would not be achieved until 1985 
in any case under current law. This target was due to be increased to one 
billion barrels, but budgetary considerations are intervening and 
additions to the reserve have been suspended lest they disturb the al-
ready fragile balance of oil imports needed for daily use and upset 
relations with Saudi Arabia. As a security measure, the strategic oil 
reserve is at the present time a broken reed. 
The president is apparently authorized to share oil with other coun-
tries under emergency conditions, but this is so obliquely put in the act 
(by reference to various chapters of the International Energy Program), 
congressional and administration press releases were so muted on the 
subject, and such a vehement disclaimer is contained in the act as to 
congressional approval of the International Energy Program in general, 
that many European observers question whether in fact the United 
States could ship oil abroad in the event of another embargo. At the 
moment, it clearly cannot. 
Even if the U.S. government could commandeer the requisite tankers 
to deliver oil abroad, the question persists as to whether an unprepared 
American public deprived of up to 50 percent of its crude oil supply and 
perhaps 100 percent of its petroleum supplies on the East Coast would 
tolerate sharing or diverting any portion of the oil it had left to either 
Europe or Japan. The conditions still exist, therefore, for another gen-
eral sauve qui peut exercise in unilateral petition to OPEC by individual 
nations and the general abandonment of OECD positions by members of 
the European community and Japan. 
The last chance for the OECD described by Andre Fontaine in Le 
Monde in November of 1973 may well have been the last chance.23 
Dependent for 60 percent of their 10 mbpd of imported oil upon Persian 
Gulf sources until the North Sea fields can mitigate this somewhat,24 
Western Europe, unless given the strongest support by the United 
States, has no recourse, as individual nations or collectively, but to 
make separate arrangements-accepting, along the way, whatever polit-
ical price may be involved. For all practical purposes Japan has already 
made separate arrangements. She receives about 70 percent of her 6 
mbpd imported oil from the Persian Gulf.25 Japan's essential oil prob-
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lem is that she cannot protect the Middle Eastern producers from the 
Soviet Union. It seems that Western Europe. would not. Our own 
capabilities are under scrutiny. 
Oil and the Middle East protection question ll.fe increasingly affect-
ing the survival of Israel. But in this process there is raised the question 
of whether the edifice known as the Free West in fact actually exists any 
more at all. We may be, in the famous post hoc American tradition, 
fervently debating and negotiating a situation long since overtaken by 
events. When we cannot control Middle Eastern oil, can we truly sup-
port the destinies of Western Europe and Japan? 
Where is the lEA to obtain its specialized information on oil reserves 
and the like? This is an extremely difficult area to assess. American 
companies are given immunity from anti-trust laws in return for cooper-
ation with the lEA. But on balance, in the process of anonymous inter-
view one gains the impression that the bureaucrats of the great oil 
corporations and related financial institutions strongly distrust the con-
fidentiality that might be accorded their company secrets by the 
bureaucrats of the lEA, and they doubt the ability of these officials to 
make gainful use of such information. On the other hand, the bureau-
crats of government energy institutions resent the implication that oil 
company data resources might be superior to theirs and turn livid at the 
suggestion that when the situation requires, diplomacy concerning oil 
matters by Exxon, or British Petroleum, or Dutch Royal Shell, for ex-
ample, might be more productive and closer to the national (or even 
international) interest than any conducted by their secretary of state or 
foreign minister-let alone the secretary for energy or the secretary of 
the treasury. Under present conditions, since the consuming nations have 
developed no alternative to oil to satisfy their energy addiction (and 
have made little genuine effort to diminish this addiction), their gov-
ernment bodies have no real bargaining leverage and no real authority in 
the matter of oil distribution other than through force majeure. The 
traumatic considerations of this latter alternative will be dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
The oil companies' position is essentially that whereas they have 
manifestly lost real title to oil sources and extractive installations around 
the world, they nevertheless have a number of strengths: unique infor-
mation (often accumulated in large automated data banks), the only 
available means at the moment for the large-scale worldwide distribu-
tion of oil (tanker fleets), a huge refinery system, and the large, com-
plex, integrated organizational infrastructure to make the system work: 
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Giving away their information to organizations unable to use it fails 
to make sense in their eyes in terms of utility. It also is deeply feared in 
terms of intercorporation competition. To the outsider this may seem an 
extreme case of occupational paranoia but it is apparently a very real 
worry in the oil business. 
On balance one would hazard the opinion that such information as is 
accumulated by lEA headquarters will be little better than that available 
to analysts working from a large cross section of publicly available 
documents. This in itself, however, represents a notable advance over 
the government positions generally obtaining in the OECD before the 
1973-1974 Arab oil embargo. 
It seems clear that the heavy proportion of voting rights obtained by 
the United States in the lEA decisional structure was a mixed blessing. It 
is a departure from any one-state, one-vote concept. But it stops short of 
the United Nations Security Council veto notion. In a sense it achieves 
the advantages of neither approach while retaining some of the irritants 
of both. 
Basically it must be understood that the United States created the lEA 
in rather halcyon days. The nation was relieved that Nixon was safely out 
of the White House. The new Federal Energy Administration had come 
forth with a "blueprint for energy independence" which implied that the 
energy independence of the United States should contribute to interna-
tional security (especially in the economic realm) and not be autarkic in 
nature. The secretary of state was popular and confident with an interna-
tional solution to the energy problem in hand. And the new president 
had dispatched to Congress a comprehensive proposal for a national 
energy program thought to be able to solve the domestic problem if but 
enacted promptly. Only a few details, it seemed, needed filling in. 
In the prolonged and rather numbing aftermath, Congress simply 
ignored the matter in large part. The president gave up. The secretary of 
state took up a sizable agenda of other problems without delegating his 
energy responsibilities. And the American public clearly cared very 
little one way or another. 
Manifestly the representations of the United States in lEA councils 
continue to carry enormous weight. Possibly the views of other lEA 
nations on U.S. energy postures as expressed in published OECD reports 
will have some effect on our own people if they are publicized and it 
becomes generally recognized that our disproportionate oil consumption 
is deeply resented (''Why should 6 percent of the world's population 
consume 30 percent of the world's oil?"). But it seems clear that the lEA 
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nations (and France, for all her "go it alone" sulkiness) will probably 
not evolve coherent energy programs susceptible to genuine and benefi-
cial international coordination until the United States does so. The be-
ginnings of this may have been achieved in Tokyo during the so-called 
summit meetings of 1979, but the results remain to be seen despite the 
lowered U.S. oil demand of 1979. 
The formation of the IEA has in no sense resulted in any control of 
international oil prices. These have risen steadily through a series of 
OPEC decisions. In mid-December 1976 a ministerial meeting of OPEC 
members took place in Daka, Qatar. The result of this meeting was to 
create a two-tier oil price system. Eleven OPEC members announced 
their intentions to raise their prices by 10 percent on 1 January 1977 and 
by another 5 percent in July. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi-
rates, however, split from this decision and indicated their intention to 
increase their price by 5 percent and to hold this level throughout 1977. 
Although praised by the United States for their "sense of responsibility 
for global growth and stability, "26 the dissenting position of Saudi 
Arabia and the U.A.E. should not obscure the point that world oil prices 
had at that point risen more than fivefold since January 1973. It has been 
estimated that each 5 percent increase in the world price of this com-
modity costs the larger industrialized countries an average of 0.3 per-
cent in GNP growth and adds roughly 0.3 percent to consumer prices.27 
In December of 1978 the OPEC members met again and evolved a new 
price-increase formula to raise the price of oil incrementally during 
1979 by 14.5 percent. After the Iranian Revolution an additional im-
mediate price rise of 9 percent was voted by OPEC. In both of these latter 
meetings Saudi Arabia in effect relinquished its previous role as price 
dampener. By the end of the summer of 1979, OPEC oil prices were 
averaging $23.50 per barrel and prices almost double that amount were 
being encountered on the spot market in Rotterdam. By August 1980 the 
average landed price of foreign crude oil in the United States was 
$33.44 and the average price of domestic oil had risen to $21.00.28 
It seems quite clear that while the social and economic viability of 
the industrial nations of the West depends largely on secure energy 
resources at prices compatible with their purses, so far neither as indi-
vidual countries nor as a collectivity have they stumbled upon the politi-
cal means to stabilize or protect their environment. And in this situation 
involving the survival of our contemporary civilization, a great deal 
depends upon what actions the United States takes, does not take, or 
even can take. But in the months and years ahead it is not just the United 
States whose energy actions are important. There is also the question of 
the Soviet Union and its energy intentions. 
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Russia-watching is a fascinating pastime for amateurs as well as a 
respectable source of income for the professional. In neither case, how-
ever, can it be described as an exact science. The nation operates as a 
closed and very secretive society. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of basic policy analysis, we do well to 
keep in mind that the masters of the Kremlin, rationally speaking, owe 
us as a people nothing; nothing, at least, that they feel compelled to 
acknowledge. They cannot logically be expected to feel any benign 
responsibility for the state of our economy or social structure. Their 
economy and social structure at the present time are, for all practical 
purposes, largely uncoupled from those of the West in spite of the fact 
that they occasionally purchase our wheat and the fruits of our technol-
ogy. Therefore, while perhaps as a moot question they may or may·not 
seek the destruction of Western (and particularly American) society, 
they cannot be charged under existing circumstances with any rational 
commitment to sustain it in their own interest. 
For all of this, the Soviet Union, ever since the bloody-handed days 
of Stalin, has assumed the status of a great industrial nation with con-
comitant accelerating energy requirements. In such a society neither 
public whim as to energy expenditure nor individual environmental 
concerns about the desirability of energy restraint need grossly impede 
the progress of government policy. Nonetheless, the industrial society 
carries with it its own built-in energy imperatives. The Soviet Union, on 
its present course and in its present image, needs and uses more and 
more energy. In today's terms, and in spite of a very extensive nuclear 
involvement, this largely translates to oil demand because of the unique 
flexibility of this fuel. 
How does this Soviet oil demand affect the United States and our 
friends and allies in the Free World? The answer to this question can be 
derived only indirectly and imprecisely. Petroleum reserves and produc-
tion statistics are generally considered state secrets in that society, 
whereas we tend to consider them as company secrets. Information 
concerning them is published irregularly and sparsely in the Soviet 
Union and not necessarily with the intent of accurately informing the 
reader as to the matter ostensibly at hand. Irksome as this may be for 
the researcher, it is of course in many respects ultimately similar to the 
situation in the United States, where the sheer volume of conflicting 
data often tends to provoke a severe case of mental constipation. 
Although in early 1980 Iranian gas deliveries to the USSR were 
stopped because of arguments over price, the Soviet Union has long 
imported relatively small lots of oil as well as gas from Iran and Af-
ghanistan. The gas was used in the southern republics of the ussR. 
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Payment has been largely in barter goods. Oil and gas were then sold to 
the satellites of Eastern Europe and to some Western European countries 
in order to accumulate "hard" currency. The Soviet Union gives a 
higher value to its ruble than the rest of the world is prepared to accept. 
Therefore, when faced with the necessity for purchasing goods, ser-
vices, or commodities (for example, U.S. grain) outside of its territory 
or immediate sphere of military control, the ussR, if unable to barter, 
must produce a currency acceptable to the dispensing nation. Basically, 
however, the Soviet Union is essentially self-sufficient in energy 
supplies at the present time. Furthermore, although the figures are not 
known exactly (they may not even exist very exactly), it is generally 
accepted that the Soviet Union has very large untapped oil and natural 
gas reserves. These lie primarily, it appears, in the Siberian region and 
in some off-shore areas. 
In 1977 the Soviet Union produced 10.9 million barrels of oil per 
day, making her the world's largest oil producer. 29 In 197 8 the ussR was 
able to export (net) 3 million barrels per day.30 This export was distrib-
uted fairly evenly between the Eastern European and Western European 
market. The COMECON countries of Eastern Europe have been heavily 
reliant on the Soviet Union for their oil needs. Werner Gumpel of the 
Unversity of Munich reports that in 1976 the ussR supplied 80 percent 
of Eastern Europe's oil needs. "If Romania, which imports primarily 
from Iran, Iraq, and Libya, is excluded, the Soviet Union furnished 90 
percent of the oil used in COMECON countries. 31 This supply of oil 
provided at less than world price and for "soft" currency or for barter 
goods manifestly affects the ability of the Soviet Union to maintain 
hegemony over the satellite nations-perhaps even more effectively 
than the presence of the Red Army. The export of oil to Western Europe 
in recent years has provided 40 to 50 percent of the ussR's hard currency 
receipts. 32 
But this picture is apparently changing. Moscow has recently assured 
her Eastern European allies that they will receive 20 percent more oil in 
the 1981-1985 period than at present. But in The World Oil Market in 
the Years Ahead the CIA estimates that Soviet oil output may peak in 
1980 and then decline sharply.33 There is considerable support for this 
view, which is not of recent origin. 
Walter Laqueur, the director of the Institute of Contemporary His-
tory and the Wiener Library in London, noted as early as 1969 that the 
target for Soviet oil production set in 1961 for the year 1981 by the 
Soviet government had been reduced in 1968 from 700 million tons to 
500 million tons.34 Barring increased imports, this would amount to a 
predicted consumption reduction of about 3.6 million barrels per day. 
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In 197 4 analysts of the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute ( SIPRI) calculated that by 1980 Soviet petroleum requirements will 
amount to no less than 600 million tons. This, amounting to about 12 
million barrels per day, is a far cry, of course, from the 17 to 20 million 
barrels per day that the United States may consume. But keeping in 
mind the substantial petroleum requirements of the huge mechanized 
Red Army, their air forces, the imposing and far-ranging Soviet navy, it 
seems clear that the oil situation is moving slowly towards a pinched 
condition for the long-suffering Soviet citizen. The question emerges, 
"What, if anything, is the Soviet government going to do about all 
this?" As Dienes and Shabad pointed out in 1979, "The Soviet oil 
industry is plainly in trouble "35 . The question is, can the Soviets substi-
tute other fuels such as gas, of which they have a great deal? Many 
observers believe that they cannot do this in a timely fashion. In its 
study The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985, the CIA 
concluded that beginning in the 1980s the Soviet Union will enter the 
world oil market (meaning for practical purposes the Middle Eastern 
market) as a heavy purchaser of petroleum to meet her domestic 
needs. 36 This conclusion is based on the belief that the readily accessible 
oil wells in the Soviet Union are rapidly being depleted and that the 
difficulties attending the extraction and delivery of oil from the distant 
and very inhospitable reaches of frozen Siberia will exceed Russian 
technological capabilities or cost more than the ussR can afford, or both, 
at least for the time being. 
There is some support for these assumptions, according to observa-
tions made by British Petroleum Company engineers who have worked 
recently in the Soviet Union under contract. Writing in Energy Policy, 
George Hoffman of the University of Texas at Austin examined a cross 
section of a large number of technical sources, including Soviet publica-
tions, relating to the ussR's energy future. 37 His conclusion is that while 
the Soviet Union may overcome the technological, climatic, geo-
graphic, and economic problems and maintain self-sufficiency in oil and 
gas production during the coming decade, it does not appear that she 
will be able at the same time to meet the needs of Eastern Europe. If 
maintaining economic as well as military hegemony over Eastern 
Europe is vital to the Soviet Union's conception of her defense needs, 
obviously a major problem and a number of imponderables are in-
volved.38 
Some have attacked the 1977 CIA report on the grounds that it was 
hastily put together and issued on the eve of President Carter's first 
energy speech in order to provide a more dramatic stage-setting for the 
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announcement of his program and plea for energy conservation. Others 
have given the CIA report more sober substantive appraisal. 
One astute professional observer of Soviet affairs, Marshall I. 
Goldman, the associate director of Harvard's Russian Research Center, 
has raised the question of how the Soviet Union would pay for the 3.5 to 
4.5 mbpd (or even 2 mbpd, according to more recent estimates) of oil 
that the CIA considers the ussR might need from the Middle East by 
1985.39 Goldman takes the economic line of reasoning that the CIA's 
logic is flawed because the Soviet Union simply does not have, nor will 
it have, in his opinion, the hard currency necessary for such large-scale 
purchases of petroleum. Goldman agrees, however, that for the short 
term (to 1985) the Soviet Union will indeed find itself pressed to meet 
oil demands from domestic resources. 
The U.S. International Trade Commission also contests the CIA re-
port.40 It posits on the one hand that the Soviet Union will be able to 
import the western technology necessary to augment its oil production. 
Further, it posits that Saudi Arabia, as the key oil producer, will be able 
to expand its production appreciably beyond that estimated by the CIA. 
Current events seem to make this forecast dubious. The Swedish con-
sulting concern Petrostudies has consistently claimed much larger oil 
resources for the Soviet Union than postulated by other Western an-
alysts. But they give no indication of when these resources might be 
exploitable. 
The reactions within the Soviet Union to Western speculations about 
energy (and particularly oil) shortages in the ussR have been schizoid. 
In August of 1979 Eduard V ertel, the chief of fuel and oil products 
management in Moscow's State Planning Committee, called the CIA 
projections "deliberate distortions" designed to weaken the image of the 
Soviet Union in Western eyes as a reliable long-term trade partner for 
oil products.41 Vertel 's attack on the CIA appeared in the Sovietskaya 
Rossiya newspaper of 31 August 1979, and in his interview he stated 
that in the first half of 1979 the Soviet Union had produced oil at the rate 
of 11.51 mbpd, more than any other nation in the world. About the 
same time that Vertel made his announcements, Yuri G. Mamsurov, 
deputy minister of civil aviation, wrote in the Soviet air transport news-
paper that fuel shortages were threatening the expansion of Aeroflot, the 
national carrier, and the "regularity and security of flights. "42 And, of 
course in May 1979, Kosygin, the prime minister himself, had warned 
the "brotherhood of socialist countries " that they, like their capitalist 
competitors, would have to take stringent measures to cut back con-
sumption of oil and natural gas.43 Problems of energy supply are now 
being openly discussed in Soviet literature.44 
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Marshall Goldman has recently written that the published CIA predic-
tions and the ensuing fanfare in the American press over Soviet energy 
problems have in reality stimulated Soviet leaders to take corrective 
measures.45 Whether these measures will prove sufficient no one is 
certain. In any case, the Soviet government is taking the energy situa-
tion seriously. It has ordered extensive energy-saving measures 
throughout Soviet society. 46 It seems quite likely, all factors in balance, 
that the Soviet Union is facing an energy shortage. Clearly what the 
Soviet leaders elect to do about this will have a major impact on Ameri-
can policy .47 The Afghanistan invasion could be the precursor of events 
to come. On the other hand an Iran rebuffed by the West may trade its 
oil and gas to the Soviet bloc in exchange for food, equipment, and so 
forth. De facto access to the Persian Gulf by the ussR may result. 
For purposes of policy analysis, we are left with considerable uncer-
tainty in this area. A major new unknown quantity has now been intro-
duced into the already complicated calculus of international energy 
affairs. A Soviet Union desirous for reasons of prestige and general 
influence to keep a finger in the Middle East pie is one thing. A Soviet 
Union hungry for Middle East oil is another thing. And a Soviet Union 
armed to the teeth but short of hard currency to pay for the oil it needs is 
still something else to consider. 
Energy Wars and Alternatives 
In the introductory chapter to this book we cited President Carter's view 
of why the energy situation constituted a national security issue. Essen-
tially Carter emphasized the increasing vulnerability of our economic 
and political independence as our oil imports rose. 
In this chapter we will examine the military and paramilitary aspects 
of the energy situation. In a broad context one view has already been 
outlined by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown: 
We are all familiar with the continuing risk of oil supply interrup-
tions and upward pressures on prices from politically motivated 
embargoes such as we experienced four years ago. Much less 
attention has been given to the potential for a much more serious 
interruption of oil supply by hostile forces in time of war. In the 
event of some future confrontation the Soviet Union might be able 
to restrict access of the Western world to its essential oil supplies 
to a degree of severity and duration greater than any embargo by 
the oil producers. The ussR might attempt to deny access to the oil 
of the Persian Gulf by direct attack on the facilities of the major 
oil loading ports which lie so near to Soviet territory. Simultane-
ous action to interdict on the high seas tanker movement of oil 
from other exporting nations could vastly exacerbate the oil sup-
ply situation for the U.S. and its Allies. 
The military, political and economic risks of oil interruption 
are very real, and are steadily increasing as dependence on im-
ported oil continues to grow .1 
Brown later emphasized: 
The present deficiency of assured energy resources is the single 
surest threat that the future poses to our security and to that of our 
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allies. We now spend annually over one hundred billion dollars on 
our armed forces. If we hand to others the capacity to strangle us 
and our allies by cutting off our and their oil supplies, then this 
expenditure does no more for us than to create a useless, encrusted 
modem day Maginot Line. Such a cut-off could grow from con-
flict between others-as in the Middle East in a crisis which did 
not involve our own forces; or it could be directed primarily at the 
United States-as in a war in which our adversary interdicted or 
destroyed our sources of foreign supply. Under either condition, 
until we lessen the import habit we are terribly vulnerable. 2 
Since energy is the lifeblood of an industrial society and since oil is 
currently the predominant fuel for energy in the world, it follows in-
exorably that the supply lines of oil are indeed the lifelines, the arteries, 
of the industrial world. The security of these lines should, it would 
seem, be the concern of every government involved. Clearly, also, any 
government intent on damaging oil-dependent governments and their 
people would probably examine the possibility of severing these 
lifelines. A less immediately hostile government, determined only to 
pose the threat of harm in order to gain control over other governments 
and peoples at minimum sacrifice and expenditure, would logically 
move to achieve the means of controlling these lifelines. 
The industrial world's "heart" is located in our present circum-
stances in the Persian Gulf. The prospects for oil in the two American 
continents apparently will no longer support our total demands. The two 
countries with the greatest known untapped conventional oil reserves, 
Canada and Mexico, are keenly aware of their own future requirements 
and are increasingly loath to sacrifice these reserves to demands of the 
moment by the United States even though, at least in the case of 
Mexico, oil exports are an important source of income and the area may 
eventually overtake the Persian Gulf in importance to the United 
States.3 For that matter, Venezuela may regain its importance to us if its 
heavy oils along the Orinoco River fulfill optimistic predictions. But for 
this decade we remain heavily dependent upon Persian Gulf resources. 
The huge majority of oil deliveries around the world are made by 
sea. The much-discussed Trans-Arabian Pipeline hardly affects the 
world delivery system. After bitter experience with sabotage and acci-
dents it was found cheaper and more expedient to deliver Arabian oil to 
Europe by supertanker around the Caoe of Good Hope. Today no more 
than about 50,000 barrels per day flows through the pipeline running 
from the Persian Gulf overland to refineries near the Mediterranean. 
Although smaller tankers now use the Suez Canal, the bulk of oil traffic 
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goes around Africa. This may change somewhat in 1981 with the en-
largement of the canal. 
Of the oil we import, 32 to 38 percent comes from the Persian Gulf. 
Of the 10 mbpd imported by Western Europe, 60 percent comes from 
the Persian Gulf. Of the 6 mbpd imported by Japan, 70 percent comes 
from the Persian Gulf. Thus, in terms of grand strategy, control of the 
Persian Gulf today implies control of the fates of the non-Communist 
members of the industrial world. As Vice Admiral William Crowe has 
phrased it, the Persian Gulf may well be the Achilles heel of NAT0.4 In 
the future, control of the Persian Gulf may also determine the fate of the 
Soviet Union and its satellites of Eastern Europe. 
But note that whereas the Soviet Union is contiguous to the oil-rich 
nations of the Middle East and could obtain oil from there overland if 
necessary, the oil-dependent nations of the so-called Free World are 
not. They must obtain their oil by sea. In every respect these nations, to 
the extent that they are friends and allies, constitute a classic example of 
a maritime alliance-with its advantages and disadvantages. 
An enormous oceanic traffic has built up to sustain this alliance, its 
trade, and, above all, the flow of its oil. According to George A. 
Lincoln, a tanker passes down the three-mile-wide channel of the Strait 
of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf every eleven minutes. A 
tanker rounds the Cape of Good Hope at the foot of Africa every twenty 
minutes.5 Fewer but still heavy numbers of tankers continually traverse 
the Strait of Malacca en route to and from Japan. The potential for 
interrupting this sensitive, defenseless, and all but indefensible traffic is 
so high and involves so little effort as to be almost ludicrous were it not 
so serious a matter in terms of individual well-being and lives and the 
very survival of civilization as we know it. 
To mention but a few opportunities available to those interested in 
the rapid demise of the existing Western order of things: the tankers 
could be attacked by submarine; the straits could be mined· surrepti-
tiously or openly; with properly organized support, a sabotage effort 
could be mounted in the Persian Gulf itself that could convert it into a 
sea of flames inextinguishable for perhaps a year. As an alternative the 
oil extracted from the Persian Gulf region could be rendered radioactive 
by covert chemical treatment and thus made useless at the ports of 
debarkation in Europe, Japan, and the United States. The forces of 
terrorism are abroad in our international society. To ignore them is 
dangerous. To employ them as surrogates may be a tempting possibility 
to some nation. 
Such efforts could well result in the dissolution of the western 
maritime alliance, because countermeasures, while possible eventually, 
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would take time. Antisubmarine efforts are analogous to the counter-
measures necessary to put down guerrilla activities; even when success-
ful they seldom produce immediate results. And today, while the United 
States is vulnerable to a Middle Eastern oil stoppage, the state of eco-
nomic depression to be expected here cannot be compared to the chaos 
that would necessarily occur in Western Europe or Japan if their oil 
jugular lines were to be severed in the near future. Without practical 
prospect of help from the United States, such governments as persisted 
there would necessarily come to any terms whatever with whatever 
power that could turn the oil on again--even at a severely limited trickle 
compared to previous consumption rates. Thus it must be recognized 
that if the Soviet Union through one mechanism or another obtains 
major de facto influence over the oil pricing and distribution system of 
the Middle Eastern oil producers, then the edifices known as NATO, the 
OECD, and the Free West will have become essentially irrelevant in 
world politics. For practical purposes, the United States could find itself 
isolated in the Western Hemisphere. 
The media, some academics, and some members of government are 
periodically transfixed on the question of possible U.S. involvement in 
a Middle Eastern war because of the intertwined questions of Israel 
(whom we support) and oil (which we need). 
But Israel is by no means necessarily the major problem in the 
Middle Eastern tangle. Whereas the leaders of the Arab world may envy 
and even hate Israel, in the final analysis their efforts to destroy her, if 
this action were to also wreck the western economic bastion upon which 
they depend, would leave them with the ultimate prospect of burning the 
Koran, handing over their Cadillacs, and learning to speak Russian. 
Their recognition of this is an implicit underlying factor in Middle 
Eastern negotiations concerning Israel. There are indications that the 
Soviet Union may be the major problem in the Middle East. These 
indications are strengthened by the current bear hug being administered 
Afghanistan. The Iraq-Iran war poses further uncertainties. 
Ever since Henry Kissinger's now famous interview published in 
Business Week magazine in early 1975, in which he remarked that under 
"strangulation" conditions force might be employed against Arab oil-
producing nations to gain access to their oil, this possibility has lurked 
in our national consciousness and, presumably, in the minds of Arab 
leaders.6 Indubitably it has been considered by the Red Army and more 
recently by the Soviet navy. The gist of Kissinger's remarks was con-
firmed by President Ford at a subsequent White House press confer-
ence,7 lending impetus to the speculation that followed. 
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In 1979 again, following the Iranian Revolution, the secretary of 
state and the secretary for energy both made statements to the effect that 
the United States is prepared to defend its vital interests with whatever 
means are appropriate, including military force where necessary, 
whether that is in the Middle East or elsewhere. This position was 
reiterated by President Carter in his January 1980 State of the Union 
Address.8 
Although many very able men have written justifications for such 
U.S. action and have discussed ways to go about it, probably the most 
vivid and detailed article along these lines was an anonymous piece 
published in Harper's in 1975.9 The author of this article took the 
position that the various petrodollar recycling schemes would not work 
and that, in fact, they constituted "the engine of our own impoverish-
ment. " He postulated the OPEC was invulnerable to any practical non-
violent measures available to us that would be useful in the near future. 
He concluded that in order to avoid financial ruin we would eventually 
resort to force. 
Anticipating further Israeli-Arab hostilities, "Miles lgnotus" (as the 
author styled himself) worked out a detailed proposal for the occupation 
of Saudi Arabia immediately following the termination of Israeli-Arab 
hostilities which he predicted would result, once again, in a victorious 
Israel beholden to the United States and prepared to offer her airfields as 
staging points for the U.S. forces to be committed against Saudi Arabia. 
The operation he envisioned combined airborne operations and sealift. 
Two major assumptions underlay the entire discussion. 
The first assumption was that Soviet forces would not be employed 
against U.S. forces. This would ensure military success since our exist-
ing deployable units are more than adequate to handle Saudi Arabian 
defenses and those of any would-be allies other than the Soviet Union. 
"Miles lgnotus" concluded that any direct confrontation between U.S. 
and Soviet armies, navies, or air forces would bring along the im-
mediate recourse to tactical nuclear weapons and then intercontinental 
nuclear war-which is thus ruled out as being "unthinkable." 
The second assumption made by "Ignotus" was that the occupation 
of Saudi Arabia by U.S. forces could continue unchallenged by the 
Soviet Union for ten years. This is the length of time that the author 
reckoned would be necessary to break the back of the OPEC price struc-
tures as well as presumably to restore the oil fields demolished by the 
Arabs in the face of invasion. 
There may be much that is superficially stimulating in this article to 
those Americans who believe that, whether justified by past events or 
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not, the nations of OPEC and particularly the Arab oil-producers are 
practicing wholesale extortion with their present prices-with respect to 
what the industrial West is accustomed to think in accepted conven-
tional ways. 
In terms of this same conventional wisdom, these nations are also 
(for all that it is their oil) cheerfully engaging in blackmail in challeng-
ing U.S. guarantees of Israel's integrity. Since they clearly do not have 
the military power to sustain them in the face of American intervention, 
they are, in the ultimate sense, relying on the armed forces-
specifically the naval forces-of the Soviet Union to protect them. This 
point will be dealt with later at more length. 
Robert W. Tucker in perhaps more scholarly articles on this same 
question made essentially the same assumptions as "Miles Ignotus," 
although he also assumed that the Soviet Union does not have sufficient 
naval forces to interpose itself in any U.S. operations in the Indian 
Ocean. 10 
Perhaps with the War Powers Resolution of 1973 in mind,n Con-
gressman Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of a Special Subcommittee on 
Investigations, requested the Congressional Research Service of the 
Library of Congress to study the matter of seizing foreign oil fields by 
force. This resulted in an overview study in some detail by John M. 
Collins and Clyde R. Mark. 12 Their essential conclusions are sum-
marized in the statement that successful operations would be assured 
only if this country could satisfy all aspects of a five-part mission: (1) 
seize required oil installations intact; (2) secure them for weeks, 
months, or years; (3) restore wrecked assets rapidly; (4) operate all 
installations without the owner's assistance; (5) guarantee safe overseas 
passage for supplies and petroleum products. 
In their discussion Collins and Mark amplified this list by noting that 
major factors were slight damage to key installations and Soviet absti-
nence from armed intervention. On balance they concluded that since 
neither of these could be assumed, "military operations to rescue the 
United States (much less its key allies) from an airtight oil embargo 
would combine high costs with high risks." In particular they pointed to 
the limited availability of parachute assault forces, the slow movement 
of amphibious forces, and the insufficiency of U.S. escort vessels to 
ensure safe passage for tankers and supply ships in any area except the 
Caribbean. 
The Defense Department position is that the several army divisions, 
marine amphibious forces, and air wings that would not be immediately 
required for the mutual defense of NATO should be adequate. This 
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position, however, involves the reinforcement of the Persian Gulf in the 
event that the Soviet Union were to make military advances towards the 
oil fields. 13 Officially the Department of Defense has not discussed 
seizing oil fields. 
At this writing, interest within the administration seems to center on 
the possibility of introducing an American or American-supported mili-
tary presence that would ensure political stability in the oil-producing 
countries. That this is feasible is at best debatable, but in any case it 
would not in itself prevent gross and sustained damage to the very 
vulnerable oil production facilities-nor would it promote much capa-
bility to restore these facilities to operating condition once damaged as a 
result of civil unrest, whether spontaneous or organized by outside 
actors. 
To a certain extent the problems facing U.S. armed intervention in 
the Persian Gulf area also apply to any adventure in this area by the 
Soviet Union. There is, however, a difference. As Vice Admiral Crowe 
has pointed out, "No nation could intervene in the Persian Gulf with 
more speed or effectiveness than the Soviet Union. "14 Crowe's "possi-
bility scenario" involves Soviet attacks on the Persian Gulf oil fields 
and facilities in conjunction with an attack on the Central Region of 
NATO. He discounts the likelihood of a Soviet attack on the sea-lanes 
although he emphasizes the importance of the United States establishing 
and maintaining naval superiority in the Western Indian Ocean. Such a 
superiority does not in fact exist today except on a tenuous and periodic 
basis. 
In each of the brief energy war scenarios sketched out, the question 
has arisen of direct Soviet military action against the armed forces of the 
United States. To some Americans, including many policymakers, this 
is not credible. The argument here is that direct conflict between our 
military forces poses too grave a risk of a general nuclear exchange and 
is therefore not viable as a policy option for either of the two countries 
concerned. Particularly the position is advanced that the upper Soviet 
bureaucracy is too cautious and too conservative to undertake adven-
tures that might escalate into a nuclear exchange. That one cannot 
present these viewpoints and at the same time debate nuclear "first 
strike" possibilities is not seen as relevant. Conceptually it is postulated 
that our mutual nuclear might has made all lesser wars between the 
superpowers unthinkable. In effect this argument postulates that weak-
ness in our conventional force capability may be a virtue, since it 
enhances the possibility of facing nuclear war alternatives. 
Regardless of the periodic ebb and flow of the detailed comparative 
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nuclear strike capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, it 
seems safe to say that they are, and will probably remain, quite compa-
rable as to overall effect. Presumably this is the essence of the phrase 
"nuclear parity. " One assumes that it is at the heart of SALT negotia-
tions. In simplest terms, neither nation can unleash nuclear strikes 
against the other without facing immediate and devastating conse-
quences. 
Under the "no war but nuclear war" assumption, it is held that in the 
case of an energy war the Soviet Union would not interdict our tankers 
or that we would not attack their submarines that did so because this 
would invite the great nuclear exchange with the attendant obliteration 
of two civilizations. But nagging doubts persist. There may be an essen-
tial irrationality in this assumption. Could not the issue of war and peace 
revolve around the more prosaic and historic questions of relative force 
capability and relative vulnerability? Would our president rationally 
unleash our nuclear missiles because we were confronted with a war at 
sea? Risking suicide may be rational when survival is threatened. But 
losing an oil war would not threaten our basic survival. It would simply 
make us a second- or third-class power. 
This may well be the "Maginot Line" thinking to which the secretary 
of defense alluded. Having allowed ourselves to become ever more 
vulnerable to an interdiction of the oil lines while at the same time 
steadily reducing our military ability to protect them, we may be essen-
tially inviting a test of the "no war but nuclear war" assumption. Since 
our dependence and that of our allies on oil imported by sea will persist 
for many years, this may constitute the single most dangerous threat to 
our national security and the integrity of the present international system 
engendered by the energy situation. 
We have already discussed what a loss of imported oil would mean to 
our society during the years required to make a transition to a different 
energy economy. This constitutes an inviting vulnerability to those who 
might wish us ill. And how are we to cover this vulnerability short of 
using strategic nuclear arms? Naval strength seems of paramount impor-
tance here, because all military operations of the oil war category are 
necessarily based upon relative naval capabilities. Our ability to inter-
vene successfully in the Persian Gulf is fundamentally predicated upon 
naval power. While initial assaults might be made by airborne forces, 
their resupply and support would necessarily be by sea. Over 90 percent 
of all personnel and material employed in the Vietnam campaign were 
delivered by sea. Our ability to protect the tankers as they depart from 
the Persian Gulf is likewise a function of naval power. And finally, our 
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ability to oppose Soviet military intervention in this crucial area is very 
much a function of our naval capabilities vis-a-vis those of the Soviet 
Union. 
In addition to strategic nuclear-armed forces which are the essential 
muscle underlying detente with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, 
guarded amicability with mainland China, tactical forces are required to 
implement many U.S. strategies, including those involving oil. These 
forces, in spite of the astronomical U.S. defense budget, have recently 
been significantly diminished in size and restricted in effectiveness-
especially in the case of the navy. A number of reasons underlie this 
change, but generally speaking it probably reflects the desire of the 
American people to circumscribe the presidential ability to "meddle" 
abroad. 
The American people have shown all of the symptoms of exhaustion, 
frustration, division, and weary disgust in the bitter aftermath of our 
prolonged, tragic, and painful military engagement in Southeast Asia. 
The national tendency, it would seem, is to turn inward, to adopt a 
self-sufficient insularity, and to withdraw substantially from the affairs 
of the world. Such a tendency has been reflected in congressional at-
titudes.15 Some evidence indicates that this opinion is shifting as public 
perception of our energy dilemma increases, but for practical policy 
development purposes the "No More Vietnams" syndrome is still a 
strong factor to be reckoned with. 16 
So far as current public opinion is concerned, a minimum of conven-
tional army, air force, and navy (including marine) forces would seem 
to be adequate. The question is, Do the forces maintained in this frame 
of mind suit the realities of our national situation vis-a-vis energy and 
the related necessary oceanic commerce? The answer is a qualified and 
hesitant yes. The qualification is a severe one. What we have (and are 
coming to) in tactical force levels is quite adequate-so long as we 
discount a Soviet presence and the tactical force capabilities of the 
Russian fleet. Roughly speaking, what we have is adequate for home 
defense and for the protection of American interests abroad (particularly 
in the Western Hemisphere)-so long as these forces are not challenged 
by comparable Soviet forces, and only so long as they are not chal-
lenged. A considerable change has taken place in our position of world 
power. 
The basic rationale underlying our present and projected tactical 
force capability is that the Soviet Union, as a matter of fundamental 
policy, will not directly confront U.S. forces-particularly when these 
forces are obviously acting in support of accepted vital national inter-
Energy Wars 133 
ests. Presumably this rationale is based on the assumption that direct 
contact between Soviet and U.S. forces must inevitably result in (1) the 
exchange of tactical nuclear weapons, and (2) uncontrollable escalation 
into an intercontinental ballistic missile Armageddon between the 
superpowers. 
For the moment we will work from a different assumption. Let us 
assume that the Soviet Union will not confront U.S. forces in tactical 
engagements unless it is clear that they can do so with relative tactical 
impunity-and when a material degree of national interest on their part 
is involved. Our long and vulnerable seaborne supply lines supporting 
both our Korean and Vietnam military ventures were never subjected to 
harassment by Soviet naval or air forces. They could have been-to our 
severe disadvantage-but they were not. Under our new assumption the 
reason to be postulated was not fear of the grand nuclear exchange 
(except for the brief period during which we had a complete strategic 
nuclear advantage). It was, instead, that Soviet forces available at the 
time for such operations could have been defeated en masse or deci-
mated in detail by existing U.S. forces. There was, therefore, no profit 
in the undertaking from the ussR's point of view. And the Soviet na-
tional interest was never directly involved. 
Today we have a different situation, induced essentially by growing 
energy problems in the ussR and the present relative conditions of the 
U.S. and Soviet fleets. The importance of the naval question lies in the 
fact that operations abroad by our tactical air units, marines, and army 
forces depend utterly upon sea transport, which can be assured only 
when naval supremacy exists. 
The fact of modern Soviet naval power is hardly understood or 
appreciated outside the admiralties of the world. Even in some academic 
circles specializing in Russian affairs the notion persists that seapower 
in general and naval power in particular were grasped at by Peter the 
Great and lost forever in the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. 
In a 1975 issue of the Christian Science Monitor, a scholar attached 
to the Russian Research Center at Harvard University explained in 
considerable detail why the Soviet Union could not be ranked as a major 
"blue water" naval power.'7 In this article Dziewanowski criticizes 
Jane's Fighting Ships for unduly stressing the relative quantitative rela-
tionship now obtaining between our navy and that of the ussR (U.S.: 
under 500 ships; ussR: over 1,000 ships). He claims that the U.S. ships 
"are on the average much larger, technologically more advanced, and 
hence much more effective than the Russian ones." He also describes 
those geographic and climatic factors that are, in general, severe imped-
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iments to the development of a naval capability by the Soviet Union. He 
concludes, "Moreover the Soviet Navy has yet to master a strategy of 
large-scale distant naval operations." The Dziewanowski article was 
timely in that the importance of relative U.S. and Soviet naval power 
is beginning to intrude on our national consciousness and to affect our 
foreign policy options profoundly-even though the administrators and 
molders of our foreign policy may not yet fully comprehend this. 
Unfortunately the facts are not as suggested by Dziewanowski, and 
he is not alone in his errors. Even members of the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee have been quoted to the effect that the smaller Ameri-
can navy is stronger than the Russian navy because of its greater ton-
nage. It should be noted that a good deal of this tonnage discrepancy has 
to do with the U.S. Navy's operation of thirteen very large aircraft 
carriers, only three of which are nuclear-powered and only a few are 
available for deployment at any given moment. Seldom is comment 
directed at relative weapons systems and tactical capabilities. 
The relative numerical strength of the two navies is important in 
assessing their respective abilities to achieve a sustainable superior con-
centration of force in a potential area of conflict. The ability to achieve 
this superior concentration of force also requires the tactical ability to 
coordinate the operations of as many of the available ships as possible. 
Force concentration effectiveness is then a function of training, com-
munications, speed and endurance, and weapons. Numbers are also 
crucial in the ability to counter seaborne guerrilla operations, such as 
submarine attacks, along lines of communication. Whether or not our 
OECD allies would join forces with us in an energy war thus becomes a 
crucial question. The necessity for an international naval alliance of the 
democracies considerably greater in scope than NATO has been argued 
recently by Admiral of the Fleet the Lord Hill-Norton, but whether such 
an alliance will be formed in the present decade remains a moot ques-
tion.18 The alliances ancillary to NATO (SEATO and CENTO) are gradually 
crumbling away. 
The new Soviet ships are generally small and fast-propelled by gas 
turbines in many cases. For the most part they are well armed with 
terminal-homing long-range cruise missiles superior to the Russian-
made Styx missile with which Egyptian torpedo boats sank the Israeli 
(British-built) destroyer Elath in 1967. This short but decisive action 
marked a watershed in naval armament development and in the tactics 
of sea fighting. Although interpreted by most American observers as 
merely indicating that now small ships can fight big ships, the true 
import of the Elath incident is that we have entered the guided missile 
age at sea. 
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Ships unequipped with missiles, or equipped with inferior missiles, 
are no longer a match for opponents armed with superior missiles. We 
have emphasized the defensive aspects of this situation in seeking to 
develop antimissile measures. But defensive measures in a missile envi-
ronment can rapidly become saturated. In this case there is no substitute 
for offensive capabilities. Even aircraft need "stand-off" missiles to 
attack missile-defended men-of-war. Simple bombing is obsolete. 
We long argued that our surface ships did not need missiles because 
we had carriers with attack aircraft. But carriers cannot be everywhere; 
they themselves are susceptible to missile attack, and our naval aircraft 
developed from Vietnam experience are not ready to fight ships. They 
are, like our surface ships, only beginning to acquire effective stand-off 
missiles. The implications of this weapon balance have yet to be 
grasped by many observers. 
In an energy war including a NATO involvement, our lines of supply 
would, like the Persian Gulf tankers, be the potential target of the ussR's 
submarine force, the largest such force ever seen in peactime. But in the 
area of operations we would possibly be confronted by a troika three-
legged attack force where the missiles, launched by ships, aircraft, and 
submarines of a Soviet force, would all be coordinated under a single 
attack scheme. The possibility of meeting this attack configuration on 
distant station instead of just in areas contiguous to or near Soviet naval 
air bases is raised by the fact that the Soviet Union is now building 
attack carriers which are already in the water and rapidly becoming 
operational. 19 
In addition we have experienced some surprises in terms of the 
Soviet navy's "surge capability"-the logistical capability of rapid ex-
tension and augmentation of ship deployments in a given area during 
periods of tension. During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the sixty-odd 
ships of the Sixth Fleet concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean were 
confronted by upwards of ninety Soviet men-of-war. The burning ques-
tion was whether or not helicopters from the U.S. fleet would be 
launched to carry American marines ashore to support the beleaguered 
Israeli forces. The Soviet Union apparently did not favor such a move. 
It was not made. 
Among those who study these matters there was substantial agree-
ment that, in the event of an exchange, the destruction of American 
ships and lives would have been devastating. It was a tossup, depending 
on who might strike first, whether the attack aircraft of the great carriers 
would have come into play at all. The general outcome would have been 
much in doubt. Admiral Rickover has described this situation by quot-
ing Thomas Jefferson, "There are events in a nation's history that are 
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like a fire bell in the night. "20 The question is whether or not we will 
heed the warnings of this fire bell. 
Since the success of the worldwide Okean Soviet fleet exercise in 
1970, the admiralties of the world have realized that the Soviet Navy 
had fully mastered the demanding art of long-range and highly dispersed 
naval operations. Any lingering doubts in this area were dispelled by the 
even more impressive Okean fleet exercise in 1975. 
While the United States was beset with the Vietnam War which 
demanded a high-level naval effort but one based primarily on the attack 
of land targets, the Soviet Union built up a modem high-seas fleet 
perfectly designed to strike U.S. naval forces in massed attack using 
Gorshkov 's "first salvo" or surprise attack concept, or alternatively to 
cripple the extended lines of U.S. and allied communications through 
the ravages of nuclear-powered attack-class submarines. 
The latter capability has long been of concern to naval planners, 
particularly in view of the vulnerability of modem tankers to torpedo 
attack as explained by Abrahamsson and Steckler. 21 But now there is the 
question of potential major naval force engagements, and the immediate 
prospects of the much-diminished United States Navy under many pre-
dictable circumstances do not appear bright. A major shift has in fact 
occurred in global naval strategic positions. As the commander-in-chief 
of the Soviet navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, has put it: "The flag of 
the Soviet Navy flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the 
United Nations will have to understand it no longer has mastery of the 
seas. "22 
Thus we have entered into a situation where, at least for the time 
being, it could be extremely dangerous for us to attempt an energy war. 
The consequences of losing such a war are shattering to contemplate. Of 
course the failure to prepare for such a war in view of the stakes 
involved could, among other things, convince the more paranoid mem-
bers of the Western European community that in fact the U.S. and the 
USSR have between them decided to rule the rest of the world a deu:x, 
with the United States assuming the role of junior partner. 
The military aspects of an energy war are, to say the least, fraught 
with uncertainty. While the outcome might ultimately be favorable to 
the United States whether or not her maritime allies would stay the 
course, much would depend upon strong leadership in the civil sector. 
The deprivations to be visited upon our population are beyond living 
experience in this country. This ignorance is not shared by the popula-
tions of Europe and Japan. The thesis advanced by the Atlantic Council 
Working Group on Securing the Seas is that the United States and its 
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Atlantic and Pacific allies can and must retain access to the seas.23 
Whether we will or not is a moot question. 
For all that has been said, U.S. naval planners and presumably 
Soviet naval planners are well aware of a severe Soviet fleet logistical 
problem. A major weakness of the Soviet navy in its present configura-
tion is that, except for the submarine forces, it depends almost entirely 
on oil for fuel. Faced with the vulnerability entailed in resupply by tank-
er, the Soviet fleet must rely on foreign basing to gain victory in an ini-
tial surprise attack. Failing such a victory, a war at sea between the 
United States and the Soviet Union would likely degenerate into a pro-
longed struggle between the two opposing nuclear-powered submarine 
contingents because, while the United States pioneered the nuclear pro-
pulsion of surface warships it has failed to exploit this tremendous 
logistical and combat advantage and presently has only eleven nuclear-
powered surface combatants in operation. 
Any war at sea between the two superpowers would probably be 
limited by the unspoken agreement to avoid strikes of any nature against 
the port cities and naval bases of either. The basis for this would simply 
be the grim mutual understanding that it is better to fight abroad--or at 
sea-than to burn at home, regardless of the outcome. This argument 
implies that some of the classic modes of antisubmarine warfare would 
be denied the protagonists. On the other hand, the early destruction of 
foreign submarine support bases such as the Soviet naval facility in 
Cuba would logically be a foregone conclusion. 
Whereas overt attack on port cities would probably fall outside the 
bounds of an energy war at sea, the same cannot be said for clandestine 
attacks on energy distribution systems within the countries concerned. 
The extremely centralized nature of U.S. oil, gas, coal, and electrical 
distribution constitutes a major vulnerability to sabotage, which can be 
defended against only at considerable cost an8 military or constabulary 
effort.24 Such efforts would logically be a facet of an energy war but are 
not incorporated in current U.S. defense planning.25 The Soviet gas, oil, 
and coal distribution systems appear to be similarly centralized and even 
less flexible because of a lack of redundancy. 26 
It probably would not be necessary for the Soviet Union to use 
submarines in much force against Persian Gulf tanker traffic since, 
being contiguous to the region, they could stop this traffic more eco-
nomically by other means. On the other hand, tankers carrying oil from 
Nigeria and Malaysia and the Caribbean oil traffic would be fruitful 
targets defended at great cost, with great effort, and with uncertain 
results. 
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Uncertain as the military aspects of an energy war are, we must not 
delude ourselves concerning the implications of military dominance in 
the Middle East. As James Schlesinger put it in his farewell address as 
secretary of energy, "Soviet control of the oil tap in the Middle East 
would mean the end of the world as we have known it. "27 
Up to this point the question of energy wars has been discussed with 
the tacit assumption that insofar as military operations are concerned, 
energy is not a problem. This indeed is the conventional view. In 
general it is taken for granted that in time of war our military forces 
would have all the fuel needed. This assumption and its implications are 
worth examining in the context of our present energy situation. The 
ability to wage modem war, unless one resorts to a thirty-minute inter-
continental nuclear exchange, is as much a function of war production 
as of military operations. This is particularly true, as we found out in 
World War II and the Korean War, when war stocks are low to begin 
with. They are low now. 
According to the conventional wisdom, World War II was fought 
and won with oil. This may not be strictly accurate. While petroleum 
products certainly were the mainstay of the operational military forces, 
the ability to produce the sinews of war in the United States may well 
have been the major deciding factor. As shown by Figure 8.1 , the 
ability to sustain war production in the United States was largely predi-
cated upon coal. Thus in a gross sense while the loss of 550 oil tankers 
at sea by the Allies was a devastating blow, the concomitant ability of 
the coal-fired U.S. economy to build 908 tankers in replacement assured 
victory.28 
During the Korean War oil and natural gas assumed increasingly 
important roles in the underpinning of the American economy. Our 
ability to sharply increase domestic oil production permitted the emer-
gency supply of Europe during the Suez crisis of 1956. But our national 
energy circumstances vis-a-vis war began to change. 
In a sense Vietnam was almost entirely an oil-based war. Its prosecu-
tion saw a sharp increase in oil and natural gas demand. It is not clear 
what percentage of this increase was caused by an expanding economy 
and what percentage was occasioned by wartime exigencies. Neverthe-
less the net effect was to exceed domestic resources. Coal production 
was not raised to fill the gap. Oil imports were begun in this era as a 
matter of necessity rather than convenience. 
The Vietnam War was an energy phenomenon for the United States 
because it was the first war we fought with foreign fuels. Practically all 
of the oil used by our combat forces was supplied from abroad. Vietnam 
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Figure 8.1 Growth of Energy Demand in the United States 
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may well be the last war we will fight without extreme energy rationing 
being imposed upon the civil sector. Today it is imported oil that 
provides such flexibility as we may have to conduct war operations, 
support war production, and maintain the civil sector. This oil might not 
be available in the next war. 
Figure 8.2 crudely illustrates the consumption of energy directly by 
the military during the intervening years 1940 to 1975. This curve 
reflects the war years of intense military activity as well as the great 
reduction in energy consumption during peacetime periods. In the main 
it is oil consumption that is portrayed. Examination of the data of 
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Figure 8.2 Direct Use of Energy by U.S. Military 
(Approximate), 1940-1980 
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Note: On the average, oil accounts for about 90% of military energy expenditure 
in wartime, about 70% in peacetime. (1 quad = 0.5 mbpd oil equivalent). 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 reveals that military activities in World War II 
consumed 10.6 percent of the total national energy budget, but 34 
percent of the national oil budget. The figures for the Korean War are 
4.3 percent of the total energy budget, 14.5 percent of the oil budget. In 
the Vietnam War the figures are 4.1 percent and 8.8 percent respec-
tively. 
For purposes of comparison, the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 for 
a few months deprived us of about 4.7 percent of our national energy 
budget and 12 percent of the national oil budget. This embargo, aided 
by other factors, caused unemployment for 500,000 people and dropped 
our GNP by about $10 billion. It was our first energy deprivation experi-
ence in the years of substantial dependence upon oil imports. 
In Table 8.1 various categories of war and embargo are compared in 
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Table 8.1 
ESTIMATED COST TO TODAY'S ENERGY BUDGET OF WAR AND EMBARGO 
Percentage of Percentage of 
national national 
Type of war energy budget oil budget 
A Vietnam without 
interruptions to 
oil imports 3.0 6.5 
A World War II 
without interruptions 
to oil imports 4.6 9.5 
Another Arab embargo 7.7 17.6 
An Arab embargo 
with military reaction 
on a Vietnam scale 10.9 23.9 
A World War II with 
90% of oil imports 
blockaded 21.7 49.2 
the light of our present-day overall energy situation. The figures in the 
table are general and not exact, but it seems clear that prevailing notions 
of an oil stockpile do not extend to providing reserves sufficient to meet 
the exigencies of energy wars. Furthermore, it seems that in energy 
wars of the future there would be no choices between guns and butter. 
There would be a considerable premium on fighting with the machines 
of war already in being, since the ability to produce more would be 
energy-limited. Some have demurred not only at the possibility of 
another World War II but also specifically at the notion of our losing up 
to 90 percent of our oil imports in any war. But not only is almost 50 
percent of our oil imported; this oil is mostly delivered across long 
distances through vulnerable sea-lanes in ships owned by foreign oper-
ators and manned by foreign crews. 
Small wonder then that planners tend to think in terms of short rather 
than long wars. The ability of the civil sector, under present energy 
circumstances, to support war production and to withstand rigid ration-
ing would be sorely tested. But again we had some difficulty in deter-
mining the length of the Korean and Vietnam engagements, so one may 
wonder why we think we will be able to control the length of the next 
war if it comes---except through capitulation. 
There are alternatives to energy wars, of course, and it is worth 
considering what some of these might be. During his campaign for the 
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presidency, Jimmy Carter made reference a few times to the concept of 
resorting to economic sanctions such as the denial of armaments or 
oil-drilling equipment to the Arab members of OPEC who might attempt 
another oil embargo. While three years in office modified such concepts 
to the point that they are no longer regarded as realistic, it is neverthe-
less necessary to recapitulate what is involved.29 After all, in a different 
context sanctions are being invoked against Iran. 
The history of economic sanctions in modem times has not been 
marked by much success. The League of Nations sanctions against 
Mussolini offer the classic example. More to the point, however, is the 
question of who in the Western entente could afford to honor such 
sanctions (which would not be effective in unilateral application). 
Under the conditions of oil dependency described earlier for Western 
Europe and Japan those nations might well be forced to conclude that 
for economic survival they would have to supply whatever the Arabs or 
Iranians needed. And in the final event, again, there is the Soviet 
Union. To what extent can she supply what is denied by the West? 
The analyst can only conclude that economic sanctions, while 
perhaps a useful talking point, would be no substitute for war. And war, 
as we have discussed, involves risks we might be foolish to undertake. 
The solution. appears to lie in considerable accommodation among 
OPEC, the oil-consuming nations, and the less-developed world. All 
have, otherwise, too much to lose. And in the final analysis accommo-
dation with the Soviet Union may be considered as inevitable if it would 
in fact reduce the risk of war or unacceptable conditions. 
Accommo<!atio11 with the Soviet Union must take into account vari:_ 
ations in interpretation of such phrases as "peaceful competition" and 
even words like "democracy. " The ussR in its own official literature 
regards itself as a democratic state even though this might seem a 
perversion of the term to us. But, after all, it does have a written 
constitution in contrast to Great Britain, the birthplace of parliamentary 
democracy, which has never seen the need for one. Yet what consti-
tutes peaceful economic competition in the eyes of the ussR might 
make the boldest of American conglomerating entrepreneurs blanch. 
Professor and Red Army General A. N. Lagovskii discusses in detail 
methods of using state-controlled economic tools as weapons in the 
international arena under conditions where political objectives are ad-
vanced without actual war.30 No concept of good will or general accord 
obtains. In fact, the approach is totally, perhaps realistically, Hobbes-
ian. One standing outside of a system may well postulate that there is 
no system worth worrying about. And Russia, it may be argued, today 
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stands outside our system, such as it is. Perhaps the most rational 
response to our dangerous condition is to bring her into the system we 
enjoy. 
But in actuality the Soviet Union does not stand completely out of 
our system and there are important benefits that she derives from this 
system, even though her theoreticians might argue she could profit 
through its demise. The purchase of grain from the United States by the 
ussR is a well-known story. Less well known is the fact that in large 
measure the Soviet Union's ability to buy grain and advanced oil-
drilling equipment comes from her international oil and gas trade, since 
about 50 percent of the hard foreign currency she accumulates derives 
from oil and gas sales abroad.31 This trade involves both import and 
export. Its fragile balance has been disturbed by the revolution in Iran; it 
may be further disturbed as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan. 
Since its construction in 1970 the Iranian gas trunkline (IGA T I) has 
been delivering natural gas to the Soviet Union. The Soviets have report-
edly paid for this gas by construction of a steel mill and machine tool 
plants and by the delivery of light arms and military vehicles. The 326.9 
billion cubic feet of natural gas piped to the Soviet Union in 1977 
permitted the ussR in turn to supply gas to Poland and Hungary in 
addition to keeping some for domestic consumption. Arrangements 
were well advanced at the time of the Iranian Revolution for a second 
pipeline, IGAT 2, which by 1981 would have permitted Soviet deliveries 
of natural gas to West Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and Czecho-
slovakia.32 In July of 1979 the revolutionary government of Iran can-
celed this arrangement.33 At the time of writing it is uncertain that gas 
deliveries to the Soviet Union will be continued at all-particularly 
under present pricing arrangements. But as sanctions by the West take 
effect there is a growing probability that Iran may seek accommodation 
with the ussR, especially in view of the war with Iraq. 
In this country there have been sharp arguments at high administra-
tive levels about whether the United States might render aid to the Soviet 
Union to mitigate its energy problems. The preponderant view up until 
the Afghanistan episode seemed to be that the United States should 
make every effort to facilitate the Soviet purchase of American drilling 
equipment and technology.34 Such a view was supported by a report of 
the Trilateral Commission.35 Whether this would have increased Soviet 
oil and gas production to the point where heavy demands were not made 
on Middle Eastern supplies during the 1980s remains a moot question. 
For the present, because of the Afghanistan invasion, the former atmo-
sphere of cooperation has been overtaken by an atmosphere of suspicion 
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on the part of the United States. Sanctions have been instituted. Uncer-
tainty prevails. It should not be forgotten that a treaty between the 
Soviet Union and Iran, originally signed in 1921 and invoked in 1941, 
can be interpreted as giving the Soviet Union broad latitude to invade 
Iran should the latter's domestic condition make this necessary. No 
matter how viewed by Iran, this treaty is apparently still considered 
valid by the Soviet Union.36 In view of Iran's treatment of the United 
States, the implications of the treaty may be viewed with mixed emo-
tions in America-especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
But questions of war may be rendered irrelevant by overtaking 
events. This brings us to the question of the Western international 
economy based upon the edifice of the international monetary system. 
As Lenin phrased it, "In order to destroy bourgeois society, you must 
debauch its money. "37 One might add under present circumstances, "or 
let it debauch its own money. " 
From one viewpoint, since the initial steep oil price rise of the 
postembargo days, the real price of oil in the world until recently has 
dropped because of inflation. For this country it may be calculated that 
it dropped perhaps 15 percent by 1979. This may have much to do with 
public perceptions of oil-conservation. 
The connection between energy prices and inflation has already been 
touched upon. As the inflationary spiral continues in the industrialized 
oil-consuming nations, the real cost of oil, all other factors being equal, 
drops. To the oil-selling nations, the incentive to index their prices is 
very high, because otherwise the coin they receive for their wares is 
worth less and less in the economies of the industrial countries from 
whom they purchase goods and food. They head once more towards 
their former relative economic and political position of abject, if com-
fortable, dependency. 
On the other hand, since increasing energy prices produce more 
inflation according to the best information we have, a very delicate 
balance is involved. This balance depends upon the soundness of the 
overall international monetary system in which billions of petrodollars 
are in constant fluid exchange largely in the form of telephoned or 
cabled "promises." No regulation is involved. 
The system is a very fragile web. When this country's finances fell 
apart in 1929, it came as a shock to many Europeans to learn how 
deeply the "American Problem" had penetrated their own institutions. 
Their collapse ensued. 
At the present time we are deeply penetrated by the international 
fmancial community. We have not even been able to ascertain how 
deeply. Much of the common stock of our corporations, for example, is 
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issued to third parties by "street names." Some assert that our govern-
ment officials at the highest level from time to time have recoiled at the 
idea of going into the matter too deeply. Too much is at stake. A "good 
thing" should not be disturbed because of theoretical problems. 
While our own economy recovered from the 1974-1975 recession, 
as 1980 begins we are now apparently entering another. The economies 
of many of our friends and allies also appear shaky. Indeed some predict 
a worldwide depression. Inflation is being grappled with fiercely and its 
control may not be achieved. The impact of oil prices is definitely 
involved, but the extent of the involvement does not seem to be clearly 
understood or exactly calculable. Even if it were, the question of what 
to do about it is unanswered. 
Thus if Western Europe or Japan, or both, go under financially, we 
may rest assured that the event will not long be an overseas phenomenon 
which we in the United States can watch with cool detachment. We will 
be hit too. We may even be hit first. 
The energy problem, therefore, raises the full spectrum of war and 
peace, prosperity and depression in the Free World. To the extent that it 
exists, we are definitely a part of that world. 
A failure on the part of the United States to reduce the rate of 
consumption of its least available hydrocarbon resources, particularly 
oil, while developing alternatives to these resources could result in 
provocation of a war for which the country and its armed forces are ill 
prepared. This may be the underlying factor in the president's decision 
to decontrol oil prices. Undoubtedly it affected his decision to impose 
an oil import limit.Js 
Under such conditions, although the proposition may seem ludicrous 
at the moment, the probability of a U.S. invasion of Canada or Mexico 
to gain control of (i.e., steal) their energy resources could become very 
high. The difficulties and risks of a war abroad in the face of Soviet 
opposition could be enormous. The invasion of our peaceful neighbors, 
while unworthy of our heritage and calling, would be, by comparison, 
simple. We must understand that wars have been fought over oil. The 
American, British, and Dutch embargo of oil supplies to Japan in the 
summer of 1941 was doubtless a significant factor in the Japanese 
decision to attack Pearl Harbor.39 
A failure to address our energy problem fully and to mount suitable 
and comprehensive solutions susceptible to international application 
could do more than destroy our polity; it could also lead us simultane-
ously into the deepest and most appalling reaches of international dis-
honor. 
Political Reactions 
to Energy Questions 
In previous chapters the physical aspects of our energy situation have 
been outlined. We have discussed some of the politicoeconomic and 
ideological viewpoints that seem to be involved in our response to these 
factors. In this chapter we examine the responses that are a matter of 
record. This record is largely a history of legislative action or major 
executive action having the effect of legislation. Though politicians, 
including those in the Congress or occupying the presidency, may be 
damned by the public for faintheartedness, short-sightedness, cupidity, 
or all three, it must be acknowledged that in our sort of democracy the 
successful politician is the most perfect mirror of the aggregate popular 
will. A politician who aspires to reelection not only takes advantage of 
the polls available to the media and to the public; he or she is also 
possessed of that most exquisitely tuned antenna powered by self-
interest. For to misread the popular will is to vanish from the public 
scene. Hence this record of what has been done or not done in the 
energy policy area by congressmen and presidents is largely a record of 
what the American public wanted done-or not done-on the basis of 
their perceptions. The Carter administration may be an exception. 
To examine the legislative record of energy policy, we must step 
back a bit into the realm of political philosophy. We must also enquire 
about environmental policy. Morton Kroll provides a theoretical 
framework for the study of policy evolution in which he emphasizes that 
public policy in a democracy such as ours is intimately related to the 
values held by our society .1 At the same time he presents the relation-
ship of political philosophy and ideology to one another and to public 
policy. He points out that where political philosophy embodies the 
parent idea, ideology provides for its contemporary adaptation. Kroll 
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also notes that, for the most part, ideologies which formerly propounded 
total change in government and society to fit a political philosophy 
have, in general, given way to a pragmatic realism that interacts with 
the facts of technology. In the cases of energy and environmental pol-
icy, however, it needs to be asked how long such an interaction with 
reality may take; there are signs that we do not have too much time left 
in which to exercise reasonable options. 
As we examine the relationship between energy policy and environ-
mental policy, it is well to keep in mind that our environmental policy, 
in the first blush of its creation, was conceived in the widely held notion 
that America had entered into a long-term stage of prosperity and eco-
nomic security. Energy policy, by way of contrast, only a few short 
years later, seems to be emerging as the child of adversity during a 
period when the United States is facing rampant inflation, the possibility 
of depression, the uncertain actions of foreign states, and the trauma of 
acknowledging a general scarcity of domestic resources to fuel its vast 
industrial machine. Among scarce resources, energy resources are by 
any measure the most important, since their availability controls our 
ability to utilize all other resources. 
The birth of our first air pollution legislation, the Clean Air Act of 
1963, provides some interesting insights on the question of national 
policy formulation in the United States. This act was produced, as 
Randall B. Ripley has pointed out, largely through congressional initia-
tive in general conformance with the predominant public mood.2 Con-
gress did not lead the public; it was led by the public. · 
Concern about air pollution goes back at least to December 1949 
when President Truman called the first U.S. technical conference on the 
problem.3 Because of industrial and corporate opposition, no legislation 
emerged from this conference. The multiple smog deaths in London 
during 1952 likewise failed to make much of an impression on public 
opinion in the United States. 
By 1958 and 1959, however, groups of citizens concerned about air 
pollution (and pollution in general) had begun to coalesce, and con-
gressmen such as Kenneth A. Roberts of Alabama had begun to identify 
themselves with the emerging and increasingly vocal body of public 
opinion holding that a national policy should be developed for the 
abatement of pollution, that specific legislation implementing such a 
policy should be passed, and that the United States could afford the 
price of resulting programs and the side effects of such a policy-
whatever they might be. 
Ripley discusses the interplay of interest groups in the development 
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of the Clean Air Act of 1963.4 He points out that while the representa-
tives of corporations and industries to be primarily affected by this bill 
sought to make individually advantageous adjustments to its provisions, 
they did so with full recognition that ( 1) the bill was inevitable and (2) 
its costs could probably be passed on to the affluent consumer. Thus 
interest-group opposition to the bill remained fragmented and diver-
sified according to the technology of the chemical, iron, steel, coal, 
petroleum, or whatever particular industry was involved. 
Ripley also points out that, lacking a common front, the corporations 
and industries which might have considered themselves penalized by the 
Clean Air Act failed to exploit the differences of opinion within the 
structure of the executive branch. In later years, during an attempt to 
evolve energy policy and legislation, the oil and coal companies, for 
example, made valiant efforts to gain the support of the various con-
tending elements within the vast federal bureaucracy, and it becomes 
very apparent that the great departments and agencies of the govern-
ment have vested interests peculiar to themselves which they will defend 
vigorously even in the face of White House attempts to whip them into 
line. The issue is by no means petty in an economic sense. Between 
1977 and 1986 close to $230 billion will probably be spent by the 
private sector to comply with the provisions of the Clean Air Act and its 
amendments. 
The environmental policy movement in the United States reached 
adulthood in 1970 with the signing into law of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1970. This bill was also developed through con-
gressional initiative that reflected the popular mood. It contained practi-
cally all of the broad policy statements (one might even say cliches) 
being espoused by the various conservationist and environmental pro-
tection groups in the country. 
There is no question that the Environmental Policy Act was an ex-
pression of policy, but there is considerable question whether the 
policies it promulgated were specific enough to provide working guid-
ance to agencies created for its implementation. 
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare quickly experi-
enced problems in administering the Clean Air Act and enforcing its 
provisions. And the Department of the Interior (to which the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1970 transferred environmental affairs) 
became rapidly and thoroughly embroiled over the specific nature of the 
policies it expressed. Congressman Wayne Aspinall, chairman of the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, was to state in 1972 
when questioning John Nassikas, chairman of the Federal Power Com-
mission, concerning policy approaches to the energy problem: "One of 
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the difficulties with the EPA Act has been that it was so broad that it has 
been impossible for the administration to implement that act without 
making policy. This has gotten us into trouble, and it is this misun-
derstanding throughout the nation that has caused so much difficulty at 
the present time. "5 
Another part of the pattern of our responses to energy questions 
began to develop during the late fifties. An energy crisis of sorts was 
occurring in this country, but it was a crisis of surplus rather than 
shortage. Large volumes of easily and cheaply recoverable oil had been 
discovered in the Middle East-primarily by international consortiums 
of American companies formed in the aftermath of World War II. The 
importation of this (then) low-cost oil into this country, as the world's 
largest single market, threatened (particularly in the view of the "inde-
pendent" domestic oil companies) to cripple U.S. oil interests and the 
coal companies to the extent that it was deemed a threat to national 
security. 
After several studies and an unsuccessful attempt to impose volun-
tary import quotas on oil imports in 1957, President Eisenhower, under 
the authority conveyed by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 
1955, established on 10 March 1959 a Mandatory Oil Import Quota 
System restricting imports for most of the country (there were regional 
exceptions) to 9 percent of the total demand.6 
This level was progressively raised by succeeding administrations 
until, in 1969, President Nixon convened a Cabinet Task Force to 
restudy the oil import question in depth. The Task Force was chaired by 
then Secretary of Labor George P. Schultz. Walter T. Hickel (secretary 
of the interior), Maurice H. Stans (secretary of commerce), and John N. 
Nassikas (chairman of the Federal Power Commission) all strongly 
dissented in the majority recommendations of the Task Force, which 
was to abolish the oil import quota system.? 
The recommendations of the Task Force were not accepted by the 
president. The import quota system drifted for several more years until 
it was finally abolished without a substitute tariff system on 18 April 
1973 as announced by the president in his report to Congress of that 
date.8 Nevertheless, as James E. Akins pointed out in an article in 
Foreign Affairs in 1973, the report was widely circulated in the adminis-
tration hierarchy and in the Congress. Much of Washington's thinking 
on the domestic and international energy situations stemmed from the 
projections developed by the Task Force. These projections missed the 
mark quite widely .9 
Akins's article, widely discounted upon publication as alarmist, was 
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vindicated within the year by the Arab oil embargo. The Task Force had 
calculated that the United States would remain essentially self-sufficient 
in oil for an indefinite period. It projected the import of only 5 mbpd by 
1980; mostly from "secure" Western Hemisphere sources. A very un-
critical acceptance of oil company and well owners' estimates of the 
producing capacity of their own wells was involved. By 1973 petroleum 
imports had already reached 6 mbpd. These imports were increasingly 
from insecure Middle Eastern sources. But on the eve of the Arab oil 
embargo there was still considerable complacency in official circles 
concerning our oil situation. Some of this has yet to be dispelled. 
Three main weaknesses in the Task Force report led to this compla-
cency. First, through neglecting to discern the dwindling domestic 
availability of natural gas, the authors were led into extremely optimis-
tic (i.e., low) estimates of how much oil would be used in this country 
in succeeding years. This failure to consider energy resources as an 
"integrated skein "10 and the practice of studying gas, oil, coal, nuclear 
power, and conservation/environmental factors as separate unrelated 
entities are at the root of much of the inadequate energy planning (or 
lack of planning) that still burdens our present efforts to catch up. As 
David H. Davis has pointed out, in our society at least five separate 
political arenas surround the production and distribution of energy from 
coal, oil, gas, electricity, and nuclear power. 11 Solar power now consti-
tutes a sixth and environmentalism a seventh. 
The second misleading aspect of the Task Force's report lay in an 
extremely naive, yet widely accepted (and still existing) political judg-
ment. This was the prediction that the oil-exporting nations would be 
unable to coordinate their actions as a cartel: "In general the world 
market seems likely to be more competitive in the future than in the past 
because the growing number and diversity of producing countries and 
companies make it more difficult to organize and enforce a cartel. "12 
The Task Force envisioned a world of diminishing oil prices according 
to the economic laws of supply and demand. That macro-political im-
peratives have overtaken micro-economic theory is, of course, one of 
the essential elements to which the oil-importing nations of the world 
must now painfully adjust. 
The final, and in the aggregate, most serious omission of the Task 
Force was its failure to come to grips with the basic, underlying energy 
problem faced by this country and the industrialized nations of the 
world. This is simply that the world is running out of cheaply available 
fossil fuels. The oil and gas in the ground, regardless of whether there is 
ten or thirty or fifty years' supply remaining, cannot be replaced. Even 
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coal is by no means inexhaustible. This is a problem of fundamental 
severity which has yet to be, perhaps cannot be, accepted by the Ameri-
can people who are being bemused-or are bemusing themselves-with 
thoughts of oil company "rip-offs" and conspiracies rather than the 
unpleasant facts of the case .13 
It is quite possible that many of the major political actors involved in 
the energy policy questions have also failed to absorb the stark implica-
tions of the worldwide fossil fuel situation in terms of what it portends 
for the completely energy-based societies of the world's industrial na-
tions. OPEc-forced higher petroleum and energy prices will perhaps give 
us the time to recognize these facts. 
On 3 May 1971, the Senate adopted Resolution 45, which called for 
an intensive study of the energy question by the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs. Senator Henry Jackson had sponsored the 
resolution. To broaden the study and to facilitate the acceptance of its 
results, ad hoc committee membership, for the purposes of the study, 
was accorded various senators who had key positions in other commit-
tees which would nominally have an interest in various aspects of the 
energy question. 
In reflexive reaction to this resolution and in response to the growing 
pressures of the antipollution campaign and increasing public concern 
over the adequacy and security of energy resources, the president ad-
dressed his first message on energy to the Congress on 4 June 1971. 14 
The president's message attempted to straddle the environmental 
question and the energy question, calling for the development of 
"clean" fuels. It gave no hint of the dimensions of the energy problem. 
It emphasized the role of private industry in fuel development and 
conveyed no sense of urgency. It was not much heeded nor even repro-
duced in the New York Times. 
For the remainder of 1971 and during 1972, no further major state-
ments on energy were made by the president and it was largely avoided 
as an issue in the 1972 election campaign. 
In the fall of 1971 the House of Representatives commenced its own 
investigations of the energy question. A "Task Force on Energy" 
chaired by Congressman Mike McCormack was convened by the Sub-
committee on Science, Research, and Development of the House Com-
mittee on Science and Astronautics. It was designated a Task Force not 
to indicate fervent interest but simply because McCormack was too 
junior to be named chairman of a subcommittee, let alone a committee. 
He wanted the job, and apparently no one else did. 
Unlike the Senate, however, the House membership made no deci-
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sion to concentrate energy hearings in a single committee. The investi-
gation of the energy question in the House of Representatives was 
eventually to involve up to fourteen different committees .15 
Testimony before the Senate and House committees was given pre-
dominantly by the following groups (generally the same people ap-
peared before the different committees-but not always with the same 
stories): (1) the scientific establishment-physical scientists and 
economists; (2) the federal bureaucracy; (3) the utilities and electric 
companies; (4) the oil companies; (5) the coal companies; (6) the gas 
companies; (7) organized labor; (8) environmentalists. 
Perhaps of significance is the point that while it was fairly clear that 
the technical and economic problems of the energy situation would be 
solved only through application of the political process, no political 
scientists testified on energy questions before the congressional commit-
tees in these early years. 
Hearings by the House and Senate continued through 1972 without 
any significant conclusion, and the Ninety-second Congress made no 
contribution of significance in this area. It was generally established, 
however, that reliable and unbiased information about the status of our 
energy resources was lacking. It began to be clear that the management 
of energy matters in the federal bureaucracy was widely scattered and 
often at cross-purposes. Institutionally, a working capability was lack-
ing in the federal government for the development and enunciation of 
energy goals and proposed policies. A count of the statutes relating to 
energy in the U.S. Code listed in the Compilation of Federal Laws 
Relating to Fuels and Energy, prepared for the use of the House Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, December 1972, showed that at 
least forty-two separate federal agencies, bureaus, departments, or of-
fices were directly involved in the energy question. The press has pub-
lished estimates of the total number ranging up to sixty-four. Secretary 
of the Interior Morton cited sixty-one "departments and agencies of our 
government who in some way have an input to our energy policy. "16 
It also became quite clear that the American people were by no 
means informed as to the real dimensions of the national energy situa-
tion. The Congress was not inclined to paint a stark picture for its 
constituents. 
Probably the most clearly voiced warning of what lay ahead for the 
country in the energy realm was given in 1971 by Thornton F. Brad-
shaw, president of the Atlantic-Richfield Company. In an interview 
accorded staff members of U.S. News & World Report, Mr. Bradshaw 
reported that our energy consumption had already overtaken our domes-
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tic supply P He warned that our increasing dependence upon Middle 
Eastern oil was dangerous to our national security and to our economy. 
During 1969 the New York Times Index shows that only four articles 
on energy were printed. Two of these were lead articles but the word 
"crisis" was not used. 
In 1970 nineteen energy articles appeared in the New York Times. On 
3 August 1970 it was reported that the chairman of the Federal Power 
Commission had called for the formation of a National Energy Re-
sources Council. On 21 August 1970 it was reported that President 
Nixon was postponing action on the oil import question pending discus-
sion with foreign governments. The word "crisis" was used for the first 
time. 
In 1971 thirty-two energy articles appeared in the New York Times. 
In 1972 sixty-six articles were printed under the "energy" title in the 
New York Times. By this time other opinion-making popular journals 
had picked up the discussion. Time printed an article entitled "Energy 
Crisis: Are We Running Out?"18 And Science commenced a series of 
articles on the energy question. 19 
In January 1973, the Reader's Digest ran an article entitled "It's 
Time to Face the Energy Crisis" and on 22 January 1973, Newsweek 
published an article called, "America's Energy Crisis." As for the New 
York Times, by this time hardly a day passed without some discussion of 
the "energy crisis." 
Whether a crisis existed in fact or not, popular attention in some 
segments of our society had become focused on the question and the 
political atmosphere was ripe for recognition of the matter although still 
chancy for total commitment to any specific course of action by the 
individual politician. 
There were the beginnings, nevertheless, of pressure on politicians to 
declare their position on the energy question and, in response to this 
pressure, various politicians moved to identify themselves with different 
proposals for solving the problem. Politicians began to seek the oppor-
tunity to pin the energy crisis (if there was one) on the opposition and, if 
that failed to come off, at least on the coattails of the energy industry 
which by this time had undertaken what was to become a massive 
defensive propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the public that the 
industry was doing everything possible to avert a critical shortage in 
energy supplies. As time passed, the thrust of this campaign was 
changed to defend the sharp increase in profits experienced by the oil 
companies (not the utilities) when oil prices went up. 
On 23 May 1973, Senator Henry Jackson addressed the question of 
modifying the then-pending S. 1570, the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
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tion Act of 1973, in order to bring it into conformance with a voluntary 
fuel allocation plan proposed earlier by the administration.20 This bill 
was eventually passed by Congress and signed into law by the president 
in the latter part of 1973 . By that time traumatic energy experiences had 
accumulated. Without assured reliability of information and with little 
or no political consensus, government reactions to what by then was 
accepted as an energy crisis were confined to piecemeal efforts. It 
became increasingly obvious that the oil companies, collectively or 
individually, did not have the capacity to work a cure. 
On 19 March 1973 Senator Jackson introduced the National Energy 
Research and Development Act of 1973.21 This was a bold and imagina-
tive piece of proposed legislation that would have set up an "Energy 
Management Project" to supervise a series of joint government and 
industry corporations which would undertake specific development of 
new energy sources. It was not passed, because of ideological distaste 
for such ventures on the part of the administration and the unwillingness 
on the part of the House to back a novel approach.22 The conservative 
reaction to the proposal had been generally summarized a year earlier by 
Rogers C. B. Morton, secretary of the interior, in responding to a 
question by Congressman Teno Roncalio of Wyoming concerning the 
feasibility of joint public and private corporate ventures for energy 
production (in the British and Canadian likeness). Morton stated flatly: 
"A joint venture with government is a halfway house of na-
tionalization-! think we need a great partnership with the people-
throughout the country people generally have invested heavily in the 
resource industries to provide all the capital that these industries need.23 
This statement was greeted with mixed feelings by some companies 
in the oil industry which had in a behind-the-scenes fashion exerted 
considerable effort to promote the Jackson concept in the first place. 
The basic objective of the energy research and development bill 
proposed by Senator Jackson was to permit the United States to be 
self-sufficient in environmentally acceptable fuels by 1983. Senator 
Jackson felt at the time that this process should be started while the· 
details of energy reorganization in the government were being worked 
out. But it was not to be. The policy-making apparatus, in a collective 
sense, had yet to receive any signal denoting energy urgency, and 
comprehensive policy proposals and supporting rationales were not 
coming in from the accepted source, the federal bureaucracy. 
On 18 April 1973 President Nixon issued his second energy message 
to the Congress. Where the president had formerly proposed consolidat-
ing energy administrative functions in a new Department of Natural 
Resources, he now proposed a Department of Energy and Natural Re-
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sources. An Office of Energy Conservation was created in the Depart-
ment of the Interior which was also to develop its own means for 
gathering energy data. An Oil Policy Committee (formerly under the 
Office of Emergency Preparedness) was placed in the Treasury Depart-
ment under then-Deputy Secretary William Simon, and by executive 
order a National Energy Office and a Special Guiding Committee on 
Energy were created in the Executive Office of the President to deal 
with top-level energy policy. The members of the Guiding Committee 
were John D. Ehrlichman, Henry A. Kissinger, and George P. Schultz. 
A director for the new Energy Office was not immediately named al-
though Charles DiBona, now the president of the American Petroleum 
Institute, was the ranking energy expert on the White House staff at the 
time. 
Referring to the energy situation as a challenge (rather than a crisis), 
the president outlined a series of points which he believed would help 
form the basis of a comprehensive energy policy. He concluded by 
noting that in order to avoid a short-term fuel shortage and to keep fuel 
costs as low as possible, it would be necessary to increase fuel imports. 
He abolished the Mandatory Import Quota. The only available 
additional fuel for us to import was that produced by the Arab nations of 
the Middle East. Thus we began an increasing dependence upon those 
nations. 
By 29 June 1973 the president, perhaps because of scandals begin-
ning to beset the administration, was obliged to break up the Energy 
Committee in the White House. In its place he announced the creation 
of a new "Energy Policy Office" to be headed by Governor John Love 
of Colorado. Governor Love's tenure was to be short and bitter. The 
president asked Congress for the establishment of an Energy Research 
and Development Administration. He called for voluntary restraint in 
the use of energy by citizens and the reduction of automobile speed 
limits by gubernatorial action. He stated: "America faces a serious 
energy problem-and unless we act swiftly and effectively, we could 
face a genuine energy crisis in the foreseeable future. •'24 This was his 
first public use of the word "crisis." 
The request for the establishment of an Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration with a $10 billion program over the next five 
years closely approached Senator Jackson's earlier proposal although 
the industry/government corporation concept was absent. But this rap-
prochement alone was by no means enough to produce policy results 
quickly. A year was to pass before a bona fide Energy Research and 
Development Administration was created. The details of its modus 
operandi, its intended functions, and, indeed, the prospects of its con-
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tinuation were obscured in the language of compromise between con-
servatives and liberals in the House and Senate. Although the agency is 
now incorporated in the Department of Energy, this problem remains. 
Unimpressed with the newly formed Office of Energy Conservation 
in the Interior Department, on 13 July 1973 Senator Jackson introduced 
the National Fuels and Energy Conservation Act of 1973. This act, 
which called for mandatory conservation measures, was not passed. 
On 9 September 1973, President Nixon and Governor Love made 
statements to the press concerning a just-concluded cabinet meeting on 
energy. The president announced setting an energy policy goal of inde-
pendence from Middle East oil within five years. He also made it easier 
for industry to burn coal by announcing a relaxation of air pollution 
standards, in order to ease an expected home heating oil shortage during 
the approaching winter. The president stated: "The United States must 
be in a position where no nation in the world has us in the position 
where they can cut off our oil. "25 
The words were to haunt the president in the weeks ahead. It should 
be noted that he was giving every indication of still being under the spell 
of his Cabinet Task Force report on energy of February 1970. For 
example, at his 5 September 1973 press conference, in response to 
questions concerning Arab threats, he had remarked: "Oil without a 
market-they will lose their markets and other sources will be de-
veloped. "26 
Governor Love, for his part, announced the administration's plan to 
develop the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve for domestic civil con-
sumption. Thus a star-crossed administration, faced by increasing in-
dustrial material shortages imported from less and less congenial na-
tions, was now selling off national wartime stockpile reserves in order to 
"reduce inflation "-surely a move of Through the Looking Glass illogic. 
Clearly the realities of the energy situation were at last beginning to 
tug at the coattails of the administration. In describing the situation, 
however, Nixon persisted into the fall in saying, "We do not face a 
crisis in that sense of the word. "27 
With the commencement of hostilities between Israel and the various 
Arab nations in October, the threat to U.S. oil imports from the Middle 
East became more than a possibility. In facing the probability of an oil 
embargo by the Arab states, Senator Jackson on 17 October 1973 re-
leased a statement to the press describing proposed emergency energy 
legislation which he planned to introduce in the Senate the following 
day as S. 2589, The National Energy Emergency Act of 1973.28 His 
proposed bill included provisions for utilities to convert to coal from oil, 
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emergency civil conservation measures, and the reduction of airline 
traffic and the rerouting of truck and common carrier traffic along the 
shortest and most economic routes. It was estimated that the rather severe 
measures proposed in the bill would save as much as 3 mbpd of oil or 
about half of what the United States normally imported at the time. The 
bill was not passed. 
On 7 November 1973 the president finally announced to the nation 
the reality of an energy crisis.29 The Arab States of OPEC (OAPEC) had, in 
fact, declared an oil embargo. 
In his speech the president proposed a number of oil conservation 
measures to the Congress, including a reduction of authorized highway 
speeds. He emphasized the need for the Alaskan pipeline, called for 
price incentives for natural gas production, noted the need for favorable 
strip-mining legislation, and asked Congress for various energy-
oriented organizational measures such as the creation of an Energy 
Research and Development Administration. 
In essence the chief executive and the Senate had reached practical 
consensus on what should be done in a short-term sense and what could 
be done for the time being vis-a-vis energy. Conservation measures 
were needed. Some sort of agency was needed to undertake a massive 
energy research and development program to augment domestic re-
sources. And a high-level policy office was needed to undertake the task 
of crisis management that clearly would be a continuing energy situation 
requirement even after the embargo. 
But the House of Representatives and its committees had not been 
counted in. The House, in its own fashion and following its own mores, 
had been preoccupied with energy conservation, particularly enforced 
conservation through rationing if necessary. Also occupying its attention 
were the problems arising from the fragmented regulation exercised 
at the time over the various subfields coming under the heading of 
energy (i.e., coal, oil, natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power, etc.). 
On 13 November 1973, H.R. 11450, "A Bill to Direct the President 
to Take Action to Assure, through Energy Conservation, End Point 
Allocation [a cautious euphemism for "rationing"], and Other Means 
that the Essential Energy Needs of the United States Are Met and for 
Other Purposes" was introduced and referred to the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, chaired by Harley 0. Staggers of 
West Virginia. Besides a gasoline-rationing provision (widely held at 
the time to be the solution to energy shortages), the bill also included 
provision for the establishment of a Federal Energy Administration as 
an independent regulatory agency-by no means the role envisioned for 
such an office by the White House or the Senate at the time. 
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In the following days no compromise could be worked out between 
the disparate bills, and as a result the Congress adjourned for the 
Christmas period without having provided the president, during the 
energy crisis, with the emergency legislation he had requested. Earlier 
legislation, however, permitted the allocation of petroleum fuels by the 
president, and the ad hoc Energy Office, by now under William Simon, 
rose more or less to the occasion by diverting available oil supplies so as 
to preclude any severe shortages of other than an industrial and public 
transportation nature. In the process of doing this, Simon informally 
created a regional network of energy resource allocation offices. This 
network was later to be confirmed by legislation. It has been paralleled 
but not abolished by a system of state energy offices created during the 
embargo and now recognized in the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act of 1975. 
The authority to divert oil supplies on a regional basis stemmed from 
the provisions of the Emergtmcy Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973. 
This act also directed the president to set prices or to evolve pricing 
formulas for crude oil, residual fuel oil, and refined petroleum products. 
Thus the low gasoline prices then prevalent in this country were fixed 
into law and a mandatory supply allocation system was thrust into the 
hands of a bureaucracy ill prepared to execute its requirements. During 
this period the Congress also passed an act limiting highway speeds to 
55 miles per hour. 
As a result of these efforts, a significant number of industries were 
forced to circumscribe their operations and, in some cases, to abandon 
operations entirely. Thus the stage was set for the unemployment that 
was to become rampant during 1974. As a result of the increased oil 
prices after the embargo, inflation was also driven up. Thus "stagfla-
tion," the condition deemed impossible by earlier economic texts, be-
came a reality. 30 
With the end of the Arab embargo in early 1974, concern about 
establishing an energy policy diminished considerably. And there was 
Watergate with its numbing influence. Nevertheless, some energy-
related legislative activity continued, aimed essentially at the consolida-
tion and legitimizing of previously achieved positions. 
Senator Jackson sponsored and pushed through Congress an "om-
nibus" energy bill which was vetoed by President Nixon because it 
included provisions for emergency rationing of gasoline. 
On 7 May 1974 the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 was 
signed into law. In passing this bill Congress was acting to confirm the 
existence of an office which had pretty well proved its merit and intrin-
sic worth. This is presumably a situation congressmen like to face, 
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although it appeared clear that many voting for the bill felt that they 
were supporting a temporary emergency measure. A very important 
provision of the bill deserves special mention. Under "Functions and 
Purposes," the first substantive task of the new Federal Energy Admin-
istration was to "advise the President and the Congress with respect to 
the establishment of a comprehensive national energy policy in relation 
to the energy matters for which the administration has responsibility, 
and, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the integration of 
domestic and foreign policies relating to energy resource manage-
ment. "31 
During the Ninety-third Congress more than 2,000 energy-related 
bills had been introduced, and more than thirty standing congressional 
committees had held more than 1,000 days of hearings. Thirty energy 
bills of one sort or another were passed.32 And yet it seemed clear that 
for one reason or another neither the president nor the Congress itself 
had been able to evolve a viable comprehensive national energy pro-
gram. Besides lack of clear-cut popular support, one of the great stum-
bling blocks seemed to be the absence of the informed bureaucratic ele-
ment normally relied upon for producing at least proposals for policy. 
But when the bureaucratic element was established, the first demand 
made by Congress upon the new office (with the president's accord) was 
to develop a comprehensive energy plan. Instant expertise was as-
sumed. 
On 11 October 197 4 the Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were estab-
lished by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.33 The provisions of 
this act incorporated the research and development operations of the 
former Atomic Energy Administration in the charter of the new Energy 
Research and Development Administration. An Energy Policy Council 
(supra-cabinet level) was also established to provide basic policy direc-
tion to the FEA and the ERDA. Both the Energy Reorganization Act and 
the Federal Energy Administration Act resulted from bills introduced in 
the House of Representatives. 
Thus, while no advances were made in energy policy formulation 
and while no material advances were made in either conservation (ex-
cept that imposed by OPEC through a quadrupling of imported oil price) 
or new energy resource development, the institutional groundwork was 
at least laid to facilitate such developments when the incentive for them 
might be recognized. The formation of the International Energy Agency 
through the efforts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger can be ranked 
with these institutional accomplishments. 
In late 1974 the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation issued 
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its final report, which had been in preparation under the direction of S. 
David Freeman since December 1971.34 The impact of this report, 
although it makes an urgent and eloquent plea for the reduction of 
energy resource consumption, was not what might have been expected. 
Three factors seemingly worked to diminish its influence upon 
policymaking. 
In the first place, a preliminary report of the Ford Foundation proj-
ect, when issued in pamphlet form in late July of 1974 (and later in book 
form), projected a rather rosy picture of the energy policy options open 
to the United States.35 It emphasized a "Zero Energy Growth 
Scenario," perhaps out of contact with demographic realities and cer-
tainly out of contact with prevailing public conceptions. It also por-
trayed a relatively easily achieved energy independence inconsistent 
with our rapidly dwindling domestic oil and (particularly) gas supplies 
and dealt quite harshly with the energy industry. The preliminary report 
incurred the rather heavy-handed criticism (published in the book) of the 
Energy Policy Project's board of advisors, which included prominent 
members of the energy industry. The final report perpetuated these 
deficiencies or problems. 
Secondly, the report is considered by some as being tarnished to a 
degree by the supposed political ambitions of its director. A L. Ham-
mond pointed out in an article in the journal of the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science that Freeman seemed to many 
observers to be striving unduly for the position of "Mr. Energy" in a 
(i.e., any) Democratic administration.36 Certainly Freeman courted the 
environmentalists considered to be in the liberal camp and played down 
the need for augmented domestic energy resources considered important 
by most conservatives. In all probability it was his ideology rather than 
his ambition that gave offense, although there were those who claimed 
that the economic studies supporting his report were not well done. In 
fact, this claim was probably in large measure responsible for the rather 
hurried publication, with conservative support, of No Time to Confuse 
by the Institute for Contemporary Studies in 1975. Although apparently 
intended as rebuttal to the Freeman effort, the book achieved much less 
circulation. Regardless of its merits, it did not have the resources of the 
Ford Foundation behind it. 
The last factor apparently diminishing the impact of the Ford Founda-
tion Energy Policy Project's final report was the almost concurrent 
issuance of the Project Independence Report by the FEA on 7 November 
1974. A massive compilation of data, this report discusses three basic 
alternative strategies. The first is an increased effort to reduce consump-
tion. The second is an accelerated effort to increase domestic supplies. 
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The third is a combination of the two. But the report made it quite clear 
that no degree of acceleration would meet domestic demand, even when 
reduced by conservation programs, in the ensuing ten years. Not only 
were our fossil fuel resources vanishing along with those of the entire 
earth, but for the United States, a decade of rather acute dependence 
upon oil imports lay ahead. According to the report it was within the 
capacity of the nation to minimize this dependence and to mitigate its 
untoward effects, but efforts were needed immediately if, after a decade 
of dependence, we were to achieve nominal independence from foreign 
energy resources. 
This latter goal was accepted as a given in the Project Independence 
study. But it cannot be gainsaid that some of those involved in writing 
the report favored "interdependence" over "independence," not only 
because for the moment it is inevitable, but also because, in their view, 
it tends to have a stabilizing influence on world affairs and thus fosters 
predominantly peaceful relations. This view, of course, contrasts sharp-
ly with the beliefs of those who espouse nationalism or who are nostal-
gic for the "Fortress America" days when the United States could 
substantially remove itself from the international arena. 
Thus the Project Independence Report, emanating as it did from the 
middle bureaucracy, is essentially a shopping list which, while it esti-
mates costs and benefits to some extent, leaves the major cost-benefit 
analysis, particularly the political side of such an analysis, to the politi-
cians. The Project Independence Report with its emphasis on conserva-
tion was the swan song of John Sawhill, the FEA Administrator under 
the Nixon/Ford administration. Its facts and figures did not predict 
energy independence in the near future. But the importance of the report 
should not be underestimated. It was a giant step forward for the 
bureaucracy in the development of an interdisciplinary policy-analysis 
methodology. In the energy area, in particular, its compilation repre-
sented the first organized government attempt to bring the multifaceted 
energy problem into focus instead of concentrating on one single ele-
ment such as oil, gas, or coal. Although some of its data have been 
challenged and its conclusions (no recommendations were made as 
such) derided, the substance of the report was to be the bedrock for 
much of the next five years' work toward developing an energy policy. 
The "energy year" 1975 opened in Washington with President 
Ford's 15 January 1975, State of the Union Address. The president's 
energy goals were described as follows: (1) In the near term (1975-
1977) halt our growing oil import dependence through voluntary con-
servation measures; (2) In the mid term (1975-1985) attain energy 
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independence by achieving invulnerability to disruption from another oil 
import embargo (this independence was described as a 1985 import range 
of 3-5 mbpd replaceable by stored supply and emergency measures); 
(3) In the long term (beyond 1985) mobilize U.S. technology andre-
sources to supply a significant share of the Free World's energy needs.37 
The proposals contained in this message were then submitted to the 
Congress in a single very comprehensive proposal for legislation. In the 
ensuing months Congress found itself unable to deal with the omnibus 
bill. Extensive debate as well as confusion resulted. Eventually three 
major lines of opinion seemed to coalesce. They were not destined to be 
reflected in policy legislation during 1975, but are summarized and 
compared in Table 9.1 because they represent rather clearly the contend-
ing views that greeted President Carter's 1977 proposals when they, in 
tum, began to be debated in Congress. Some of the items are themselves 
reflected in the National Energy Act submitted to the Congress by 
President Carter for implementation of his 29 April 1977 energy pro-
gram entitled The National Energy Plan. 
On 10 October 1975, while the debate continued in Congress over 
energy policy legislation, President Ford proposed and submitted legis-
lation to support the creation of an Energy Independence Authority 
(EIA). This authority (or government corporation) was to be provided 
with $100 billion with which to assist private industry in energy de-
velopments of a high-risk and capital-intensive nature. It was expected 
that the EIA would provide the impetus to start the country moving 
towards the goal of energy independence earlier enunciated by President 
Nixon. Inasmuch as the "high-risk" ventures included pipeline systems 
and nuclear power plants as well as synthetic fuel p1ants,38 it can be 
considered that the EIA proposal represented clearly (and for the first 
time) recognition by the conservative element in the United States that 
private industry simply would not or could not raise the capital neces-
sary to move the country at a reasonable rate into a new energy era-
risk or no risk. For a variety of reasons, however, Congress was not 
impressed and the bill did not pass. 
Finally, as 1975 drew to a close and the election year of 1976loomed 
ominously, Congress brought forth the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act of 1975. Generally speaking, the act provided no energy policy per 
se other than a general laissez-faire and "hope for the best" set of 
ambiguous statements. In deference to election year prospects in 1976 
the only positive step taken in the act was to reduce, for the immediate 
future, the price of domestic oil by about $1.09 per barrel. No attempt 
has ever been made to explain how this measure contributed to the 
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conservation of energy. Nevertheless, probably because of the same 
pressures that its drafters were responding to, President Ford signed the 
act and made it law on 22 December 1975. William Simon, then se-
cretary of the treasury, has subsequently termed President Ford's failure 
to veto this Act a "tragic error. "39 
On 26 February 1976 President Ford transmitted his third and last 
major energy message to the Congress. It essentially consisted of a 
restatement of previous recommendations and positions. If the United 
States did not adopt an energy policy, it was not to be said during the 
election year of 1976 that President Ford had not at least proposed one. 
But in no way did he make any strong personal appeal to the American 
people for his program. He did not lend it the weight of his office. He 
did not stress the subject during his campaign-but neither did the man 
eventually to emerge as his principal opponent. 
On the congressional side of the ledger, what was probably the main 
debate on the subject of energy took place on 19 May 197 6 in the House 
of Representatives.40 The debate evolved over the appropriations bill for 
ERDA. While illuminating to anyone wishing to discern "who stood for 
what" in energy matters, the debate made little contribution towards 
enunciating a comprehensive energy policy. A salient feature worth 
noting for future reference was the prolonged and sharp exchange be-
tween proponents of a breeder reactor program and backers of a solar 
energy program. This polarization was to become more accentuated in 
the months ahead and eventually crystallized as a result of the Three 
Mile Island accident. 
The Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976 was passed 
and signed into law on 14 August 1976. As in the case of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, this law belies its name. Its 
salient purpose was to extend the termination date of the FEA to 31 
December 1977. Although the act also established an Office of Energy 
Information and Analysis within the FEA and included a large number of 
detailed special-interest provisions and modifications to other energy-
related laws, it did not establish a meaningful national conservation 
policy nor an energy production policy for the United States by any 
stretch of the imagination. 
During the campaign of 1976 all presidential candidates avoided the 
energy issue at every conceivable opportunity. The signs were very 
clear. The people of the United States did not believe that an energy 
crisis existed.41 The painful duty of apprising them of their energy plight 
was to be deferred to 1977. 
Gasoline tax 
Oil import quotas 
Foreign oil purchases 
Fuel allocation 
Energy research 
Table 9.1 
THE THREE RIVAL ENERGY TAX PLANS COMPARED 
House Ways and Means Committee 
5 cents a gallon this year, 
rising to 40 cents in four 
years 
U.S. imports to be reduced 
from 37 percent of consumption 
to 25 percent by 1985 
duction Board 
A new agency to buy foreign 
oil by accepting sealed bids 
from producing nations 
None 
Creation of an energy trust 
fund to finance development 
of alternative energy sources 
Composite Views of Congressional 
Democratic Leaders 
5 cents a gallon 
U.S. imports to be reduced 
500,000 barrels this year, more 
thereafter, as determined by 
proposed National Energy Pro-
duction Board 
No federal agency to purchase 
Proposed board to have authority 
to allocate fuel supplies within 
U.S. and decree gasoline ration-
ing 
Creation of energy trust fund 
to develop alternative energy 
sources 
~ 
President Ford 
None 
None. Reliance on higher 
tariffs to reduce imports 
No federal agency to purchase 
None 
Increased money for Energy 
Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) 
Auto efficiency 
Depletion allowance 
Oil prices 
Oil import tariff 
Tax cuts 
Steep excise tax on gas 
guzzlers; tax credit to buyers 
of fuel-efficient cars 
Repeal of 22 percent allowance 
on oil and natural gas 
Phased decontrol of domestic 
oil and natural gas prices, 
plus windfall profits tax 
None 
$21.3 billion, including $8.1 
billion in 1974 income tax re-
bates, up to maximum of $200 
per person; $8.1 billion in 
lower 1975 income taxes, plus 
$5.1 billion investment credit 
for corporations (from 7 to 10 
percent) 
Excise tax on gas guzzlers; 
tax rebates to buyers of fuel-
efficient cars; car-makers re-
quired to raise gasoline mileage 
standards 
Repeal of oil and natural gas 
allowance, except for small 
producers 
Modified decontrol of prices 
on domestic "old" oil 
None 
Linked to oil-depletion 
allowance 
Source: Based on data in Christian Science Monitor, 4 March 1975. 
Relax clean air standards 
on cars in return for in-
dustry promise to increase 
fuel efficiency 40 percent 
by 1980 
Phased repeal of oil and 
gas allowance, linked with 
windfall profits tax 
Decontrol of domestic crude 
oil prices 
$3 a barrel tariff on 
imported oil 
Comparable to House Ways 
and Means proposal 
0> 
01 
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The Department of Energy, established in 1977, has a long prehis-
tory. Starting in 1971 a cabinet reorganization proposal was advanced 
by the Nixon administration which would have, among other things, 
provided a Department of Natural Resources. As interest began to 
mount on the question of energy, it was proposed that in this department 
could be brought together all, or most, of the myriad executive branch 
functions and responsibilities having to do with energy. Finally, as 
energy became a critical subject, the name of the proposed department 
was changed to the Department of Energy and Natural Resources. 
In the meantime, the energy situation escalated into a full-blown 
crisis. On 4 December 1973 the president asked the Congress to estab-
lish a new Federal Energy Administration. As a stop-gap measure he 
simultaneously created, by executive order, a temporary Federal Energy 
Office headed by William E. Simon, then undersecretary of the trea-
sury. The Energy Policy Office in the White House headed by John 
Love was disestablished. 
During December of 1973 while the administration bill (H.R. 11793) 
for FEA was discussed in the Subcommittee on Government Operations, 
a somewhat similar bill (H.R. 11450) was referred from the floor of the 
House to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. In 
this latter bill, however, the FEA was proposed as "an independent 
regulatory agency," which is to say that it would not be part of any 
department nor answerable in all cases to the president. This was a 
distinct departure from the administration's concept of having a subor-
dinate agency within the executive branch to coordinate energy affairs 
for, and in the name of, the president. On the other hand, H.R. 11450 
was written in response to a perceived need for coordinated regulation in 
the total energy field in place of the fragmented regulation existing at 
the time. 
Eventually in 1974 the FEA and the ERDA were created, but as the 
events of the winter of 1976-1977 illustrated, the problem of frag-
mented regulatory powers over energy matters remained unsolved. The 
FEA, empowered to regulate and allocate petroleum supplies, found that 
only the Federal Power Commission with its specialized regulatory 
powers could deal with the matter of natural gas shortages and maldis-
tributions. This did not, of course, deter the press from questioning the 
administrator of the FEA as to what he proposed to do about the "gas 
crisis." 
The energy reorganization legislation (A Bill to Establish a Depart-
ment of Energy in the Executive Branch ... etc.) submitted to Congress 
by President Carter on 1 March 1977 was developed in recognition of 
these problems. It specifically called for the incorporation of the FPC 
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into the new department. This provision, while undoubtedly vital to the 
comprehensive functioning of the department and the containment of 
future energy crises, encountered predictable resistance on Capitol Hill, 
particularly in the House of Representatives. The resistance was over-
come largely through the efforts of Speaker of the House Thomas 
O'Neill. On 4 August 1977 the Department of Energy (DOE) was created 
with James Schlesinger installed as the Secretary for Energy and head of 
the twelfth cabinet-level department of the United States. Congress's 
only major change to President Carter's original proposal lay in the area 
of price control authority. Where the administration had originally pro-
posed that the secretary of energy have price control over oil, gas, and 
other fuels, the act as passed placed this authority in the hands of a 
five-person committee ostensibly separate from and independent of the 
DOE. With 20,000 people only generally acquainted with details of the 
energy problem assembled under one official, the DOE has had severe 
growing pains. 
To accompany his submission of a proposal to establish a new De-
partment of Energy, the president commenced a campaign skillfully 
designed to attract the attention of the general public to the national 
energy situation. By repeatedly referring in various public statements 
and in interviews to possible sacrifice and predicting a sharp drop in his 
popularity poll rating, President Carter ensured that when he finally 
announced his proposed energy plan for the nation he would command a 
wide and attentive audience in this country and abroad. The interest of 
the world was further aroused just before his announcement by the 
release to the public of the April 1977 CIA report entitled The Interna-
tional Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985 which portrayed an ominous 
crisis looming in international oil affairs, with reserves running out and 
the Soviet Union entering the Middle Eastern oil market as a heavy 
purchaser by the 1980s. 
On 18 April 1977 President Carter spoke to the American people and 
indeed to the world from the Oval Office of the White House. His 
remarks have already been discussed in an earlier chapter. It should be 
noted in a historical context, however, that his speech was the first 
presidential announcement that the very foundations of our industri-
alized, mechanized, automated, and highly mobile society were in 
jeopardy because of energy factors. 
The impact of the president's speech was considerable. By the time 
he appeared before a Joint Session of Congress on 20 April 1977 to 
deliver an outline of his formal "Message on Energy" to Congress, the 
4 percent of the general public formerly considered to be interested in 
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and concerned about energy matters had apparently grown, according to 
White House polls, to about 50 percent of the population. But the 
reactions were mixed and did not meet the expectations of White House 
aides who had earlier referred privately to the president's speech as his 
"Chicken Little" or "The Sky Is Falling" speech. Although public 
interest had definitely been aroused, it was by no means clear that it was 
entirely favorable. The "tiger in the tank" had been seized by the tail 
and it proved politically dangerous in the months ahead either to let it go 
or to hang on. Eventually it was let go. 
There are some enigmatic aspects of the president's moves. Al-
though a "Detailed Fact Sheet" of some twenty-eight pages was issued 
by the White House supporting his presentation to the Congress, the 
official National Energy Plan which he was apparently outlining did not 
yet exist in its entirety on paper. The prefatory letter for it was not even 
signed by the president until 29 April 1977. 
While there is certainly support for the claim made by White House 
aides that they were simply faced with too great a writing, editing, and 
clerical effort (the Plan comprises over a hundred printed pages)-it 
seems a strong possibility that a certain amount of practical politicking 
was taking place with the written "Message to Congress" being care-
fully tailored until the last moment to achieve the most favorable possi-
ble reception in Congress. If this was the case, the House of Representa-
tives may have been impressed but the Senate distinctly was not. 
Informal contact with the agencies concerned reveals that neither the 
FEA, the ERDA, nor the Department of Interior played any significant role 
in the drafting of the president's energy messages, the "point papers," 
or "fact sheets," let alone The National Energy Plan. The entire pro-
gram was drafted (and redrafted) and closely held in house by White 
House staff members. Thus, it can be estimated that the various "leaks" 
appearing in the press before the president's 18 April speech were, by 
and large, almost certainly deliberately planted to serve as "straws in 
the wind." 
The president postulated ten fundamental principles as the underly-
ing rationale for the plan and the framework within which present and 
future policies should be formulated.42 
In summary, the ten principles are: 
1. The energy problem can be effectively addressed only by a gov-
ernment that accepts responsibility for dealing with it comprehen-
sively and by a public that understands its seriousness and is ready 
to make necessary sacrifices. 
2. Healthy economic growth must continue. 
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3. National policies for the protection of the environment must be 
maintained. 
4. The United States must reduce its vulnerability to potentially devas-
tating supply interruptions. 
5. The program must be fair. The United States must solve its energy 
problems in a manner that is equitable to all regions, sectors, and 
income groups. 
6. The growth of energy demand must be restrained through conserva-
tion and improved energy efficiency. 
7. Energy prices should generally reflect the true replacement cost of 
energy. 
8. Both energy producers and energy consumers are entitled to rea-
sonable certainty about government policy. 
9. Resources in plentiful supply must be used more widely and the 
nation must begin the process of moderating its use of those in 
short supply. 
10. The use of nonconventional sources of energy-such as solar, 
wind, biomass, geothermal-must be vigorously expanded. 
These principles have not been seriously attacked. Their implementa-
tion, however, has been the subject of bitter debate and the source of 
much controversy in the political and economic arenas, and even within 
the federal bureaucracy. 
While stressing the need for a shift to coal, increased safety precau-
tions for nuclear reactors, and a general need to seek renewable energy 
resources such as provided by solar power, the president emphasized 
conservation of energy and said very little specifically about developing 
alternate resources other than essentially expressing the hope that pri-
vate industry, if energy prices rose a bit, would develop shale oil, would 
use processes for burning municipal waste, would advance solar energy, 
and so forth. Staff members in the White House in response to queries 
on this matter somewhat guardedly advanced two theses: First, conser-
vation of the rapidly vanishing domestic oil and gas was something that 
most Americans could agree on once they accepted the premise that 
these resources are in fact dwindling; presentation of energy develop-
ment options would only serve to cloud the conservation issue and raise 
false hopes for oil and gas. Second, five hundred thirty-five strong-
minded individuals (assisted by a host of lobbyists) on Capitol Hill 
would be ready, willing, and able to propose energy development con-
cepts which the president could then consider for inclusion in the Na-
tional Energy Plan in the light of developing public opinion. 
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The proposal for an advancing tax on gasoline which was a feature of 
the Carter plan, although treated as a novelty by the press, was by no 
means original with President Carter. In many respects it can be viewed 
as a "bone for Congress to gnaw on" because it is by no means estab-
lished that five cents or so a gallon of gasoline would, in itself, substan-
tially reduce gasoline consumption by the American public. The present 
transportation system and the European experience cited earlier seem to 
belie this prospect. The proposal to remit portions of the tax did not 
indicate any intention to accumulate public funds for alternative energy 
resource development. The president's gasoline tax proposal was consid-
erably modified by House action and eventually perished in the Senate. 
Similarly the president's key proposal to tax crude oil at the well-
head to bring the domestic price to world price levels and then rebate 
the proceeds to the public, while probably supportive of conservation, 
was necessarily viewed with alarm by those seeking reelection and not 
much thought of by those believing that energy development should be 
allowed more money. 
All told, the omission of a specific and vigorous energy development 
program came close to costing President Carter whatever leadership he 
enjoyed over Congress, or even his party, in the energy policy area. 
It cannot be glossed over, either, that the political clout of environ-
mental groups may have so impressed the president that his program, as 
proposed, should stand at face value as an acceptance of a considerably 
slowed down America. This involves a concept of what conservation of 
energy is all about. If conservation is viewed as a dynamic effort to 
increase efficiency in energy use and to eliminate waste, then it is 
possible to look toward an advancing America, provided vigorous ef-
forts are made to develop domestic energy resources, particularly of a 
renewable nature. A concept of conservation as a prolonged emergency 
measure requiring pain and suffering and self-deprivation in the "moral 
equivalent of war" has turned out to be at best at odds with the country's 
general perceptions and at worst probably unnecessary at least for the 
present. 
Conservation to be enforced by government and energy production to 
be achieved by the forces of the marketplace seem to have been the 
hallmarks of the initial Carter proposal. This position carried with it 
considerable middle-of-the-road optimism about the private sector's 
dedication and ability to "make up the difference" in needed energy 
development programs. 
Luther Carter reported in a Science article that the Carter pian-as it 
stood-fitted in essentially with the consensus of the more conservative 
leaders of the nation's major environmental groups.43 There remains, of 
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course, uncertainty about the administration's plans on breeder reactors. 
The cancellation of the sodium-cooled breeder does not by any means 
preclude further research on other breeder categories, such as a gas-
cooled breeder reactor based on thorium. In the year 1977 grandiose 
crash energy development programs in the Manhattan Project or Apollo 
Project mold were not part of the president's thinking. In fact, the 
National Energy Plan stated that such programs were too expensive for 
the economy to bear and would have adverse effects on remaining fossil 
fuel resources and the environment.44 The lack of a strong energy re-
source development program was judged by many to be the weakest 
aspect of the initial Carter program, at least politically. 
Nevertheless, the energy issues delineated during 1977 and 1978 as 
the House and Senate struggled to reconcile opposing views on the 
National Energy Plan brought forth in the White House a realization of 
the great problems faced by the private sector in amassing the capital to 
develop those energy resources closest to the national interest. Serious 
attention was increasingly directed to some sort of a combined 
government/business energy development corporation. 
At the beginning of the Ninety-fifth Congress the Senate streamlined 
its energy affairs by creating a Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources chaired by Senator Jackson. While the House, if anything, 
complicated its committee structure insofar as energy is concerned, the 
Speaker designated Congressman Thomas Ashley of Ohio as chairman 
of a select committee to consider the president's energy plan after the 
various portions of it emerged from the several standing committees 
involved. The president met with the select committee shortly after 
formal submission of his National Energy Plan. 45 
It seemed at the outset fairly likely that the Congress would respond 
at least by early 1978 to the president's initiative through the enactment 
of comprehensive and interlocking energy legislation. As a first step 
both houses had already passed the bill creating a Department of 
Energy. But many complications arose. 
In technical terms, apparently as a result of prior arrangements 
reached with the Speaker of the House (but, it seems, not with the key 
senators in the other chamber), the president chose to submit the legis-
lation supporting his proposed energy plan in the form of an omnibus 
bill similar in overall concept to the one submitted earlier by President 
Ford. The Carter energy bill (the proposed National Energy Act) com-
prised some 283 pages. It offered amendments to fourteen existing 
laws. It was a legislative potpourri guaranteed to tax the administrative 
skill of any legislator. O'Neill was indeed placed on his mettle if he 
172 Energy and the National Defense 
encouraged the submission of such a package. Yet for a while it seemed 
that his parliamentary powers had proved adequate to the occasion. On 
6 August 1977 the House voted 244 to 177 in favor of legislation 
reasonably close to that proposed by the president.46 
The omnibus bill fared less well in the Senate. One factor seems to 
have been that, party labels notwithstanding, energy votes in the Senate 
in recent years, have tended to split almost evenly along what can be 
best described as conservative and liberal lines which, coincidentally or 
not, also reflect the division between states with substantial energy 
resources of their own and those without. Only one-third of the incum-
bent senators were running for reelection. And the matter of actual as 
opposed to media-perceived and official leadership in the senatorial 
chamber of the Ninety-fifth Congress was long in being determined. 
The National Energy Plan as proposed by President Carter had de-
ficiencies and offended conservatives deeply ("this unhappy vision of 
America ");47 uncertainties attended public and congressional reactions, 
not to mention the possible effects once it might be adopted. Neverthe-
less, the Plan is the first formal expression by an American president 
that we can no longer rely upon oil and gas for our energy supplies, and 
that comprehensive action on a broad scale is necessary to rectify the 
situation. It is also the first proposed national plan for anything of 
substance to be submitted by a president of the United States. In the 
end, something resembling an energy plan became a necessity for mem-
bers of Congress running for reelection. The resulting legislation will 
one way or another profoundly affect the nature of our Republic and the 
lives of unborn generations of American citizens. 
Technically speaking, the most important aspect of the National 
Energy Act of 1978 may be that there is no such act. After almost a year 
and a half of bitter and acrimonious debate the Ninety-fifth Congress, 
upon its adjournment on 15 October 1978, produced five bills relating to 
energy in response to the president's onmibus bill. These were: the 
Energy Tax Act of 1978, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 
1978, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, and the National Energy Conservation Policy Act. 
Upon passage of these somewhat disparate and occasionally conflict-
ing bills, the president announced: "We have declared to ourselves and 
the world our intent to control our use of energy, and thereby to control 
our own destiny as a nation. "48 
James Schlesinger, the secretary of energy, proclaimed that the pur-
pose of the "National Energy Act" is to "put in place a policy 
framework for decreasing oil imports" by replacing oil and gas with 
abundant domestic fuels in industry and electric utilities; reducing 
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energy demands through improved efficiency; increasing production of 
conventional sources of domestic energy through more rational pricing 
policies; and building a base for the development of renewable energy 
resources. "49 
A brief review of the five bills is in order.50 The Energy Tax Act of 
1978 emphasizes a progressive "gas guzzler" tax on automobiles. It 
also includes a residential energy tax credit for insulation and solar 
energy installations. Gasohol is exempted from federal excise taxes on 
motor fuels until 1985. A tax credit is provided against the first $300 of 
the purchase price of a new four-wheel electric or hydrogen-powered 
motor vehicle, or against the cost of converting a gasoline-powered 
vehicle to the use of hydrogen. 
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 is essentially 
aimed at prohibiting the use of natural gas or petroleum as a primary 
energy source in new electric power plants or new major fuel-burning 
installations (e.g., industrial plants). Various exemptions are provided. 
One such exemption permits the use of gas or petroleum provided that at 
the end of the exemption period it can be shown that synthetic fuels 
derived from coal or other sources will be used. In general natural gas is 
prohibited as a power source for all electric power plants after 1990. 
Considerable print is devoted to the prohibition of outdoor lighting by 
natural gas. Provisions are made for loans to assist power plants in 
acquiring air pollution control equipment rendered necessary by the 
conversion to coal. The bill also authorizes the expenditure of $18 
million for an eighteen-month national coal policy study as well as a 
similarly funded coal industry performance and competition study. 
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 is an extremely complex piece of 
regulation reconciling radically different approaches to the problem on 
the part of the House and the Senate without much regard for the 
original presidential proposals. The House approach to natural gas pric-
ing was essentially that of the Carter administration. Part 4 of H.R. 
8444, the National Energy Act passed by the House (but rejected in the 
Senate), proposed establishing a single uniform price policy for natural 
gas produced in the United States. It also would have imposed federal 
price controls on the intrastate gas market for the first time. The price of 
gas nationwide was to have been raised initially from $1.42 per million 
BTU (about 1 , 000 cubic feet of natural gas) to $1.7 5. The Senate 
approach (S.2104) would have eliminated federal price controls on new 
gas in two years with all controls expiring in five years. The interim 
price ceiling was to have been tied to the current cost of No. 2 fuel oil 
landed in New York City. Intrastate natural gas was not to be subject to 
federal pricing jurisdiction. In the final compromise it was agreed that 
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all natural gas prices would be allowed to escalate with inflation and, in 
most cases, faster than inflation. The new gas prices under the act as 
passed will generally escalate at an annual rate equal to the sum of an 
inflation factor, a "correction factor," and a real growth factor equal to 
3. 5 percent through April 1981 and 4 percent thereafter. Thus gas prices 
are hooked progressively to the most recent GNP deflator data. As of 1 
October 1978, for instance, gas was priced at $2.06 per million BTus. 
Optimistically assuming a 6 percent inflation, by 1985 gas would be 
priced at about $3.75 per million BTUs. Obviously it will probably be 
higher. Various categories of gas are defined as to source, however, and 
these prices would not uniformly apply. In the main, price controls on 
"new" gas would expire in 1985 with provision for their reinstatement 
by the president if deemed necessary-subject to congressional review. 
Intrastate gas is placed under price controls until1985. "High cost" gas 
is almost immediately deregulated. Such gas is defined as natural gas 
from wells more than 15,000 feet deep, natural gas (methane) produced 
from geopressurized brine, occluded natural gas produced from coal 
seams, and natural gas produced from Devonian shale. Latitude is af-
forded the Regulatory Commission to add other categories of gas pro-
duced under conditions of extraordinary risks or costs. 
Since the Natural Gas Policy Act is a compromise experiment de-
signed to ascertain whether its Byzantine labyrinth of scheduled price 
increases will make a significant impact on an important area of domes-
tic energy supply, the act requires the Department of Energy to submit 
two reports to the president and to the Congress. The reports, to be 
submitted by 1 July 1984 and 1 January 1985 are required to discuss 
natural gas prices, supplies, and demand, and the competitive condi-
tions and market forces in the natural gas industry in the United States. 
The Public Utility Regulatory Act establishes federal standards for 
electric utilities. One of these standards prohibits the practice of "de-
clining block rates" where the rate charged per kilowatt hour decreases 
as usage increases. The implementation of these standards, however, is 
left to the discretion of state regulatory bodies with the proviso that such 
bodies must report their decisions in writing and make them available to 
the public and that the Department of Energy has the right of participa-
tion and intervention in rate-making proceedings. Electric utilities are 
prohibited from charging the cost of promotional or political advertising 
in this area to consumers other than shareholders or owners. Similar 
provisions are made for the retail policies of natural gas utilities. En-
couragement is provided for the development of small hydroelectric 
power projects. Provisions are made to expedite the development of 
crude oil transportation systems from California inland. The secretary of 
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energy is directed to designate thirteen universities where coal research 
laboratories will be established and operated. The voluntary conversion 
of facilities from the use of natural gas to the use of heavy petroleum 
fuel is provided for and encouraged. During a natural gas supply emer-
gency the president is authorized to prohibit the burning of natural gas 
by major fuel-burning installations and electric power plants. 
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act provides for the finan-
cial assistance (up to $300 per customer) of utilities in the installation of 
home energy-saving devices. It provides for "weatherization" grants for 
low-income familites and the purchase by the Government National 
Mortgage Association of loans for the installation of solar energy sys-
tems. Grants totaling $900 million are authorized for energy audits and 
the installation of energy-saving equipment in schools and hospitals. 
For state energy audits $15 million is appropriated. More detailed in-
structions are given to the Environmental Protection Agency for the 
development of automobile mileage standards, and to the Department of 
Energy for the development of energy efficiency standards for products 
and appliances. The energy efficiency of industrial equipment is made 
the object of a study by the Department of Energy, and the secretary of 
energy is directed to set targets for increased industrial utilization of 
recovered material. The method of reporting measures taken to achieve 
industrial energy efficiency specified in the Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act is somewhat clarified, as are the provisions of that act con-
cerning state energy conservation plans. Appropriations are provided in 
furtherance of the executive agency energy-conservation plan developed 
in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. Solar heating and cooling, 
photovoltaic utilization, and building retrofit are emphasized. Concern 
is expressed over preserving national coal resources. A "second law" 
(i.e., of thermodynamics) efficiency study is directed by the DOE to 
probe the concept that energy efficiency may be defined as the ratio of 
the minimum available work necessary for accomplishing a given task 
to the available work in the actual fuel to accomplish that task. Finally, 
leaving no stone unturned, the act states: "The Congress recognizes that 
bicycles are the most efficient means of transportation, represent a 
viable commuting alternative to many people, offer mobility at speeds 
as fast as that of cars in urban areas, provide health benefits through 
daily exercise, are relatively inexpensive, and deserve consideration in a 
comprehensive national energy plan." 
In each one of these acts reference is made to national security and, 
in most, some words are devoted to the dangers implicit in interruptable 
oil imports. Yet the Congress did not, in the final analysis, address these 
questions frontally. Under the bill originally passed by the House, pro-
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vision was made, much in accordance with the Carter Energy Bill, for 
an excise tax on price-controlled domestically produced crude oil. The 
tax rate proposed would have increased the price of all U.S. crude oil to 
the world price by 1980. A form of rebate to taxpayer of the net pro-
ceeds of this tax was proposed by the House in line with the president's 
concept of preventing the accrual of windfall profits to the oil produc-
ers. This measure foundered in the Senate. The Senate apparently con-
cluded, in general, that while conservation of oil might be achieved by 
this tax process, no incentives were provided for the domestic produc-
tion of oil which the Senate deemed just as important a national security 
measure as oil conservation. The matter was dropped by mutual agree-
ment of the two chambers. An attempt in the Senate to create an energy 
production, conservation, and conversion trust fund from oil tax reve-
nues likewise failed. Similarly the concept of taxing businesses that use 
oil and gas and providing tax credits for those that desist, although 
proposed in both chambers, in the end found no support. 
The Ninety-fifth Congress adjourned for its final election campaign-
ing, having essentially placed the energy policy ball in the president's 
court. It was left to the president to reopen the oil conservation, produc-
tion, import, and national security issues with the Ninety-sixth Congress. 
As the Ninety-fifth Congress concluded its business, the president 
was left with harsh political choices. Clearly the nation was in no mood 
to listen to talk of an energy crisis. President Carter continued his 
energy silence of 1978 with a minimal reference to energy in his State of 
the Union Address of 1979. 
As to commitments, the president had announced at the previous 
summer's economic summit in Bonn that he would move U.S. oil prices 
to world levels by 1980. And indeed mechanisms were available to do 
this with minimum public reaction. Under existing laws, deregulation of 
crude oil prices could occur at his discretion on 1 June 1979.51 But even 
without deregulation, the application of existing price regulations was 
steadily advancing the U.S. average price of crude oil towards the world 
price level set by OPEC. The diminishing volume of "old" oil regulated 
at about $5.90 per barrel was being displaced progressively by increas-
ing volumes of "new" oil priced close to $13 per barrel, which by 1979 
amounted to nearly three-quarters of the total. 
Thus without lifting controls the president could have approached 
meeting his Bonn commitment with minimum adverse reaction from the 
public and the liberal elements of Congress. In all probability this was 
the thinking of many members of Congress when the oil issue was 
avoided in 1978. But then came Iran-followed by Saudi Arabia. 
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Figure 9.1 OPEC Oil: The Supply/Demand Gap 
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When the Iranian Revolution broke out and the Shah was deposed, 
Iran was producing on the order of 6 mbpd of oil. About 5 million 
barrels of this was exported on the international market plus a modicum, 
along with natural gas, to the Soviet Union. 
During the revolution the Iranian oil fields were shut down. At that 
time the United States was importing from Iran about 700,000 barrels 
per day (directly and indirectly through Caribbean refineries). This 
amounted to about 8 percent of U.S. imports, but the effect of the 
shutdown was not felt in the United States for better than thirty days, 
since the tanker voyage from the Persian Gulf takes at least that long. 
Figure 9.1 is based on a world oil supply/demand chart developed by 
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the CIA in 1977.52 The CIA projection was widely criticized on a variety 
of counts when first published. Its validity, however, seems even firmer 
with the passage of time, all related uncertainties being considered. It 
includes a Soviet demand of 3.5 mbpd for world oil by 1985 that has 
been contested on the grounds that the Soviets can't afford it.53 It also 
includes a contribution from the Mexican oil fields (3.0 to 4.5 mbpd by 
1985) which appears compatible with what can be discerned at this time 
of the geologic, economic, technological, and political aspects of the 
Mexican oil and gas situation. 
The dotted line superimposed on the CIA projections illustrates the 
drawdowns resulting from events in Iran as well as a projection of Saudi 
Arabian production decisions stemming from their probable analysis of 
the Iranian development. 
The essential element of Figure 9.1 is that the "break" upward in 
predictable world oil prices (when demand outruns supply) is not an 
event to be encountered in the 1990s or by our children in the twenty-
first century. Rather it is an eventuality which may be reasonably ex-
pected within the next few years or even the next few months. The 
political situation in Iran in itself is a disturbing event, but its reality 
serves mainly to highlight the fragility of the world oil supply-and-
demand system and to underscore once again that it is an edifice essen-
tially built upon decaying reservoirs owned by unstable regimes. 
The present provisional government of Iran has given clear indi-
cations that Iran would supply neither Israel nor South Africa with oil 
and, of course, she no longer sells oil to us. The United States, by 
executive agreement, is apparently committed to a guarantee of Israel's 
oil needs. Israel formerly received about 40 percent of her oil from Iran. 
But Israel might not be the only claimant on the reduced U.S. oil 
budget. Under the provisions of the International Energy Agreement 
(lEA), all twenty nations involved are committed to share oil resources 
when one or more member nations experience a 7 percent reduction in 
their accustomed supply. 54 The existence of the IEA is acknowledged in 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, but the wording of the 
act makes it clear that Congress abstained from any blanket approval of 
this executive agreement which could impose gasoline (and other) ra-
tioning in the United States because of conditons in a number of foreign 
countries. 
The initial reaction of Saudi Arabia to the Iranian oil situation was to 
help plug the gap by raising her production by approximately 1.5 mbpd. 
At least Saudi Arabian authorities permitted Aramco to do this. Infor-
mation has now appeared suggesting that Saudi Arabia has reconsidered 
the situation and has ordered a reduction in Saudi Arabian production to 
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8.5 or 9.5 mbpd. The technical rationale for this is explained in some 
detail by a staff report to the Subcommittee on International Economic 
Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.55 In summary, 
the higher production rates are perceived as inimical to the long-term 
production capability of Saudi Arabian wells. High production rates 
necessitate flaring natural gas, which the Saudi Arabian government 
desires to reduce as much as possible for obvious reasons. Some over-
production of Saudi Arabian fields may already have occurred. Discov-
ery of new reserves is lagging. The Saudi Arabians have therefore 
relinquished their long-accepted role as moderating price setters for 
world oil through "flood the market" threats--as indicated by the major 
price increases set by OPEC for 1979. Although this was not noted in the 
staff report, some observers believe that an attempt to regain this leader-
ship may be made by Saudi Arabia through modernization and stream-
lining of their oil production facilities. 
On other than technical grounds it may be postulated that the U.S. 
was perceived by the Saudis as more or less ineffectual in dealing with 
the Iranian situation. We may not appear to be the stabilizing factor in 
the Middle East we were once thought to be. This might change if a 
strong U.S. military presence were to be established in the Middle East. 
Conflicting perceptions exist as to the hazards of such a move, how-
ever, and there remains, naggingly, the thought that anything short of 
a major involvement would carry the risk of a "Suez venture," result-
ing in an even less viable U.S. posture. 56 A lead editorial in the English-
language Saudi Arabian Arab News publicly made a point obviously 
made privately to the president much earlier: "It is time Congress 
started making policy for the United States rather than other countries. 
The country has no choice but to cut its standard of waste. It has had 
many years to come to grips with decisions about U.S. energy sources 
with time bought with OPEC oil, and there simply isn't any time left 
for brushing aside questions that may not seem politically palatable. "57 
After assessing the inflationary impact of higher domestic oil prices 
and the countervailing necessity to raise oil prices in order to induce 
conservation as well as to stimulate new production and the develop-
ment of alternative energy resources at home, the president on 5 April 
1979 announced his decision to decontrol oil prices gradually, begin-
ning 1 June 1979. At the same time he asked Congress to pass legisla-
tion that would tax what the president termed windfall profits to be 
reaped by U.S. oil companies: 
Part of this excessive new profit will be totally unearned-what is 
called a "windfall" profit. 
180 Energy and the National Defense 
That is why we must have a new windfall profits tax to recover 
the unearned billions of dollars and to ensure that you-the 
American people-are treated fairly. 58 
The president proposed establishing an Energy Security Fund with 
the proceeds of the windfall profits tax. This fund was to be controlled 
by an Energy Security Board which would "let us pursue a sound 
strategy of energy research and development. " Functions of the board 
were apparently to be to (1) improve automotive and appliance designs, 
(2) improve mass transit, (3) broaden use of coal deposits, (4) promote 
research into ways to use our immense reserves of oil shale, (5) produce 
more gasohol, (6) promote the use of small-scale hydroelectric plants, 
(7) tum increasingly towards solar energy. 
The essential element of the president's speech was the implicit 
acknowledgment that the 1977 National Energy Plan was inadequate in 
that it emphasized conservation to the practical exclusion of energy 
resource development. "Just as we harnessed American dedication and 
brainpower to put men on the moon we will make the same kind of 
massive, purposeful effort to achieve the goal of national energy secu-
rity through technology. " 
The decision made by the president was a courageous one. The 
alternative of coupling a promise to decontrol oil prices with congres-
sional action on a windfall profits tax was available. But to have chosen 
this course would have been to invite a repetition of the endless and 
unproductive congressional debates of 1977 and 1978. As matters stand 
U.S. oil prices will now move steadily towards world oil prices and a 
major uncertainty has been removed from the energy policy arena. As 
Senator Jackson said of the National Energy Act of 1978, however, 
"This is the beginning of a national energy plan. It is no more than 
that. "59 This is a fair assessment when it is realized that gasoline prices 
per se would still remain controlled under the president's new formula. 
The bottom line still remained the perceptions of the American people. 
These perceptions were given a severe jolt in the summer of 1979. 
Shortly before the president's address of 5 April1979 outlining new 
energy initiatives, the Department of Energy issued The National 
Energy Plan II (NEP II) in response to congressional dissatisfaction with 
the original Carter National Energy Plan. Whereas the latter had been 
prepared in careful isolation from the bureaucracy, it is clear that NEP II 
was a product of the bureaucracy benefiting little if at all from White 
House attention and energy thinking. While offering a useful compila-
tion of statistics, NEP II completely missed the thrust of the president's 
new program. More important, it missed by a wide margin the serious-
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ness of the oil price and supply situation that was developing for the 
country. It predicted, for example, that 1990 world oil prices could 
reach $30 per barrel.60 By late summer of 1979 world oil prices were 
about $20 per barrel and spot prices in Rotterdam exceeded $40 per 
barrel. In March 1980 the average landed price in the United States of 
foreign crude oil was $30.75 and the average price of domestic oil had 
reached $16.98.61 Finally NEP n gave no inkling of the problems begin-
ning to be faced by the military in the mobility fuels area. The Defense 
Department was not consulted in its preparation.62 
But the American public was still in no mood for talk of an energy 
crisis.63 When the president launched a new energy initiative in re-
sponse to the Iranian development, the first significant reaction of the 
Congress was to vote down the administration's proposed emergency 
rationing plan which the Congress had ordered prepared in the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. The measure, although passed in 
the Senate, was defeated on 10 May 1979 by a vote of 253 to 159 in the 
House of Representatives. 
And then reality. U.S. refining capacity exceeds domestic produc-
tion by about 7 mbpd-that is, our refineries are dependent upon im-
ports for full production. Whereas Saudi Arabia and other OPEC mem-
bers increased production to help offset the Iranian drawdown, the long 
lead times involved in raising production, transporting the oil, and 
changing refinery allocations resulted in an increasing gasoline shortage 
first in California and then in the Northeast. Some of this may have been 
compounded by inflexible and outdated Department of Energy alloca-
tion procedures. Much of it was precipitated by panic on the part of the 
motoring public, heightened by scare reports by the news media. Also 
involved was the increasing number of vehicles and of licensed drivers. 
The total car, bus, and truck fleet had increased in number from 125.7 
million in 1973 to 143.8 million by 1977, and licensed drivers had 
increased from 121.5 million to 137.9 million in the same period.64 In 
actuality, however, calculations after the fact by the American Petro-
leum Institute and the Department of Energy indicate that only briefly in 
May did the total national gasoline inventory drop below a minimum 
acceptable level which could theoretically be expected to disrupt con-
sumer deliveries and create spot shortages.65 Nevertheless, gasoline 
supplies were well below normal range, and chaotic conditions ensued 
that were seemingly beyond the capacity of the administration, let alone 
the oil companies, to contain. At this juncture OPEC again raised the 
world price of oil. 
As these events occurred, the president was in Tokyo attending a 
summit conference of OECD partners at which energy was a key issue. It 
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was at this point (28 June 1979) that his senior domestic policy aide, 
Stuart Eizenstat, wrote a striking memorandum on the energy situation 
that was leaked to the press and in many ways acted as a catalyst for 
further sweeping changes in the administration's energy planning.66 The 
memorandum was perhaps politically parochial in its tone and surely 
very xenophobic in its view of the villainous role played in our problems 
by OPEC (a position the president was forced to abandon some months 
later).67 Bu(Eizenstat's memorandum clearly made the point that strik-
ing changes, particularly in the area of additional energy development, 
would be necessary if the administration was to retain (or regain) credi-
bility in the eyes of the American public. In a sense the memorandum 
precipitated presidential initiatives that might otherwise have waited 
until after a successful election campaign. 
After a prolonged period of consultation during which one highly 
publicized energy speech was canceled, the president spoke to the na-
tion from the Oval Office on 15 July 1979: 
In little more than two decades we have gone from a position of 
energy independence to one in which almost half the oil we use 
comes from foreign countries, at prices that are going through the 
roof. Our excessive dependence upon OPEC has already taken a 
tremendous toll on our economy and our people. 
This is the direct cause of the long lines which have made 
millions of you spend aggravating hours waiting for gasoline. It is 
a cause of the increased inflation and unemployment that we now 
face. This intolerable dependence upon foreign oil threatens our 
economic independence and the very security of our Nation. 
The energy crisis is real. It is worldwide. It is a clear and 
present danger to our Nation-! am tonight setting a clear goal for 
the energy policy of the United States. Beginning this moment, 
this Nation will never use more foreign oil than we did in 1977-
never.68 
The 15 July speech, perhaps the most eloquent made by the presi-
dent, emphasized an erosion of our confidence in the future that "is 
threatening to destroy the social and political fabric of America. " The 
next day the president followed the speech up with an address to the 
National Association of Counties at Kansas City, Missouri, in which he 
spelled out further details of his new energy approach.69 The following 
twelve-point program was proposed for the next decade in the two 
speeches taken together: 
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1. Annual limits would be placed on oil imports. After some discus-
sion this evolved to a figure of 8.2 mbpd for 1979 with the pros-
pect of a cut to 4 to 5 mbpd by 1990. 
2. A new cabinet-level energy mobilization board would be established 
with far-reaching powers to ensure that procedural, legislative, or 
regulatory actions spurred by environmentalists no longer cause 
extended delays in the creation or expansion of plants, ports, re-
fineries, pipelines, and so forth. 
3. A government-chartered energy security corporation would develop 
a synthetic fuel industry producing at least 2.5 mbpd of oil sub-
stitutes from shale, coal, and biomass. A figure of $88 billion 
was earmarked for this task. 
4. A standby system for rationing gasoline would be prepared. 
5. Each state would be given a target for the reduction of fuel use, 
including gasoline use, within its borders. Failure of a state to act 
would result in federal action. 
6. The ninety-four nuclear power plants now being built or planned 
would be completed. Additional nuclear policies would be an-
nounced after completion of the Three Mile Island investigation. 
7. Owners of homes and commercial buildings would receive interest 
subsidies of $2 billion for extra insulation and conversion of oil 
heating to natural gas. 
8. Utilities would be required to cut their use of oil by half over the 
next ten years. Conversion would be partially financed by grants and 
loan guarantees. 
9. Bus and rail systems would receive $10 billion for improvement, 
while $6.5 billion would be expended to upgrade the gasoline 
efficiency of automobiles. 
10. Low-income groups would receive $2.4 billion each year to offset 
higher energy prices. 
11. The installation of solar energy systems in homes and businesses 
would be subsidized by loans and tax credits. A solar bank would 
be formed. 
12. About $142 billion in federal funds was involved in the Carter Plan 
over the next decade. It was envisioned that most of this money 
would come from an energy-security trust fund financed by a tax 
of about 50 percent on the windfall profits earned by U.S. oil 
companies as price controls are phased out. An additional $5 
billion would be raised through the sale to the public of bonds 
in the energy security corporation dedicated to the development of 
synthetic fuels. 
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Most of the program proposed by the president required legislative 
action by Congress. An exception to this was the limiting of oil imports. 
Under section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the president 
is authorized to adjust imports of "crude oil, crude oil derivatives and 
products" provided that the secretary of the treasury finds that these 
commodities are being imported into the United States in such quantities 
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national secu-
rity. Treasury Secretary William Simon had determined such a condi-
tion to exist as early as 1975 and Michael Blumenthal, the secretary 
under Carter, had strongly reiterated this position on 14 March 1979, in 
the course of submitting a report showing that the proportion of U.S. oil 
imports from the Middle East had risen to 34 percent (from 27 percent in 
1975) with the cost of imports reaching $42.3 billion in 1978.70 
President Carter's proposals may have touched the hearts of the 
American people, but it is certain that they also touched, one way or 
another, upon the nerves of practically every interest group in the 
United States. 
Before its adjournment for the summer recess, the House of Repre-
sentatives had passed the Moorhead Amendment to the Defense Produc-
tion Act, which was about to expire. This amendment, besides per-
petuating the Defense Production Act first passed in 1950, also called 
for the development of synthetic fuels for national security reasons 
through a joint government/industry cooperative effort termed a Syn-
thetic Fuel Corporation. The haste and plurality with which it was 
passed gave clear indication of the reluctance of House members to 
return to their home districts without any energy production action on 
the record during the gasoline crisis. Yet when the president proposed a 
large-scale development of synthetic fuels, practically every environ-
mental group in the country erupted with outrage almost overnight. The 
loudly proclaimed anguish of the oil lobby over the windfall profit tax 
coupled with the repugnance dedicated free-enterprise advocates felt for 
a government-sponsored synthetic fuel industry combined to create an 
atmosphere of congressional consternation. The prospect of an Emer-
gency Mobilization Board which could override state and local laws in 
the interest of energy production exacerbated this situation. 
Vituperation between the houses rose. In discussing an omnibus 
energy bill being sponsored by Senator Henry Jackson, a prominent 
House leader remarked that "Jackson is trying to find out how to make 
pork out of energy. " 
But then came the dramatic and traumatic seizure of the American 
Embassy in Tehran. This event and the president's subsequent decision 
under the Trade Expansion Act to cease importing Iranian oil resulted in 
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energy actions in both houses.71 The president was given authority to 
prepare a new emergency rationing plan. Emergency assistance to the 
poor for heating bills was voted at the level of $1.35 billion. Funds 
amounting to $19 billion dollars were allocated to a government-
sponsored synthetic fuels industry with provision for later increases 
toward the president's requested $88 billion. Action was taken in both 
houses towards creation of an Energy Mobilization Board. The presi-
dent's decision to levy a $4.62 per barrel gasoline conservation fee 
effective 15 March 1980 on imported crude oil intended for gasoline 
production was greeted with hardly a murmur although later a veritable 
firestorm broke out over the action as its election impact became appar-
ent. 
But this spirit of cooperation had a short life. When the Crude Oil 
Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 finally emerged it bore little resem-
blance to the original Carter proposal. In effect it is essentially a revenue 
act. A new excise tax is placed on domestic oil produced after 29 
February 1980. The tax is levied on a portion of the selling price, 
defined as a windfall profit, above a statutorily defined base less a 
portion of state severance taxes. Both the base price and the tax vary 
depending upon the classification of the oil into one of three tiers. Sixty 
percent of the first $227.7 billion collected from this tax (and 66 2/3 
percent thereafter) are to be placed in a special Treasury account ear-
marked for future (unspecified) personal and corporate income tax re-
duction. Individual taxpayer credits for sun, wind, and geothermal 
property installed on a principal residence are raised to 40 percent of the 
first $10,000 spent. Equipment for generating electricity by solar or 
geothermal means is also included. Credits for businesses that invest in 
sun, wind, and geothermal equipment are raised from 10 percent to 15 
percent. There are also income tax incentives for small-scale hydroelec-
tric facilities and cogeneration equipment. Significantly the four cents 
per gallon excise tax exemption for gasohol is extended from 1985 to 
1992. This may stimulate investment in gasohol plants. Tax exempt 
bonds are authorized for issuance by state and local governments for 
renewable energy projects, for some hydroelectric projects, and for 
energy projects producing steam, electricity, or alcohol from solid 
wastes. Synthetic fuel production is ignored. Domestic crude oil pro-
duction incentives are not discussed. 
Basically the compromise Windfall Profit Tax Act demonstrated a 
"first things first" approach probably indicating a surge in congres-
sional interest in oncoming 1980 reelection prospects and a correspond-
ing diminution of interest in the energy problem. The president signed 
the act matter-of-factly. The oil industry apart from conventionally ex-
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pected rhetoric had little to say. Their rising profits on imported oil 
would have considerably raised their taxes anyhow and the act stipulates 
that the windfall profit tax is deductible as a business expense for 
income tax purposes. 
As of late April 1980 it seemed that three major energy issues logi-
cally remained as unfinished business before the Ninety-sixth Congress. 
The first was the Jackson omnibus energy bill incorporating a Synthetic 
Fuel Corporation. At that stage of Senate-House negotiations between 
the thirty-five senators and twenty-three representatives on the confer-
ence committee there was the concept that in the early months, after 
passage of the bill, while a Synthetic Fuel Corporation is being formed, 
the Defense Department would have the responsibility under the ex-
tended Defense Production Act of 1950 for pushing the development of 
synthetic fuels. The second issue was the matter of the Emergency 
Mobilization Board for expediting energy projects. The third issue con-
cerned the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. What is done legislatively with 
these issues will have a profound effect on the energy situation of the 
United States for the remainder of the decade, but congressional action 
of the moment will inexorably be fixed on the elections of 1980 in 
November and a very uncertain perception of how the American public 
views the energy question. Gasoline use dropped appreciably in early 
1980; oil imports were somewhat reduced during 1979 and so far con-
tinue their downward trend in 1980. Does the voting American think, 
from media reports of these events, that the energy problem is now in 
hand? Or does he or she perceive that recession factors are at work? 
Does the public perceive a connection? 
Best estimates in Washington seem to be that the Jackson Act will 
emerge from the conference committee and, in one form or another, will 
be voted on favorably in both houses. It seems that whatever emerges 
will probably be signed by the president. At least that appears to be the 
opinion in the energy industries where, for example, Exxon is hastily 
making arrangements to acquire shale oil production rights. How effec-
tive an act this will be-both in its language and in its subsequent 
implementation over the years-remains to to be seen. Its opponents 
will not relinquish their combat after it is signed by the president. 
Similarly it is believed in congressional staff circles that a com-
promise will be reached on the Emergency Mobilization Board bill and 
that a proposed law will be forwarded for the president's signature. The 
opinion is expressed that, as in the case of the Jackson bill, the president 
will probably sign whatever the Congress presents; his reelection pros-
pects are intertwined with those of his colleagues on Capitol Hill. But 
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how effective the bill will be when implemented is necessarily indeter-
minate. And the bill may fail. 
The last issue, that of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, is likewise far 
from a straightforward matter. This reserve, despite the mandate of the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, is not being filled by the 
administration. The reasons are both economic and geopolitical, and 
their logic changes with the beholder. During a year when much atten-
tion is being given to balancing the budget there is the hope that the 
costs of filling the reserve can be deferred for a while without danger of 
another embargo or oil supply interruption due to war. The Office of 
Management and Budget and the White House staff are quite capable 
of insulating themselves, and perhaps the president, from the harsher 
realities of world affairs. Secondly, there is no longer any reasonable 
doubt but that many members of OPEC including, probably, Saudi 
Arabia, our major supplier, have given indications that they do not want 
the reserve filled and are prepared to take punitive oil delivery measures 
if it is. Such measures, besides outright embargo, could include price 
rises or production cutbacks or both. The view of the OPEC oil producers 
is, presumably, that their political leverage on U.S. foreign policy 
would be diminished by the existence of a substantial strategic oil re-
serve. On the other hand, from the U.S. viewpoint, there are sound and 
cogent national security reasons for the establishment of this reserve. By 
insisting on the reserve being filled promptly, the Congress would be in 
the position in the eyes of the public of faithfully discharging its duties 
without having to suffer much of the opprobrium likely to follow in a 
secondary fashion from its actions. In an election year, given the uneasy 
relationship between the Congress and the present chief executive, this 
appears to be almost irresistible bait. A painful choice would be pre-
sented to the campaigning president should Congress pass a bill to this 
effect or include it as a rider in other important energy legislation. 
In summation, while still responding to long-established congres-
sional mores, the members of the Ninety-sixth Congress have given 
indications that they are at least beginning to appreciate the dimensions 
of the enormous threat posed to our polity by the energy situation. As 
we move into the decade of the eighties the question before the Con-
gress and before presidential aspirants will be How close are these 
perceptions of a threat matched by those of the American people? 
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Conclusion 
Our energy situation as it relates to national security is considerably 
starker than suggested by the major energy analyses published during 
1979.1 These studies-by the Harvard Business School, by the Ford 
Foundation Study Group, by Resources for the Future, and by govern-
ment agencies-combine to indicate that through conservation and a 
gradual transition to renewable energy resources we can maintain our 
polity more or less in its present condition and that we can expect to 
emerge in the twenty-first century unscathed, productive, and energy-
autonomous. 
These analyses tend to deal with energy in the aggregate and to 
ignore our inability to substitute freely one source of energy for another. 
Since our total resources do offer much hope in the gross sense, the 
result is an optimistic assessment that overlooks both the substitution 
problem and the tangled thicket of legal, ideological, technological, 
economic, and political difficulties through which energy decisions 
must move. The difficulties beset decisions in both the public and the 
private sector, on both the domestic and the international scene. 
The paradox confronting us is that these problems cannot be rapidly 
overcome without Draconian measures by government which, in view 
of technological uncertainties, may tum out to be less than optimum or 
even plain wrong-while in the meantime the time available for deci-
sive steps arrived at through consensus becomes less and less. Within 
this paradox lies the full potential for chaos at home and disaster abroad. 
In general the studies listed above minimize the need for expediting 
the production of synthetic fuels and accept as inevitable a growing 
dependence upon worldwide oil resources for the next two decades. 
These conclusions do not square with the developing realities highlight-
ed for us by Iran. The oil producers of the world are increasingly aware 
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that theirs is a dwindling resource to be husbanded carefully. Their 
incentive to pump less oil faster, rather than more oil slower, is almost 
nonexistent. Their confidence in the United States as a protector is 
vanishing. As long as the United States persists in its voracious con-
sumption of oil on a worldwide basis, the less there remains for others, 
the less time there remains for the existence of an oil economy, and the 
less time there remains for transition to a new energy base--{)r, more 
probably, to new energy bases. 
The United States, with 6 percent of the world's population, now 
consumes 30 percent of the world's oil. One out of every nine barrels of 
oil used in the world each day is burned as gasoline on American 
highways. This is noted and resented by friends and foes alike. The 
studies mentioned, as well as recent studies by Denis Hayes and Barry 
Commoner, assume that we will be able to survive in this rising sea of 
resentment without scathe or energy-interruptions.2 The research con-
ducted in support of this book indicates otherwise. Our conclusion is 
that the 1980s will be a decade of energy traumas frequently involving 
the risk of war. 
The events of the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath underscore for 
us that our oil supplies from the Middle East are not to be relied upon. 
Our national security demands that we expedite means of divorcing 
ourselves from our present acute dependence upon this source of oil. To 
fail to do so is to invite domestic chaos, war, or both. Two immediate 
means for the improvement of our situation are at our disposal. The first 
is petroleum conservation on a scale and to an extent not yet generally 
contemplated. The second is the rapid large-scale development of syn-
thetic mobility fuels. This latter move is dictated by the fact that conser-
vation alone cannot solve our problem and that the development of other 
energy resources does not promise immediate help in fulfilling transpor-
tation needs. In only a long-range sense can our energy policy focus on 
dependence upon renewable resources. 
The U.S. transportation system is almost completely premised on the 
availability of liquid hydrocarbons. A singular aspect of this system is 
short-range and long-range mobility for individuals. This individual 
mobility has a great deal to do with domestic satisfaction within the 
American system. It permits a plurality of choice and individual 
decision-making that is unequaled in the world. It has much to do with 
the success of the social, economic, and political schema of this coun-
try. It is very wasteful in energy terms, but it is to be departed from only 
with the greatest caution and the most careful search for alternatives. 
Mass transportation along fixed routes is not in itself an entirely satisfac-
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tory substitute in our current economy for the freedom of movement 
provided by the private automobile and short-haul truck along well-
maintained and extensive roadways. 
Our mobile military apparatus on the ground, in the air, and on the 
seas, with the exception of nuclear-powered submarines, is almost 
completely dependent upon petroleum-based fuel. The mobility of 
weapons systems now being designed for the twenty-first century is in 
the main dependent upon the availability of petroleum. Should war 
come as a result of our energy posture, we have shown in this book that 
energy deprivations might be visited upon the civil sector considerably 
beyond those of our historic experience. Efforts to mitigate this prospect 
have been minimal. The Defense Department has tested the use of 
synthetic fuels derived from coal and shale oiP but has not taken the 
position that the rapid development of these domestic resources is vital 
to the national defense, being content to rely upon their development as 
part of a normal societal evolution.4 Meanwhile the Defense Depart-
ment relies upon foreign sources for about 22 percent of its peacetime 
petroleum requirements. In recent years this figure has been as high as 
62 percent.5 
The Department of Defense occupies an anomalous position with 
respect to mobility fuels. Institutionally it is not in a position to advocate 
broad legislative measures which could entail the expenditure of public 
funds for the anticipated sinews of war. To do so would be to invite 
drastic and unwelcome changes to the structure of the always hotly 
contested defense budget. The department, therefore, emphasizes con-
servation in its energy planning. This in itself is a significant element in 
the national energy picture because whereas the department uses only 
about 2 percent of the total energy budget in peacetime, it is neverthe-
less, presently the largest single consumer of energy in the United 
States. Additionally, energy conservation measures ranging from the 
more efficient burning of coal to novel solar energy applications and 
improved utility rate procedures can be initiated and evaluated more 
rapidly and more efficiently within the structured confines of military 
bases than in civilian towns of the same size. These efforts, undertaken 
with the extended cooperation of the Department of Energy, are benefi-
cial and extremely important. They should not obscure the fact, how-
ever, that much of the 8 percent reduction in energy use achieved by the 
Department of Defense since 1975 reflects real reductions in the oper-
ations of ships, aircraft, and military ground vehicles. 6 In the case of the 
navy it represents essentially a halving of the number of warships in 
commission. In a very serious sense the energy conservation efforts of 
the Department of Defense serve to underscore the mobility fuel prob-
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lem rather than to solve it. Certainly our ability to wage energy wars is 
affected. The 100,000-man quick reaction force being discussed in 
Washington is by no means an adequate substitute for the ability to 
control the sea-lanes of the world. The technology of transportation has 
not changed drastically since Vietnam. Oil in quantity is deliverable 
only by sea from the Middle East. 
Concerning the matter of energy wars, the popular conception has 
been that of a lightning raid upon oil fields followed by forceful adjudi-
cation which restores oil flow to the United States on favorable terms. 
That this is a naive oversimplification is one of the messages of this 
book. Raids on oil fields cannot be counted upon to result in productive 
capacity. And raids of this sort in the Middle East, where the bulk of 
world oil reserves lie, must take into account the reaction of the Soviet 
Union. More recently the question has arisen as to how to prevent a 
Soviet occupation of the oil lands. 
Some readers of this book undoubtedly will conclude at this point 
that much ado is being made about nothing. The threat of war, they will 
point out, particularly the threat of war directly involving forces of the 
Soviet Union and those of the United States, has never been lower, 
because of our balance of strategic nuclear armaments. Detente, it will 
be argued, will return again despite Afghanistan. Further, it will be 
pointed out, the dependence of the United States upon the world oil 
market is a healthy circumstance in a world where none can suffer 
without causing harm to all others. The Soviet Union and her satellites, 
in spite of temporary setbacks, are increasingly and beneficially per-
ceived as part of the international system. 
Other readers may conclude otherwise. For them the Soviet Union 
and her satellites are essentially removed from the international eco-
nomic system and relatively invulnerable to sanctions. For this group 
the idea that no conflicts between us and the Soviet Union are credible 
other than a vast intercontinental exchange of nuclear weapons is a 
dubious and dangerous assumption. They will point out that under such 
an assumption the Soviet Union could forcefully or, more probably, 
more or less peacefully, gain practical dominion over the Strait of 
Hormuz now controlled essentially by Iran. Should this occur, the 
Soviet Union could become master of Western Europe and Japan 
through control of oil shipments and at the same time acquire the capa-
bility of exerting substantial control of the United States. This thinking, 
of course, was reflected in President Carter's State of the Union Mes-
sage to Congress in January 1980 when he pointed out the strategic 
significance of the region threatened by the Soviet troops in Afghanis-
tan. The president made the specific point: "Let our position be abso-
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lutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests 
of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, 
including military force. "7 
In the same address the president stressed that the collective efforts 
of Free World allies and the participation of those who rely on oil from 
the Middle East were demanded to meet the situation. In response to a 
nonmilitary coup by the Soviet Union in the Middle East this uniting of 
the allies would be hard to achieve and support for presidential interven-
tion might not be readily forthcoming at home. In his Persian Gulf tour 
in March of 1980, President Giscard d 'Estaing reportedly stressed the 
need for the states of the region to look to their own defenses against 
Moscow.8 Concerning a direct military threat to the Free World's oil 
production, transportation, and delivery system, only the United States 
is in a position to interpose its forces effectively on a sustained basis and 
with the possibility of Soviet reaction. As Klaus Knorr has pointed out 
concerning our allies: 
The military forces they maintain have only a minimum capacity 
for engagement beyond their posture for deterrence and defense. 
They seem content, furthermore, to rely upon the United States 
for their security to a much greater degree than is necessitated by 
their limited material resources.9 
Without collective response, the U.S. ability to intervene successfully 
against a Soviet military thrust into the Persian Gulf area must be 
considered minimal at the present time. 
If indeed the risk of energy wars is increasing, there is reason to 
believe that our capacity to prosecute such wars successfully may be 
decreasing. This change may be the composite product of our increasing 
dependence upon imported oil, the resulting debasement of our cur-
rency, and our diminishing strength in conventional, particularly naval, 
arms. 
Our reliance on imported oil must be diminished for national security 
reasons at the same time that we enhance our ability to protect the 
imports that we need. If we do have enemies, the mid-1980s could 
become our most dangerous period. Our vulnerability would be highest, 
yet there would be prospects of its decreasing. Our vulnerability would 
be ripe to take advantage of our transitory weakness. 
Heavy dependence upon imported oil for national energy needs 
brings with it, inexorably, the threat of war and the need for security 
measures. Measures to reduce such energy dependence tend to reduce 
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the need for security forces as well as to lessen the threat of war. These 
factors act and react one upon the other in their claims for attention and 
money. Similarly the issues of whether to conserve energy or to develop 
new resources are debated in adversary fashion while in reality our 
situation demands both approaches. 
But for all our discussion of war, the energy situation also substan-
tially affects the internal security of our society. In our attempt to make 
a transition from an oil-based economy we face grave problems which 
must be solved with a speed not required in earlier shifts from one 
energy-base to another. 
Those earlier transitions in our national energy base were accom-
plished at a leisurely pace allowing ample time for societal adaptation 
and the evolution of technologies and supporting infrastructure appro-
priate to our desires and circumstances. In each instance, the changes 
took place without much government planning largely in response to the 
"invisible hand" influence of the market. Nor were the associated 
technologies directly supported in their development by the government 
except in the case of nuclear power. But this is not to say that energy 
was not publicly subsidized. It always has been. 
Apparently our next energy transition must be the acute and direct 
concern of government. This situation results from the limited 
availability of domestic oil and the limited time available for our next 
energy-base transition, as well as from our vulnerability during the 
transition. It also stems from the fact that unconsciously we, as a 
people, tend increasingly to view energy as a public good. This is to say 
that the public expectation is that "the government" will ensure a supply 
of energy at "reasonable" prices. The merits of this expectation are not 
debated; it is merely posited. 
In Figure 3 .4 it was shown that federal spending in the area of energy 
research and development considerably exceeds that of private corpora-
tions and the various state governments. It is worth our while to exam-
ine the trend of what has been happening in the area of relative public 
and private control of our energy future. Figure 10.1 shows the shifting 
relationship of private versus public expenditures for energy research 
and development in the United States. This curve illustrates that if 
energy is not now, it is nevertheless rapidly becoming, a public good in 
the minds of the American public. Reducing the curve to deflated 1973 
dollars emphasizes the point. Current government expenditures for 
energy research and development exceed $3 billion per year. 10 
Generally speaking, the public expected the government to do some-
thing about the gasoline situation during the Arab oil embargo of 
1973-1974. And so it did, despite the probably correct argument that 
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Figure 10.1 Migration of Private versus Public Expend-
itures for Energy Research and Development 
in the United States, 1973-1975 
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what it did compounded the problem. 11 But the measures to allocate fuel 
supplies taken in those years were predicated upon a return to the status 
quo in fuel supply, if not fuel price, once the emergency had passed. 
The next major step in government response to fuel deprivation is 
inevitably rationing. This is generally regarded as necessary to preserve 
equity of distribution and to prevent political turmoil when the duration 
of the emergency becomes extended. Rationing also generally involves 
price controls if they have been lifted in the interim. In this regard the 
Congress has again instructed the president to prepare a stand-by 
gasoline rationing plan and has voted against the decontrol of gasoline 
prices. 12 
Looking over the world oil situation, especially in the light of Middle 
Eastern instability, and considering the dim prospects for increased 
domestic production, voluntary conservation, voluntary changes in 
life-styles, or heavy imports from Mexico, my personal conclusion is 
that periods of gasoline rationing will become a fact of American life 
during the 1980s. Whether we believed the president or not in 1977, we 
may, in fact, during the 1980s, experience something like the "moral 
equivalent of war" even if no military operations occur. 13 
The Iranian experience gives us some insight on what may lie ahead. 
At this writing the president has decreed that no Iranian oil will be 
imported into this country while U.S. citizens are held hostage. The 
revolutionary government of Iran has, in turn, decreed that no Iranian 
oil will be sold to American companies. The net deficit in oil imports for 
the United States amounts to about 700,000 barrels per day or 8 percent 
of our imports. Until recently this has presented little hardship to Iran, 
because she could sell the oil formerly shipped to the U.S. elsewhere. 
But if our allies in Western Europe and Japan respond to our requests to 
institute sanctions against Iran, their oil trade with that country may also 
be stopped. This could result in an enormous financial loss to Iran with 
the concomitant effect of driving her into more or less permanent trade 
arrangements with the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe. 
In this case Iran's oil would be effectively lost to the West. Table 10.1 
gives a breakdown of Iranian oil distribution according to CIA sources in 
1978. Current output is thought to be about 1 mbpd less. It is prob-
lematical whether Saudi Arabia and her neighbors could make up the 
deficit involved. The maximum pumping rates in the oil-producing 
countries are closely guarded secrets. The maximum sustainable rate for 
Saudi Arabia is thought to be about 10. 5 mbpd on the basis of state-
ments made by Clifton C. Garvin, Jr., chairman of the Exxon Corpora-
tion, one of the Aramco partners. 14 
But of equal likelihood is the cessation of oil production in, say, 
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Table 10.1 
DISPOSITION OF IRANIAN OIL, 1978 
(in Barrels per Day) 
Western Europe 
W. Germany 
Netherlands 
Italy 
France 
Britain 
Spain 
Other 
United States 
Japan 
Canada 
Domestic consumption 
347,000 
325,000 
294,000 
209,000 
185,000 
173,000 
520,000 
2,053,000 
771,000 
852,000 
llO,OOO 
1,459,000 
Libya (2 mbpd) in support of Iran's struggles or in similar anarchy. And 
for that matter, Iran may collapse as an entity altogether through internal 
political turmoil, occupation of Soviet troops or both. Saudi Arabia, the 
key oil producer, is not considered to be immune from internal dissen-
sion. Iraq is prone to adventuring. 
The instabilites of the Middle East in general and of the present 
government of Iran in particular indicate that we and our OECD allies 
should prepare for periodic oil supply reductions of several million 
barrels a day as a norm during the 1980s. This possibility, which is 
largely a political factor, is overlaid by the consideration that the known 
oil producers may already have peaked physically in their delivery 
capability. This was the conclusion of the latest report of the World 
Energy Conference held in Calgary, Alberta, in November 1979. 15 
These considerations form the backdrop for the Sawhill report entitled 
"Oil Shortage Contingency Planning," which notes that "the events of 
the past year and current market trends have increased the probability of 
chronic or sudden interruptions of oil supplies in the coming months as 
well as further price increases. "16 
The general point here is that we will probably not be able to increase 
oil imports on the basis of a swelling foreign supply. The only way to 
meet burgeoning demand created by demographic factors and rising 
social expectations in the United States is to institute sharp conservation 
methods while at the same time pushing the rapid development of syn-
thetic mobility fuels. 
The conservation efforts most probably will evolve into some com-
bination of state and federal fiat (such as gasoline rationing and tax 
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rebates for insulation) and an array of price inducements (such as the 
increases in gasoline prices, a heavy tax on gasoline, or both). But in 
establishing a conservation pattern in our energy use, it will be of the 
utmost importance that we proceed with consummate caution since we 
really do not understand the complexities of the relationship between 
economic growth and energy use. Given clumsy methods, we might 
unnecessarily "embargo" ourselves-with disastrous consequences. 
This is particularly the case in the energy-for-transportation area which 
is our most vulnerable energy consideration at present. 
The development of synthetic fuels on a large scale is therefore seen 
as complementary to a conservation program, not as a substitute or 
alternative. Of the various possible domestic fuel sources which might 
produce synthetic mobility fuels, we have, in this book, chosen to fasten 
on gasohol, liquefied coal, and shale oil. Tar sands were given little 
consideration since the most significant tar sand deposits in North 
America lie in Canada. Similarly, heavy oils were discussed only briefly 
because their recovery is viewed as a natural extended responsibility of 
the conventional petroleum industry-and the greatest deposits of this 
resource are to be found in Venezuela where full development is not 
expected within the decade. 
At this writing the president has recommended an $88 billion pro-
gram to develop 2.5 mbpd of synthetic fuels by 1990. In view of the 
risks posed by our acute dependence of 8 mbpd upon unreliable imports, 
this must be regarded as a minimum endeavor. Yet currently the Con-
gress is debating a synthetic fuel program to be funded at a level of 
about $20 billion. Although this figure may be increased as the years 
pass it still indicates that we are probably considering action that is too 
little, too late. This is said even though it has been estimated that 
implementation of the president's full program within ten years would 
possibly require up to 50 percent of our entire production capacity in the 
construction industry .17 Of such urgency is our present energy situation. 
Many of the opponents of a synthetic fuel industry have opposed it 
on environmental grounds. It is not generally recognized that the use of 
coal to provide synthetic fuels results in considerably less of an insult to 
the environment than does the direct use of coal in electric power 
production. 18 And even though up to 25 percent of the coal's intrinsic 
energy may be lost in converting to synthetic fuels, this use of coal is 
still more economical in terms of thermal efficiency than is its use for 
the production of electricity--even considering the high efficiency of 
electricity in end-point application. 19 The "greenhouse effect" must be 
considered here too, but it is very uncertain which would release more 
carbon dioxide-the increased direct use of coal or the use of additional 
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coal to provide synthetic fuels. Stephen Schneider of the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research at Boulder, Colorado, and George 
Woodwell of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute have testified 
against the advisability of a large-scale synthetic fuel program before 
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the grounds that U.S. 
efforts in this direction will cause widespread emulation in less-
developed countries thus increasing worldwide pollution.20 Siegenthaler 
and Oescher of the University of Bern take a more down-to-earth view 
of the problem but warn that by the tum of the century, "new 
technologies would have to take over a substantial part of global energy 
production. "21 
Thus, again, an uncertainty factor is introduced into the energy equa-
tion: while it seems that synthetic fuels must be exploited for security 
reasons during the next two decades, we are not relieved of the burden 
of simultaneously working towards an energy regimen employing other 
than fossil fuels. This emphasizes the necessity for research on photo-
voltaic cells and commercialization of direct solar and related energy 
usage on a broad scale. It also suggests that nuclear power, via the 
breeder reactor, may not safely be discarded. The whole spectrum of 
energy resources must be exploited as a major preoccupation of our 
society if we are to preserve it. Above all, our transportation system 
must be the focus for intense efforts in energy research for both domes-
tic and national defense reasons. 
The synthetic fuel problem and the means being developed to solve it 
work directly at the nexus of a cherished if not always realistic Ameri-
can concept of the free enterprise system. The Synthetic Fuel Corpora-
tion proposed by the president and now being debated by the Congress 
would put the government into the business of supplying energy. Thus 
not only does it draw opposition from the environmental groups; it also 
disturbs conservatives dogmatically opposed to involvement by the 
government in any of the means of industrial production. Doctrinaire 
objections of this sort have been submerged in times of crisis before, 
however. The synthetic rubber industry was created by the government 
during World War II when natural rubber supplies were cut off. In fact, 
the synthetic rubber example was seized upon in the spring of 1979 
when serious debates began as to the merits and demerits of synthetic 
fuels and their government sponsorship. 
Paul R. Ignatius, Eugene Zuckert, and Lloyd N. Cutler joined forces 
in June 1979 to write an article in the Washington Post urging the 
creation of a joint private/public "Petroleum Reserve Corporation" to 
produce up to five mbpd of synthetic oii.22 As analogies they cited the 
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government-owned synthetic rubber plants financed during World War 
II by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the aluminum and steel 
plants financed during the same period by the Defense Plants Corpora-
tion, and the aluminum, copper, and nickel development efforts given 
market-guarantee contracts by the General Services Administration dur-
ing the Korean War. 
W. W. Rostow had pointed out earlier that, contrary to popular 
conceptions, public and private industrial cooperation is "the sort of 
thing we have done well in this country from the time the Jefferson 
Administration gave Eli Whitney a contract for guns with interchange-
able parts down through construction of the long distance railways to 
Project Apollo. "23 But it must be admitted that in each case an emer-
gency or at least unusual pressure was felt to stimulate this cooperation. 
An emergency exists today. Because of the construction time in-
volved, development of synthetic fuel facilities after the fact of hos-
tilities would be of little help. Although it can probably be demonstrated 
that eventually synthetic fuels might be cheaper than oil at the world 
price,24 it remains an inescapable fact that, at the moment, imported 
petroleum is cheaper and our oil companies, for the time being, have a 
great deal of this oil to sell at high profits. There is little incentive, 
therefore, for the most capable and richly endowed of American oil 
firms to go heavily into the realm of synthetics as a purely private 
venture. To do so would be entirely alien to the ethos of relatively 
short-term goals that characterizes American business enterprises.25 
Therefore, if mobility fuels are to be in assured supply in this country 
for security reasons, the government must take steps to speed their 
production. 
The Energy Mobilization Board proposed by the president to expe-
dite the permits for new energy facilities is also being hotly debated in 
Congress. At risk in the eyes of many is the basic concept of federal 
government with practical autonomy of state and local governments. On 
11 September 1979 the National Association of Counties, the National 
League of Cities, the National Governors' Association, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
sent a telegram to all members of the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce. Here it was stated: "All of our organizations 
support the concept of an Energy Mobilization Board and support ex-
pediting the federal permitting process .... However, we strongly op-
pose allowing this appointed federal body to override state and local 
substantive law. '•26 
Thus the expediting potential of an Energy Mobilization Board may 
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be quite minimal in practice if our polity is to be preserved in its present 
form. But will the board have any real value if it does not have authority 
to override obstructionist state and local law in certain cases? 
While energy conservation and synthetic fuel production are being 
debated, the whole concept of the national strategic oil stockpile, 
another basic factor in energy security, is in jeopardy. The strategic 
reserve program was initiated in 1975 under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 197 5. When President Carter took office in 1977 he 
announced his intention to double the planned size of the strategic 
reserve to one billion barrels by 1985. From its inception the reserve has 
been plagued by problems and cost-overruns. Instead of a planned 250 
million barrels in storage by the end of 1978, a mere 70 million barrels 
had been placed in the salt domes designated as storage receptacles. 
Until the summer of 1979 no means e,xisted to remove the oil if needed. 
Foreign purchases for the reserve have now ceased and the stockpile 
stands at about 94 million barrels. Both oil-producing nations and 
America's allies in the West have reportedly been pressuring the admin-
istration to abandon the world oil market permanently as a basic source 
for the strategic reserve so as to avoid any more upward pressure on 
world oil prices.27 Apparently the administration is now considering 
filling the stockpile slowly from domestic sources; probably from the 
Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve.28 The irony of shifting oil from 
federally owned oil fields to federally leased caverns is simply that in 
the midst of this transfer the basic needs of the Defense Department, for 
which the oil fields were exploited in the first place, are being ne-
glected. Reserves directly available to the armed services now stand at 
about 92 million barrels or a 10- to 14-day emergency supply. 29 
On the face of it, it would appear that the acute oil dependence of the 
United States is a dangerous condition from which we should extricate 
ourselves as rapidly as possible and at whatever cost. Here some readers 
will demur, noting that undue haste probably need not be a cornerstone 
of our energy transition policy. Using "their" oil saves "ours. " It will 
be pointed out that news reports in 1978 emphasized increasing and un-
expected worldwide oil supplies. U.S. News & World Report discussed 
the spate of expert opinions which reject theories of scarcity in oil 
supplies.3° Contemporaneously Newsweek and the National Geo-
graphic described prospects for a new gas bonanza in this country. 31 
Concerning the optimism engendered about oil supplies, it must be 
recognized that the new finds in Mexico, for instance, would only 
extend by perhaps a decade the still predictable era of oil scarcity. It 
cannot be supposed that much oil found in a China struggling towards 
modernization will be sold to propel automobiles in the United States. 
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Sales might be made to Japan to ensure solidarity in the Far East against 
the Soviet Union. As concerns U.S. national security, it is well to 
remember that these finds are in the main outside the United States. In 
general for technological reasons they also seem to guarantee continu-
ously rising oil prices in the 1980s. In an article published in Mideast 
Events during November of 1978, the marked fall-off in discoveries of 
the so-called super-giant oil fields in the last decade was discussed. The 
author of the article analyzed a CIA study on giant oil field discoveries 
done by the Rand Corporation and a U.S. Department of Energy study 
performed by Petroleum Economics, Ltd., of London: "What both 
studies seem to be doing is to put some of the smaller finds of recent 
years into perspective, deflate the euphoria which surrounds them, and 
bring people face to face with the real likelihood of a very tight supply 
situation in the 1980s. "32 
So, again, U.S. national security remains at risk and, as before, the 
national security or vulnerability of the United States are major factors 
in the security or vulnerability of the Free World from either economic 
or military perspectives. 
As to the natural gas finds, one can certainly hope that increased 
supplies will act to reduce dependence upon imported oil somewhat. 
Gas is not entirely substitutable for oil, however, and there are 
additional considerations. Most of the gas bonanza predictions are based 
on economic projections after 1985 when price ceilings have expired. 
In some cases they are based on technological advances yet to mate-
rialize. No drastic alteration in the national security aspects of our 
energy situation can be expected in the short term. 
One effect of the recent euphoria over the passage of the so-called 
National Energy Act of 1978 and of the press's optimistic view of 
energy supplies was to reinforce the spirit of energy complacency al-
ready abroad in this country. This complacency has been shaken by the 
events of Iran, but given any temporary improvement in our energy 
situation it will reemerge. There are a number of basic energy questions 
with which we still grapple, however, and with which we will continue 
to grapple during the 1980s. 
Since money is a limiting factor in development of new energy 
sources and in the movement away from dependence upon dwindling oil 
and gas, how we raise and spend the money becomes a matter for 
serious debate. Conservatives claim that price increases will achieve 
desired results; liberals question that the money thus raised would in fact 
be spent on energy development per se. Taxation in itself, on the other 
hand, does not necessarily achieve energy development either. Tax 
money always has multiple demands placed on it. And conservatives 
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question the ability of the public sector to achieve energy development 
economically, efficiently, or at all. 
The public bureaucracy does have a proclivity for the building of 
institutions on a scale and of a durability unrelated to their productivity. 
Yet our data suggest that to achieve a goal of reasonable energy secu-
rity, public money will be required above and beyond what can be 
amassed in the private sector. What is the solution? 
If price is to be a determining factor in energy conservation within 
the United States, how is social equity affected? How do we ensure that 
price increases do not place an intolerable burden upon those sectors of 
the population least able to carry its weight and most likely to revolt 
against perceived oppression? Are we heading back toward the riots and 
destruction that plagued our cities in the late 1960s? 
If taxation is used to achieve energy conservation and energy de-
velopment, social equity is again involved, but the question also arises: 
"How are regional discrimination and hardship avoided?" The present 
distribution of oil and gas in this country is such that some regions are 
almost entirely dependent upon imports. Left to oil company arrange-
ments, New England's sea-delivered fuel comes from abroad, not from 
our Gulf Coast. Or it may come from Alaska through the Panama Canal. 
But the oil companies are not solely to blame here. We have also 
environmental quarrels over the running of west-to-east pipelines--and 
always, always the regulations of multiple layers of government. Can 
these problems be resolved in a timely manner? Will the democratic 
process be preserved? 
Must energy and environmental demands be compromised? Ours is a 
very "high energy" society. Increases in energy production by fossil 
fuels will inevitably have a deleterious impact on the environment. 
Increase in energy production by nuclear reactors could have a serious 
adverse environmental impact. Even large-scale solar energy develop-
ments for electric power generation could significantly affect land use. 
Must the western states be land-raped to provide electricity for New 
York City? What is their return? Can arm-chair environmentalists in 
California block energy developments in Colorado where citizens want 
the jobs? 
Are conservation and economic soundness compatible? In recent 
history, the "Growth of Energy Use" curve has followed that of the 
GNP. There is a debate over whether this need be the case. Is the GNP an 
accurate indicator of what we want in our society? Conservation per se 
reduces money needs for new energy sources, reduces pollution, re-
duces dependence upon imports--but exactly what does it do to em-
ployment and productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors? 
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Will, or can, or need our population accept a large-scale substitution 
of manual labor for energy use? Is small beautiful when you have to live 
it? 
How is industrial energy efficiency achieved? How is agricultural 
efficiency achieved in a total food-delivery sense? How is transportation 
energy efficiency assured? Will higher prices force further conservation 
in these energy-intensive areas? If they do, will industrial cut-backs and 
job lay-offs occur? Will food production drop and food prices soar? 
Are our citizens who oppose energy development at horne willing to 
enlist in a war for energy resources abroad? What are the trade-offs 
between an ability to fight abroad and resolving our problems at horne? 
What time scale is really determinant in our energy situation? What 
priority must be given to immediate stopgaps as opposed to possibly 
wiser and, in any case, cheaper long-term solutions? 
What are the alternative societal impacts of a high-technology energy 
approach as compared to a low-technology approach? Are they neces-
sarily exclusive? Can we not find a pragmatic middle path? 
The answers to these questions and others like them are presently 
indeterminate. We are groping for them through a prolonged, inchoate, 
adversary process which is the essence of democracy. The ideological 
issues implicit in these questions are sharp and bear upon the very 
meaning of democracy. It is only the political history of the past two 
hundred years that gives us encouragement to believe that while prag-
matic compromise is distasteful, solutions are yet to be found where the 
democratic process is preserved and a de facto dictatorship avoided. 
Time plays an essential role in this. If time is available to resolve many 
of the uncertainities faced by our society in the energy arena, an orderly 
transition of our energy base may be achieved. If this time is shortened 
by physical factors not yet recognized or accepted--or if external forces 
are brought to bear on our society-then manifestly the democratic 
process will not prevail and the nature of our society will change drasti-
cally. For the moment it appears that we have the option to adapt our 
society to new energy conditions in a fashion meeting the composite 
national social, economic, and political choice. We can exercise this 
option only if we use wisely whatever time is available to us to work out 
our salvation. But the time available may be less than many of us think. 
National security as defined by the energy issue is then not simply a 
matter of defending against external threats or becoming embroiled in 
wars abroad-although these risks are real and are perhaps increasing. 
The internal security of our country is also necessarily a matter of 
national security concern. Because of the ubiquitous effects of energy 
supply and use in our society, it is apparent even now that major fuel 
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shortages and a failure to undertake conservation and to develop alterna-
tive supplies in a timely manner could lead to severe conditions of 
economic depression, social unrest, violence, and political peril. Simi-
larly, the threat of those dangers could cause us to undertake wars for 
which we are ill prepared. Or, under duress and without the arms to 
undertake wars beyond our continent, our unattended energy needs 
could lead us into a condition of international obloquy should we under-
take the invasion of Mexico, Canada, or Venezuela to wrest from them 
their energy resources. Such tragic ventures would absolve us of energy 
problems for only very short periods. 
The 1980s promise to be a decade of great energy uncertainty with a 
high potential for domestic unrest and international conflict in eco-
nomic, political, and perhaps military terms. Great demands will be 
placed upon the American political system if peaceful solutions are to 
obtain. 
One major feature of our political system has been in abeyance for 
over two decades. This is the second-term presidency. We have not, 
except for a brief and unhappy period, had a second-term president 
since Eisenhower. A second-term president is, politically speaking, a 
different animal from a first-term president. The first-term president 
acts to achieve reelection. The second-term president responds to a 
sense of history. His influence over the Congress and with the public is 
substantially greater. It may be that our ability as a people to face the 
unpleasant issues raised by the energy and national security question 
will be largely determined by whether we choose during the 80s to elect 
a president for the second term. 
The energy situation, then, involves the entire spectrum of national 
policy. It reflects the alternatives of poverty and plenty, war and peace. 
In effect, the question posed by the national security and energy situa-
tion is whether a democracy can make the decisions necessary for its 
survival before being overwhelmed by the most obvious of crises. 
And yet there is hope. If we can husband our resources and work our 
way intelligently through the dangers of the next decade or so, there is 
every prospect that we may reach a plateau of sustainable and reason-
able energy plenty in a world at peace. But our persistent personal 
exertions as citizens are necessary to this end. The epitaph of the great 
American experiment in democracy should not be: "Canceled because 
of lack of energy. " 
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Bibliographical Essay 
The most complete bibliography for this work is contained in the 
notes for the various chapters. The following comments are intended 
only to indicate some of the more important sources upon which I have 
drawn and to suggest useful introductions to the fields and problems 
discussed. 
Interdisciplinary studies are always difficult in America because of 
the rigid and jealously guarded departmentalized control of academic 
fields. Nevertheless, my experience of the last two years as chairman of 
the Energy and International Affairs Working Group at The Ohio State 
University has convinced me that interdisciplinary studies are the most 
appropriate way of addressing major problems in our society. Most 
major energy studies result from such efforts, since no single discipline 
provides the insights necessary to approach reality. A single scholar can 
argue a more cohesive case, but he is vulnerable in his solitude. In my 
own case, I write as a political scientist with a previous background of 
twenty-seven years as a naval officer with experience mostly focusing 
on the operation of nuclear-powered submarines and strategic operations. 
Therefore in the preparation of this work it was necessary for me to read 
deeply in the works of scholars in many different fields as well as of 
people in various areas of business and government-and to sit at their 
feet as a pupil. The experience has been stimulating. I hope that I have 
transmitted their variegated viewpoints and information logically and 
correctly. If not, the fault is mine, not theirs. 
Not until the early 1970s were many books published on the subject 
of energy per se. Most relevant books tended to deal with oil, or coal, or 
natural gas, or nuclear power, or electrical power distribution as unre-
lated entities. The most useful sources at the beginning of my work on 
this book were probably those evolved by the staffs of the various 
congressional committees inquiring into energy and assisted by the re-
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doubtable Congressional Research Service, for which I have formed a 
great respect. The document Energy Statistics printed for the Senate 
Committee on Finance in July 1975, while now obsolete, is a case in 
point. Similarly a good deal of information in the book stems from the 
published (and some unpublished) versions of hearings conducted in the 
Capitol during and after the Arab oil embargo. The Congressional 
Record was also a constant source of reference, although more for the 
capturing of attitudes than for factual information. Major U.S. oil com-
panies, notably Exxon and Shell, made available on request excellent 
statistical summaries and projections, as did the British Petroleum 
Company. The Alliance to Save Energy, of whose Board of Advisors I 
am a proud member, made available a very useful and extensive press 
clipping service which is used in their internal office affairs. The 
publication Energy Daily and the journals Energy Policy (British) and 
Energy Communications (U.S.) were continuing sources of reference. 
Helpful technical data and useful book reviews were found in the jour-
nal Energy Research Reports. 
As books and major government reports began to emerge on energy, 
it became apparent that most of them worked from assumptions best 
described as ideological perspectives. This was just as true of the Proj-
ect Independence Report published in 1974 by the FEA, the Ford Founda-
tion Report of the same year, the American Enterprise Institute works 
written in rebuttal to the Ford Report, later works sponsored by Re-
sources for the Future and the Friends of the Earth as it was, for example, 
of pamphlets published by the Exxon Corporation and the Chase Man-
hattan Bank. 
Each of these works (and others) provided specialized viewpoints 
and information that seemed reasonable even if contradictory. It became 
obvious that not only should this book deal in ideological 
perspectives--it should, as a major theme, also emphasize the element 
of uncertainty in our energy affairs. 
By 1979 the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy had begun putting out an excellent series of statistical 
information, particularly in its reports to Congress. It was still useful to 
match these data against information provided, for instance, by the U.S. 
Geological Survey. The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
published by the Office of the Federal Register proved a useful source 
for presidential statements, although copies of energy-related speeches 
and accompanying "fact sheets" were generally requested of the Office 
of the White House Press Secretary, since press treatment of the fact 
sheets tended to be at best erratic. On the other hand, the fact sheets 
sometimes introduced dubious propositions also. 
Bibliographical Essay 225 
For technical data considerable reliance was placed on energy arti-
cles published by Science, particularly those edited by Philip H. Abel-
son and Allen L. Hammond in the two volumes of Energy: Use, 
Conservation, and Supply. My commentary on shale oil was made 
possible through the courtesy of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 
which permitted a visit to their test site in Colorado and discussions with 
their engineers as well as interviews with principal officers of the corpo-
ration, including Armand Hammer. 
The examination of congressional and presidential policy relative to 
energy through 1978 was assisted by the book Energy Policy, published 
in April 1979 by Congressional Quarterly, Inc. of Washington, D.C. 
The chapter on policy analysis in the 5th edition of Felix Nigro's and 
Lloyd G. Nigro's Modern Public Administration (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1977) has been of great assistance. Introduction to the Study 
of Public Policy (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), 
by Charles 0. Jones, was also helpful in arguing the case of public 
versus private control and expenditures in the energy area. A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), by 
Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, was particularly useful in 
assisting in the analysis of what could be expected of energy production 
efforts in the U.S. private sector. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking 
Reexamined (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968) provided 
considerable insight into the workings of the public sector's bureaucracy 
and suggested useful analytic tools. 
The paper "World Shipping at Risk: The Looming Threat to the 
Lifelines," by Admiral of the Fleet the Lord Hill-Norton in Conflict 
Studies, no. 111 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979) was 
illuminating as was subsequent correspondence from the admiral com-
menting on Chapter 8 in this book. 
In the preface to this work an apology of sorts is made for the high 
level of reference to the so-called gray literature of government reports, 
especially compilations of hearings, and the popular press. Here, as in 
the preface, this bibliographic source is defended on the grounds that it 
is through these sources that governmental leaders and the informed 
public form their opinions on matters of public policy. It was important 
for the purpose of this book to detail what our people and its leaders 
perceive as reality as much as to attempt a description of reality itself. 
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